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Abstract 
The concept of 'ageism' has often been thought to be of limited moral concern, 
especially in comparison to other forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism. 
Nevertheless, there are also those who believe that ageism is morally significant, and 
there are diametrically opposed views within liberal and egalitarian theory as to 
whether age discrimination is or is not just. 
This thesis has two objectives. Firstly, it seeks to overcome the apparent vagueness of 
the concept that has given rise to such diametrically opposed views concerning 
ageism by examining exactly what the phenomenon involves. It defines the 
wrongfulness of much age discrimination as originating in either the nature of the 
reasons for which people discriminate against the old or the nature of the 
consequences for the individuals affected. In the course of the thesis I make several 
important distinctions, the most important of which are between the social and moral 
worth of a person, and between the synchronic and diachronic interests of a person. 
These distinctions allow us to distinguish between a culturally oppressive ageism and 
ageism that is justified by reasons of equality and efficiency. The former is 
intrinsically morally wrong, the latter extrinsically wrong. 
The second aim of the thesis is to develop an anti-ageist ethical principle capable of 
challenging both forms of ageism in a comprehensive way, and which is consistent 
with a broader liberal egalitarian political theory. This is achieved by drawing on the 
distinction between the irreducible nature of each person's synchronic and diachronic 
interests. I have identified the principle that we should protect the synchronic interests 
of older persons with a democratic social egalitarianism that seeks to equalise the 
social relations between citizens rather than concentrating upon an equality of 
distribution. It is in this way that I also connect the debate about the morality (or 
otherwise) of age discrimination with debates within contemporary liberal egalitarian 
philosophy. 
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Introduction 
As with any other issue of political morality there are a range of positions that might 
be taken on the issue of ageism. However, unlike other forms of discrimination, age 
discrimination seems to illicit diametrically opposed viewpoints within mainstream 
political thinking. Many writers, particularly those involved in medical ethics and 
healthcare economics, justify adverse discrimination against the old as a necessary, if 
unfortunate, consequence of pursuing justice between the complete lives of separate 
individuals. Others, however, express the view that ageism is 'no less vicious a form 
of discrimination than racism and sexism, and there can be nothing 'fair' in its 
application to resource application. " The fact that age discrimination may be either 
wholly justified or wholly unjustified makes it an interesting subject of study. 
Moreover, part of the reason for this disagreement may be that thinkers either justify 
or condemn age discrimination without really examining what it involves. 
My own thinking about the morality or otherwise of age discrimination was first 
aroused by reading an article by Geoffrey Cupit which tries to make intelligible the 
intuition held by some that age discrimination is unjUSt. 2 Cupit notes that 'the alleged 
injustice of age discrimination presents a puzzle' because the 'Standard argument 
against discrimination - the argument from equalizing benefits - seems not to apply. 3 
It doesn't apply because equalizing benefits over the complete lives of separate 
'Oliver Leaman, 'Justifying ageism, ' in A. Harry Lesser (ed. ),, 4geing,. 4utonomyandResources 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 180-187, p 187. 
2 Geoffirey Cupit, 'Justice, Age, and Veneration, ' Ethics 108 (1998): 702-718. 
3 lbid, p702. 
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persons might actuallyjustify age discrimination rather than challenge it. It does this 
for the obvious fact that each of us has a turn to be old, and, by taking turns to be 
well-off or badly-off, temporal or synchronic inequalities will even out over the 
course of people's lives. Thus, as Cupit notes, to say something is wrong with age 
discrimination seems to suggest there is something wrong with taking turns. 
The argument that Cupit develops in order to express the anti-ageist intuition is that of 
status. He claims that each of us has an equal moral status, and the injustice of age 
discrimination has its real source in that equal status not being respected throughout 
one's life. Thus, age discrimination is not a comparative injustice in the same way as 
sexism or racism are, and the injustice it involves is 'not in the inappropriate 
treatment of some people in comparison to others, but as far as it is comparative, in 
the inappropriate treatment of people in comparison to their earlier (or later) selves. A 
%ile defming status is a complex issue, what Cupit's argument implies is that age 
discrimination is wrong because it treats persons differently at one point in their lives 
to the way they are treated at another point. 
However, Cupit, along with almost every other writer on the subject, assumes that 
there is only one form of ageism, and that it is either defensible or indefensible 
depending upon the force of the arguments provided. However, it seems to me that 
there are at least two very different categories of ageism which are wrong for different 
reasons. One category of ageism is similar to sexism and racism in that it involves 
negative cultural judgements regarding the moral and social worth of the old, just as 
racism and sexism do for blacks or women. I will argue that this form of 'cultural 
lbid, p709. 
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ageism' is intrinsically morally wrong. The second category of ageism does not 
involve these judgements. Instead, it justifies age discrimination on the basis that it 
either ensures a greater diachronic equality of benefits over the complete lives of 
separate persons, or a greater efficiency of distribution of scarce resources. 
Discrimination motivated by both efficiency and diachronic equality are not 
intrinsically wrong because they do not involve negative moral judgements regarding 
those discriminated against. Nevertheless, as I will argue, these forms of age 
discrimination may still be wrong for extrinsic moral reasons: i. e. that they treat 
people inappropriately in comparison with their earlier selves. What it means to be 
treated inappropriately will be explained below. Nevertheless, once it has been 
established what ageism is, we need to show how it can be challenged within 
egalitarian political theory, bearing in mind Cupit's insight that the ahn to equalise 
benefits endorsed by most contemporary egalitarians will actually condone that form 
of discrimination. I should also note here that the thesis focuses mainly upon wrongful 
discrimination motivated by normative egalitarian reasons, or 'egalitarian ageism', 
rather than efficiency reasons. 
The purpose of the thesis, therefore, is twofold. Firstly, following the efforts of Cupit, 
it seeks to make more intelligible the intuition that some forms of age discrimination 
are morally wrong. One caveat that should be noted is that I understand the term age- 
discrimination to involve any discrimination against either the old or young, while the 
term ageism refers to the two wrongful forms of discrimination against the old 
outlined above. Once an anti-ageist ethical view has been structured and defended the 
second aim of the thesis is to situate that view within an egalitarian political theory, 
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one that would both defend anti-ageist social policies and challenge the age 
discrimination that other egalitarian theories justify. 
Chapter one begins by discussing some of the social contexts in which age 
discrimination is often thought to either currently exist or to be theoretically justified, 
and it aims to show how cultural ageism and egalitarian reasoning motivate ageist 
policies. The chapter then reviews the recent emergence of anti-ageist legislation, 
identifies the inadequacy of that legislation, and finally outlines the challenge that 
anti-ageists face in the light of this discussion. That anti-ageist challenge is to develop 
an ethical argument that can achieve three things: It must suggest a strategy that can 
challenge negative cultural stereotypes while not impinging upon the liberty of 
individuals; it must suggest principles that constrain egalitarian distributions to the 
extent that they justify age discrimination as a consequence of diachronic equality; 
and those same principles would need to constrain considerations of efficiency. 
Chapter two attempts to clarify the debate over the justness of age discrimination by 
first investigating the particular interests of individuals that are harmed by ageist 
policies. This project is at the heart of constructing an anti-ageist ethical position, and 
it makes two important distinctions: firstly, between judgements of moral and social 
worth; and secondly, between the synchronic and diachronic interests that a person 
has. The difference between moral and social worth is the difference between the 
intrinsic worth of a person and the perceived instrumental worth of a citizen to 
society. Someone may posses either one without the other. Liberals would always 
refute judgements that certain citizens embodied negative moral worth merely on 
account of their age. I would argue, however, that both negative moral and social 
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judgements constitute wrongful cultural ageism, and that anti-ageists must make a 
case for challenging them both as distinctive elements of the same phenomenon. 
The distinction I make between the diachronic and synchronic; interests of persons 
draws on the work of several contemporary philosophers. 5 These thinkers claim that 
on the one hand individuals have long-term, life-time projects and goals that we each 
have diachronic interests in pursuing, and that those interests include such things as 
having access to as wide a range of opportunities as possible to follow careers and 
develop relationships, and in having the material benefits to facilitate the pursuit of 
those opportunities. On the other hand, however, individuals also have synchronic 
interests, and a certain class of these are fundamental in the sense that they have 
special moral concern. These are the interests we have at any temporal moment of our 
lives to have sufficient resources to ensure our basic needs are met, to be at least 
minimally autonomous, and to enjoy the social conditions of self-respect. I follow 
David Velleman and Elizabeth Anderson in claiming that these diachronic and 
synchronic; interests are not reducible to one another, and in some cases may even 
conflict. It is my claim that most contemporary egalitarian theories give exclusive 
concern to a diachronic equality of opportunity, and that as a consequence the 
fundamental synchronic interests of older individuals are often neglected. The final 
part of the chapter structures a classification or taxonomy of the various forms of age 
discrimination, which is grounded on both the reasons that motivate them and the 
degree to which their consequences are harmful. 
5 J. David Velleman, 'Well-Being and Time, ' in his The Possibility ofPractical Reason (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000): 56-84; Alasdair Macintyre, After Virute: A Study in Moral Virtue Second 
Edition (London, Duckworth, 1985), chapter 15; Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
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It is this idea that individuals have both synchronic and diachronic interests, and that 
each person's fundamental synchronic interests have an equal claim of justice, that I 
think makes sense of Cupit's claim that the injustice of age discrimination lies 'in the 
mappropriate treatment of people in comparison to their earlier (or later) selves. ' The 
source of injustice is found in the degree to which the synchronic interests of the 
young are respected while the same interests of the old are not. If these synchronic 
interests are equally important for all persons irrespective of their age, then it is 
morally wrong to neglect the interests of some people and not others on account of 
their age. And this would be the case even if the ultimate aim was to either ensure an 
equal diachronic share of benefits for each person or a more efficient use of scarce 
resources. This, then, is the ethical principle that I believe supports the anti-ageist 
intuition: that there are moral reasons to give equal concern to the fundamental 
synchronic interests of persons irrespective of their age. 
Chapter three examines cultural ageism in greater detail, and it defines it as an 
oppressive ideology which involves a dynamic between socially constructed groups 
and cultural stereotypes. I argue that ageist stereotypes exist prior to the assumption 
that the elderly constitute a social group, and that to effectively challenge cultural 
ageism we must challenge the accuracy and rationality of these stereotypes about the 
old. It is in this part of the thesis that the analogy between ageism on the one hand and 
racism and sexism on the other is analysed in greater detail, and while there are 
similarities and parallels between cultural ageism and those other forms of cultural 
oppression there are also significant differences. The chapter examines the actual 
response of much liberal egalitarian theory to the existence of cultural oppression 
generally, and I describe Andrew Kernohan's advocacy strategy that I believe anti- 
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ageists should adopt if they are to effectively challenge this category of ageism even 
within an egalitarian society. 6 This strategy seeks to persuade people of the fallacy of 
ageist cultural stereotypes by using the economic, educational and ideological power 
of the liberal state without resorting to censorship. The advocacy strategy therefore 
differs from both perfectionism and the traditional laissez faire attitude that liberals 
have to cultural values. 
Chapters 4 to 6 examine the egalitarian forms of ageism and its justification in much 
contemporary liberal philosophy. As noted, ageism motivated by a concern for 
efficiency will be extrinsically wrong. for the same reasons as that motivated by 
equality. Chapter 4 starts by outlining the difference between a purely distributive 
economic egalitarianism and a broader social and political egalitarian ideal. I claim 
that it is within the former that egalitarian ageism is condoned and that only within the 
latter can it be effectively challenged. Distributive egalitarianism focuses upon the 
complete lives of citizens and aims to ensure that each person has an equal diachronic, 
share of benefits over her complete life. This has been called the complete life view 
(CLV), and it embodies the problem identified by Cupit that 'the argument form 
equalising benefits is a poor basis on which to try to account for any intuition that age 
discrimination is unjust. )7 The CLV itself is justified by two fundamental values. It 
views diachronic equality as the fairest system of economic distribution and it claims 
to enforce the independent moral principle that individuals should be responsible for 
the success of their own lives. 
6 Andrew Kernohan, Liberalism, Equality and Cultural Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). Although Kernohan himself does not discuss cultural ageism he does allude to the old as 
a group that is subject to cultural oppression (see pp5O-5 1), and I expand on this below. 
' Cupit, 'Justice, Age, and Veneration, ' p705. 
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The social ideal of equality, a recent version of which has been described as 
democratic egalitarianism (DE), has the fundamental goal of promoting and 
maintaining relations of social equality between citizens, and it views economic 
distribution as a secondary or derivative issue. 8 DE would challenge egalitarian 
ageism because such discrimination would invariably involve social relations of 
inequality between citizens even if their diachronic shares of benefits were equal. It is 
thus within DE that I believe the anti-ageist ethical view can be best represented. 
Chapter 5 examines the CLV and its ageist implications in more detail and compares 
it with various alternative views about possible synchronic distributions of resources 
or welfare between citizens. It also compares these views with the 'fair innings 
argument' (FIA) that claims that people are only entitled to a certain (and perhaps 
equal) length of life, and with the concept of the QALY. The chapter argues that both 
the CLV and the synchronic alternatives have implausible implications, and that the 
best possible distributive view is a hybrid of the two. Unfortumtely, this too suffers 
from difficulties, though these are with practicality rather than moral plausibility. 
Chapter 6 argues that the CLV logically adopts a prudential analogy (PA) to 
detennine the rational way that a finite diachronic share of benefits would be 
distributed over the course of one life. This thought experiment would then be 
replicated within society in order to structure the tax and welfare institutions of a just 
state. The chapter examines how the PA functions within the work of two of the most 
prominent contemporary liberal thinkers. Part of the force of the PA is that it views 
3 Elizabeth S. Anderson, 'What Is the Point of Equality? ' Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337; Samuel 
Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism? ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39. 
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the different age-groups as different stages within the same life, and consequently the 
interests the young and old no longer need to be viewed as being in conflict. 
However, we can only do this by denying the importance of synchronic interests, and 
therefore, the chapter claims, the PA provides further justification of discrimination 
against the old in ways that frustrate their fundamental synchronic interests. 
Finally, in chapter 7,1 return to the social ideal of democratic egalitarianism and the 
principle of equalising social relations (ESR) that I first described in chapter 4. Within 
this concluding chapter I show how the hybrid model of economic distribution 
outlined in chapter 5 might be implemented within that social ideal. By incorporating 
this model the social ideal can protect both the diachronic and synchronic interests of 
persons as defined in chapter 2. And, by protecting both forms of interest, DE can 
both avoid egalitarian ageism as well as embrace the advocacy strategy that 
challenges the cultural ageism outlined in chapter 3. DE undermines intuitive support 
for the CLV both by refuting the idea that diachronic equality is the fairest system of 
economic distribution, and by simultaneously incorporating the principle of individual 
responsibility. Finally, the chapter returns to the four social contexts discussed in 
chapter I and briefly examines how DE and the principle of ESR would challenge the 
age discrimination found within those contexts. 
What this thesis achieves, therefore, is not only a greater understanding of the nature 
of ageism and what makes it wrongful, or that the anti-ageist ethical principle is 
compatible with a broader egalitarian philosophy. The thesis also links the 
discrimination of the practical ethical problem of how we should treat the old with a 
wider contemporary debate within egalitarian political philosophy. By showing that 
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DE can refute or incorporate the justifications of the CLV the theory is shown to be an 
important and morally plausible alternative to the mainstream distributive egalitarian 
views. 
13 
Chapter One: Ageism as a concern of social justice 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline both the defences and challenges to ageism 
and age discrimination that have developed over recent years, and to do so in a 
number of social contexts including health care, income distribution, citizenship 
rights, and employment. The chapter will also note the emergence of anti-ageist 
legislation and critique the reasons for that emergence. Any discussion of ageism, 
however, should begin with an analysis of the nature of discrimination per se. 
1.1 The concepts of discrimination and ageism: Some preliminary remarks 
In his entry for the Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, Harry Lesser notes that the 
concept of ageism is of 'recent coinage', that it is generally based on the models of 
'racism' and 'sexism', and can be defined 'as wrongfiil or unjustified adverse 
discrimination on the grounds of age'. 9 One aim of this thesis is to go beyond that 
definition and determine what makes discrimination on grounds of age wrongful. Any 
form of discrimination may be 'adverse' to the interests of the individuals affected, 
but it is a further question as to whether that discrimination is also 'wrongful'. 
Discrimination per se has very much become a morally laden term. As Peter Singer 
notes, 'discrimination' is a term that has the dual function of being both descriptive 
and evaluative and these terms are often conflated. 10 If a public policy or social 
practice is described as discriminatory it can automatically bring with it evaluative 
implications that may not be justified. These evaluative implications mean that to 
Harry Lesser, 'Ageism, ' Encyclopedia ofApplied Ethics, Volume I (Academic Press, 1998), p87. 
10 Peter Singer, 'Equality- Is Racial Discrimination Arbitrarý' in Jan Narveson (ed. ), Moral issues 
(Toronto, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983): 308-324, p309. 
14 
accuse someone or some thing of being discriminatory is often seen as a term of 
attack, though, at the same time, to call someone an ageist does not have the same 
resonance as calling someone a racist. As Oliver Leaman notes, 'while many people 
feel guilty at admitting to racist or sexist attitudes, ageist attitudes do not tend to gain 
the same opprobrium'. " 
We therefore need to be careful with the specification of terms, and we need to 
distance the term discrimination from its emotive use and to understand it in a 
dispassionate sense. To discriminate means only to make a distinction between 
persons on the basis of reasons, and it is these reasons, and the consequences that flow 
from discrimination based upon them, that determine whether a form of 
discrimination is morally wrong or morally benign. Even if social institutions and 
officials discriminate against people of a certain race, gender or age in the allocation 
of goods and services, the practice simply involves the favouring of one category of 
person over another. There is nothing integral to the term that makes such 
discrimination necessarily wrong. 
When someone experiences 'adverse' discrimination, then, there are certain interests 
of that agent that are either neglected or thwarted as a consequence of a 
discriminatory practice. But again, this definition in itself does not mean that adverse 
discrimination is wrong, and people in fact suffer legitimate adverse discrimination all 
the time within the contexts of job recruitment and in the allocation of university 
places. If I am an unsuccessful candidate for either of these goods, and the selection 
"Oliver Leaman, 'Justifying Ageism, ' in A. Harry Lesser (ed. ) Ageing, Autonomy andResources 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 180-188, p 182. 
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process has been fair, then I have been legitimately discriminated against on the basis 
of my merit, qualifications and experience. Although my interests in having the job 
that I want or the university place of my choice have been adversely affected these 
forms of adverse discrimination are not wrong. They are not wrongful so long as the 
discriminatory decision was based upon criteria aimed at determining expected 
performance within either the job or on the university course. Adverse discrimination 
that is based partly upon what are often thought to be non-performance criteria, like 
race and gender, are more problematic. Nevertheless, as many who support various 
forms of positive discrimination might argue, such discrimination is not always 
obviously wrong even then. 
We are also not helped in our attempt to define the wrongfulness of any 
discrimination to simply label the trait on which individuals are discriminated against 
as 'irrelevant'. As Larry Alexander argues, that merely begs the question of what 
makes it irrelevant: the trait is obviously relevant to those who wish to discriminate on 
its basis. 12 Moreover, as Geoffrey Cupit points out, '[t]he mere fact that a distribution 
is made on the basis of an 'irrelevant' consideration does not make that distribution 
unfair. ' 13 The street number of one's house may seem an irrelevant ground for the 
distribution of water for gardening, but that does not make it unjust for the council to 
impose a hosepipe ban on even-numbered houses on alternative days of the week. 
It might be suggested that it is wrong to use the mere fact of chronological age as 
grounds for adverse discrimination because, as with any other form of wrongful 
12 Larry Alexander, 'What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes, 
and Proxies, ' University qfPennsylvania Review 141 (1992): pp 149-219. 
13 Geoffrey Cupit, 'Justice, Age, and Veneration, ' Dhics 108 (1998): 702-718, p7O4. 
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discrimination, it arbitrarily defmes individuals as members of a social group, in this 
case the 'elderly', and it therefore does not treat them as individuals. However, this 
also fails to define the wrongfulness of ageism because if we look at discrimination 
per se we find that simply categorizing people according to a particular defming 
feature and discriminating against them on that basis does not necessarily constitute 
an immoral action. For example, if I were a passenger in a particular train carriage in 
which a violent crime had taken place, then it is not immoral that I am inconvenienced 
as a consequence by being held back and interviewed by the authorities seeking the 
culprit. The defming feature that puts me in to the arbitrary group of 'crime suspects' 
is the fact that I was in the train carriage at the time. 
It might be argued that it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of an immutable trait 
for which one is not responsible. Old age may be thought of as an immutable trait 
because, although a person has not always been old, once they are it is a feature they 
can only escape with death. Naturally, discrimination on the basis of immutable traits 
is not always adverse, and discrimination on the basis of chronological age is in fact 
often favourable to older people. A current example of such favourable age 
discrimination within health care is the provision of free influenza injections to older 
people who are more likely to become seriously ill and develop pneumonia. 14 
However, if it is not wrong to defme the old on the basis of their immutable trait in 
the case that the discrimination is beneficial, then why should it be wrong if the 
discrimination should be adverse? In any case, some examples of unfavourable 
discrimination on the basis of an immutable trait do seem acceptable. For example, 
"A cynic might say that the primary reason the government offers free influenza injections to older 
people is not simply to prevent unnecessary suffering, but because it is a great deal cheaper to inoculate 
the elderly against the disease than to pay for the care of numerous old people each year being admitted 
to acute hospitals with pneumonia. Nevertheless, the elderly directly benefit from the policy. 
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blindness is an immutable trait but there seems nothing obviously wrong with 
discriminating against blind people who wish to become bus drivers. Moreover, the 
categorization of persons on the basis of an immutable trait could not exclusively 
defme the wrongfulness of discrimination because discrimination on the basis of 
many mutable traits is also thought to be wrong. Discrimination on the basis of 
religious affiliation is an obvious example. 
A more subtle approach to determining the wrongness of discrimination generally is 
to look at the historical and contemporary socio-economic position of the individuals 
that comprise the social groups discriminated against. Blacks will earn relatively less 
than whites on the whole, and women earn less than men. However, the social and 
economic position of victims of discrimination in fact merely represents a symptom of 
the discrimination, and although the fact that such consequences occur may be part of 
what is wrong with wrongful discrimination, such an approach does not explain why 
the discrimination occurs in the first place. Moreover, although there are many very 
poor older persons in the real world of contemporary society, there are also a large 
number who are very well off. But the existence of wealthy old people, as with the 
existence of wealthy blacks, does not at the same time discount the existence of 
wrongful discrimination. 
It would appear, therefore, that we cannot determine that a form of discrimination in 
general or ageism in particular is wrong simply because it has adverse effects, or that 
it is arbitrary, or that it is based upon an 'irrelevant' or 'immutable' feature, or that 
those discriminated against are members of a socio-economic group that has 
historically fared badly. The primary focus of this thesis is age discrimination, and, as 
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noted in the Introduction, I am arguing that there is not just one category of ageism 
but two; cultural ageism and egalitarian ageism. Most anti-ageists have described 
ageism only in terms of negative cultural assumptions, and, like Steve Scrutton, they 
merely argue that ageism 'creates and fosters prejudices about the nature and 
experience of old age. ' 15 Although the attitudes and stereotypes that dominate society 
are not shared by all they are unquestioned by most. This understanding is 
undoubtedly true of 'cultural ageism', but if ageism involved only negative attitudes 
then all mainstream liberal political theories would reject any ageist policies that 
adversely affected older people. This is not the case, however, and the issue is 
complicated by the fact that many liberal egalitarians either explicitly or implicitly 
justify some age discrimination. In response to this complexity I argue that there are 
two elements that determine the wrongfulness of discrimination in general, which are 
firstly, the nature of the reasons for which we discriminate, and secondly, the degree 
to which the consequences that flow from that discrimination are harmful to certain 
fundamental interests that all persons have. In the context of age I define the term 
6ageism' to constitute only urongful age discrimination, which means that not all 
discrimination on the basis of age would count as ageism. 
1.2 Ageism: The emergence of a concept 
Having made some preliminary definitions we should set the scene of the current 
ageist debate. We have noted that the concept of ageism is very recent. The earliest 
use of the concept of ageism was by the psychiatrist Robert Butler who saw parallels 
15 Steve Scrutton, 'Ageism: The Foundations of Age Discrimination, ' in Evelyn McEwen, The 
Unrecognised Discrimination, (London: Age Concern England, 1990), p 13. 
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between the generational conflict between students and police on American campuses 
in the 1960s with those between the middle aged and the elderly in residential housing 
projects. Ageism was seen by Butler to have close parallels with racism and sexism, 
and he defmed the former 'as a process of systematic stereotyping of and 
discrimination against people because they are old, just as racism and sexism 
accomplish this for skin colour and gender'. 16 As we will see below there are several 
reasons why the parallels between ageism on the one hand and racism and sexism on 
the other have been challenged, but it is important to note that Butler's coining of the 
term, and the recognition of the existence of the phenomenon, had its roots in a 
society seeking to promote wider civil rights for what were perceived as the oppressed 
members of certain social groups. 
'Ageism' was then used as an evaluative term to challenge the dominance of 
'disengagement theory' within gerontology and sociology in the 1950s and 1960s, 17 a 
theory that some believe continues to have strong influence on most people's 
thinking. 18 The theory was thought to be ageist because it uncritically accepted 
negative stereotypes of the elderly and even sought to justify them. Disengagement 
theory explains the condition of old age as a process of role adaptation and suggests 
that ageing involves gradual and progressive withdrawal by older individuals from 
social roles and obligations, and a corresponding lowering of the expectations that 
others have of them. This process of disengagement supposedly takes place on three 
levels; social, individual, and psychological. On the social level older people are 
" Robert Butler, 'Ageism: a forward, ' Journal ofSocial Issues 36 (1980): 8-11, p9. 
17 See E. Cuumming & W. Henry, Growing Old. - 7he Process of Disengagement (New York: Basic 
Books, 1961). 
'a John A. Vincent, Inequality and Old, 4ge (London: UCL Press, 1995), p 154. 
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eased out of roles in which they are no longer able to function effectively (perhaps as 
paid employees), and their place is taken by younger persons in order that society can 
continue to work efficiently. On the individual level older persons can conserve their 
diminishing energies by fulfilling fewer and less demanding roles, perhaps as 
grandparents. And at the psychological level disengagement allows an emotional 
a ustment rt preparation r eat . 
The assumptions that underlie disengagement theory, that older people are in an 
inevitable process of progressive physical and intellectual decline, that the older a 
person is the less adaptable and capable they are, and the idea that it is beneficial to 
society that they are marginalised, are all in fact cultural stereotypes. The 
incorporation of these stereotypes in to a theory designed to explain the condition of 
the elderly today fails to question whether this degenerative condition is a necessary 
one for all old people even if it may be for some, and it does not question whether 
justice might require that people have the opportunity to remain productive and 
socially included members of society irrespective of age. Some sociologists have 
more recently criticised, much gerontological theory along these lines and have argued 
that the discipline has tended to explain 'the problems of the aged as consequences of 
the individual's deterioration and decline', 19 rather than to challenge the assumptions 
that lie behind those problems. 
However, despite the charge that established theory and many social practices are 
ageist the phenomenon has rarely been seen as a serious social, political and moral 
" J. Levin & W. C. Levin, Ageism: Prejudice and Discrimination Against the Elderly (Belmontý CA: 
Wadsworth, 1980), pix. 
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issue. In 1980 Bill Bytheway, one of the few to attempt to develop and clarify the 
concept, recognised the fact that ageism was generally perceived to be little more than 
a joke . 
20 Ten years later the title of a collection of essays on ageism published by Age 
Concern acknowledged the fact that this form of discrimination continued to be 
largely 'unrecognised %2 1 However, while the idea of anti-ageism was dismissed as a 
joke by many, the use of chronological age as a basis on which to treat people 
differently and unfavourably was increasingly justified in several contexts. There 
have, for example, been an increasing number of health economists, and writers on 
medical ethics, who have viewed age discrimination that adversely affected the old as 
an unfortunate but necessary consequence of pursuing a particular conception of 
fairness: that is fairness between the complete separate lives of persons rather than 
just between the young and old. There have also been justifications presented for 
discriminating against the old in the distribution of income, the distribution of 
electoral rights and in employment, and each of these will be examined in more detail 
in the next section below. 
1.3 Ageism in context 
The aim of this section is to examine the various sources of motivation for ageist 
policies within four social contexts. These contexts will be returned to briefly in 
chapter 7 to show how the arguments presented in the thesis can be used in practice to 
support non-ageist or anti-ageist positions within them. 
20 Bill Byetheway, 'Is Ageism just ajoke? 'New. 4ge 12 (1980): 29-30. 
" Evelyn McEwen (ed. ), Age: The Unrecognised Discrimination (London: Age Concem England, 
1990). 
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(i) Healthcare 
There is evidence that the negative cultural judgements regarding older people that are 
prevalent in society are also shared by some hospital stafý and this manifests as a 
reluctance to work with the elderly and in the patronising ways in which they often 
communicate with them. 22 Alison Norman argues that within the professional medical 
field of gerontology '[w]ork with old people is not a prestigious occupation and there 
is a vicious circle in that jobs with low prestige tend to attract unambitious or less 
skilled workers, or those who because of racial or social discrimination or competing 
domestic responsibilities cannot get work elsewhere. 23 This suggests that because an 
underlying ageist ideology devalues old age, and older citizens, it also devalues the 
work of professionals charged with caring for them. 
The consequence of this ageist ideology is that, at the very least, older individuals will 
receive less than equal care from medical and social service professionals and 
auxiliary staff. ne Kings Fund has identified the existence of similar negative 
attitudes towards the elderly among residential and nursing home staff 24 One 
investigation in to the Nye Bevan Lodge Residential home in 1988 found that 
residents had been illegally deprived of their money, made to queue naked for the 
baths, and suffered regular physical and sexual assault. 25 
22 S. Lookinland & K. Anson, 'Perpetuation of Ageist Attitudes among Present and Future Healthcare 
Personnel: Implications for Elder Care, 'Journal ofAdývancedNursing 21 (1995): 47-56. 
23 Alison Norman,. 4spects of, 4geism:. 4 Discussion Paper (London: Centre for Policy in Ageing, 
1987), p5. 
24 S. Farrell, J. Robinson & P. Fletcher,. 4 New Erafor Community Care? What People wantfrom 
health; housing andsocial care services (London: Kings Fund, 1999). 
25 Scrutton, 'Ageism: The Foundations of Age Discrimination', p22. 
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In such instances individual care staff have acted in a vicious way towards the 
vulnerable persons in their care and it might be suggested that these care staff were 
merely sadistic bullies; the fact that the victims were old not necessarily having 
anything to do with the abuse. Certainly there will always be bullies and sadists to 
prey upon the vulnerable. However, what the authors of these reports argue is that the 
abuse is secondary to socially held beliefs that stereotype the older person as 
meaningless, expendable, and ultimately of less intrinsic moral worth. Indeed, Margot 
Jeffries argues that 'elder abuse' such as this 'is probably more common than the few 
cases which receive publicity would indicate'. 26 This sort of clahn is supported by 
Mike Brogden who argues that there is in fact a widespread illegal killing of the 
elderly that goes unchecked (mostly by medical and nursing staff or other carers), and 
that such 'geronticide ... could not occur without the dominance of an ideology of 
ageism'. 27 Such an ageist ideology is clearly as destructive for older persons as racist 
ideology can be for members of particular racial and ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, even if cultural ageism within the health service does not lead to 
humiliation, physical violence, and death, it often leads to discrimination that most 
people would find unfair. The most obvious forms of direct discrimination involve the 
arbitrary use of upper age limits to control access to health care services, and a study 
by Age Concern found that GPs operated such age limits for older patients when 
26 Margot Jeffries, 'Aged People: Social Attitudes Towards, ' in Encyclopedia oppplied Ethics, 
Volume I (Academic Press, 1998): p84. 
27 Mike Brogden, Geronticide., Killing the Elderly (London: Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2001): p187. 
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arranging referrals for knee replacements, kidney dialysis, and heart byo-pass 
operations. 28 
There is, however, a difficulty in determining whether such discrimination in access 
to services reflects a judgement by the doctors responsible that older persons are 
either morally or socially inferior, or whether it reflects the quite different idea that 
we should discriminate against the elderly on the basis of either efficiency or 
'fairness'. Dan Brock has noted that on the conventional view, held by physicians and 
public alike, the allocation of healthcare in conditions of scarcity should be on the 
basis of need alone. Although both healthcare needs and the expected benefits of 
treatment will differ between younger and older patients it is nevertheless these 
differences, and not the differences of chronological age, that should be of relevance 
in determining their claims to social resources for treatment. Thus, '[i]n the 
conventional view, differential treatment based on age itself is unjust ageism' . 
29 And, 
'in response to any proposals to limit the availability to the elderly of resources 
generally, and healthcare in particular, their advocates have added the charge of 
6ageism' to the more familiar charges of racism and sexism' . 
30 Thus, the conventional 
view involves adhering to the idea that needs alone should dictate allocation of 
resources, and this conventional view is one for anti-ageists to continue to defend. 
Nevertheless, for different reasons many contemporary political and moral thinkers 
reject this conventional view and justify discrimination on the basis of age. 
211 Age Concern, New Survey ofGPs CconfinnsAgeism in the NHS (Age Concern England Press 
Release, 17 May 2000). 
29 Dan Brock, 'Justice, healthcare, and the elderly,, Philosophy andpublic Affairs 18 (1989): 297-312, 
p299. 
30 Ibid, p388. 
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Many of the defences of age discrimination in health care have been utilitarian. A. B. 
Shaw has argued that 'utilitarianism is necessary if not sufficient for ethical rationing 
decisions' in healthcare, and that therefore 'ft]he case for ageism is moral. 931 It is 
utilitarian in this context in the sense that utility is accepted as the primary good, and 
that most utility would be produced as a consequence of age discrimination in this 
context. Utility might be measured in the number of extra years lived by the younger 
people favoured with medical treatment than would have been enjoyed by the old had 
they been treated. The concept of the Quality Adjusted Life-Year (QALY), developed 
by health economists like Alan Williams, is arguably an example of the utilitarian 
social choice theory that aims to ensure maximal efficiency in order to, in turn, ensure 
maximal welfare for society as a whole. QALYs are a way of prioritising patients for 
treatment by ensuring that scarce healthcare resources are distributed in such a way as 
to maximise aggregate benefit. As the concept ostensibly involves only the use of 
medical criteria in deciding which treatments or patients it would be most efficient for 
society to finance it is supposed to be value neutral. Nevertheless, the economists that 
use the concept may implicitly look at the elderly as 'nearly dead', whose productive 
years are behind them, and for this reason the practical use of the QALY would 
inevitably discriminate against the old. It has therefore been claimed by John Harris 
that 'the ageism of the QALY is inescapable', 32 and even if such ageism is not 
31A. B. Shaw, 'In Defence of Ageism, 'Journal qfMedical Ethics 20 (1994): 188-9 1, p9O. It is 
noteworthy that Shaw defines what he thinks isjustifiable age discrimination as 'ageism', while my 
own definition of ageism constitutes only unjustifiable age discrimination. Nevertheless, I would agree 
with Shaw that his defence of age discrimination is ageist, the difference being that I believe it to be 
unjust 
32 John Harris, 'More and Better Justice, ' in Bell & Mendus, Philosophy andMedical WeIrare 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 75-96; p 79. 
A 
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motivated by age bias it may nevertheless reinforce it. I discuss the concept of 
QALYs, its relation to utilitarianism and its ageist implications in chapter 5. 
However, defences of age-differentiated treatment in healthcare are not confined to 
utilitarians and a moral case for ageism may also be made on reasons of fairness. It is 
often thought that in circumstances of scarce resources, where rationing is necessary, 
that those resources should be used for the benefit of the young rather than the old 
who can be said to already have had a 'fair innings' of life. The classic explication of 
the FIA is that of John Harris, though he does not himself support it, and he suggests a 
number of responses to it that I will analyse in more depth in chapter 5.33 Briefly, 
however, what the FIA tries to do 'is capture and express in a workable form the truth 
that while it is always a misfortune to die when one wants to go on living, it is not a 
tragedy to die in old age; but it is ... both a tragedy and a misfortune to be cut off 
prematurely'. 34 A reasonable form of the FIA, therefore, would hold 'that people who 
had achieved old age or who were closely approaching it would not have their lives 
prolonged when this could only be achieved at the cost of the lives of those who were 
not nearing old age. 35 Consequently, the basis of the FIA 'points to the fact that the 
injustice done to someone who has not had a bad innings when they lose out to 
someone who has is significantly greater than in the reverse circumstances'. 36 
33 John Harris, 7he Value of Life. An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London: Routledge, 1985), 
chapter 5. 
34 Ibid, p93. 
35 Ibid, p94. 
36 Ibid. 
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The FIA is a philosophical argument that has obvious advantages for those who must 
make rationing decisions in the distribution of health services and other cases of 
intergenerational justice involving the distribution of benefits between the 
generations, and it is unsurprisingly one that is often used. 37 Moreover, as in the case 
of QALYs, it is difficult to assess the degree to which those who defend age 
discrimination on the basis of moral reasons like fairness may in fact be motivated 
primarily by cultural ageist prejudice. To have a moral reason for doing something 
that one would like to do for immoral reasons is of obvious benefit to those who are 
prejudiced. However, in the course of this thesis I will examine the moral reasons for 
age discrimination and challenge them solely on their own terms rather than because 
they may mask cultural ageism. 
(ii) Income support 
There are several sources of ageism active within the context of income distribution, 
and together they have generated a fierce debate in the last two decades over what has 
become known as 'generational equity'. The origins of this debate partly derive from 
what Bill Bytheway has called a 'moral panic', which has developed from recent 
demographic forecasts about an unsustainable growth in the numbers of the elderly 
and a corresponding decline in the number of young adults of working age. 38 The 
projections by the Office of Popular Census and Surveys (OPCS) on population trends 
37 Alan Williams, 'Intergenerational equity: an exploration of the 'fair innings, ' argument' Health 
Economics 6 (1997): 117-32. 
31 Bill Bytheway, Ageism (Buckingham, Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1995), pp524. The 
nature of this panic is not moral in the sense that morality itself is endangered by the activities of older 
citizens. Rather, it is a moral panic in the sense that taking care of older citizens is a moral issue and 
current demographic trends are arguably creating a crisis for the moral question of what level of a 
society's resources should be redistributed to the old. 
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estimate that between 1991 and 2031 the number of people between 65 and 75 will 
rise by nearly 52%, while the numbers of those over 75 will increase by 70%. 39 These 
changes will supposedly lead to an increase of the dependency ratio with ever fewer 
young people having to support ever more old people. What this allegedly means is 
that younger people will have to forego more of their income and provide more 
resources to the growing number of idle old people. 
This view has been allied to a second widely held belief that the old are in fact 
currently consuming more than their fair share of society's resources to the detriment 
of the young, and especially of children. The generational equity debate has been 
fuelled by organisations like Americans for Generational Equity (AGE) that claim 
that the elderly benefit disproportionately from current public spending programs 
while the young are deprived. 
At the same time that this equity debate has developed there has also been something 
of a change in the popular perception of the elderly, and while in the 1960s and early 
1970s elderly people were generally stereotyped as poor and deserving, by the 1980s 
they were more likely to'be portrayed as a powerful and financially secure social 
group using that power to further their selfish interests at the expense of others . 
40 Both 
popular perceptions are of course stereotypes, and they are equally mistaken because 
they both assume that all elderly people have the same characteristics. Nevertheless, it 
is interesting to note that while they were stereotyped as part of the deserving poor 
they benefited from benevolent and universal policies to assist them, but during the 
39 Office of Population Census and Surveys, Population Trends 72 (London: HMSO, 1993). 
40 K Farlie, 'Greedy Geezers: Talkin 'Bout My Generation, 'New Republic 28 March 1988, pig. 
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1980s, when the forecasts of a demographic time-bomb became prevalent, Britain and 
other 'Western' countries underwent far-reaching retrenching of their welfare states. 
Integral to a debate on generational equity, therefore, is the issue of how cultural 
images and stereotypes are used by political leaders to ftirther their desired policies. 
But a number of important points can be identified here, and the basic premises of the 
intergenerational equity debate questioned. 
Firstly, we can question the validity of the forecasts of a demographic time bomb and 
the fears that go with it of huge numbers of economically dependent, and even 
question the assumption that an ageing population is actually a social problem at all. 
Population ageing has in fact been going on for generations and we are not now in a 
new demographic situation. The average age of the population in Britain started to 
increase in the first decade of the Twentieth century and peaked in the 1930s. 41 
Moreover, it was at the time when Britain's population was ageing most rapidly that 
the pension system was established and expanded, and when it had its widest popular 
support. Margot Jeffreys argues that 'the moral panic of the 'burden of the aged' 
actually reflects 'a deep seated ambivalence towards older people, which can lead to 
an exaggeration of the size and nature of the resources required to meet their needs or 
of the sacrifice required of younger people'. 42 Other commentators have argued that 
the demographic time bomb is imaginary and that, if society removes mandatory 
retirement requirements and encourages active people to work until later in their lives, 
41 F. Laczko & C. Phillipson, Changing Work andRetirement (Buckingliam: Open University Press, 
199 1), p 107. 
42 Margot Jeffries, Growing Old in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1989), pxiii. 
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the economic growth that would result would be more than sufficient to provide 
support for the ageing population. 43 
Finally, as John Vincent points out, the issue of population ageing is rarely considered 
in the context of other population issues such as immigration. Vincent insists that the 
demographic time-bomb thesis is built upon the assumption that the citizens of a 
society are only those who are born in to it, and excludes the possibility of 
immigration to ease the dependency ratios. There are a large number of young people 
from developing countries that are desperate for the opportunity to work in 
industrialised economies, and yet ever more elaborate procedures are being 
implemented to stem the tide of people seeking new opportunities in the very 
countries that are identified as having a 'problem' of ageing. 44 
We can also question the extent to which the elderly are indeed a relatively affluent 
age group and whether Paul Johnson is right in characterizing public policy as an 
'increasingly bitter competition for resources between workers and pensioners'. 45 As 
noted, in recent years the accepted stereotypes concerning the old have focussed less 
on their being a part of the deserving poor and more on them being parasitic to the 
well-being of society generally and to the young in particular. This change has 
corresponded with a change in the political culture from social democratic to the new 
43 Phil Mullan, The Imaginary Time Bomb (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). This argument has 
been strenuously challenged by other writers, because economic growth rates alter the absolute level of 
both wages and pensions but not the relative value between the two. 
44 John A. Vincent, Inequality and OldAge, p38-39. 
" Paul Johnson, 'Introduction, ' in P. Johnson, C. Conrad, & D. Thomson (eds. ) Workrs versus 
Pensioners: Intergenerational Justice in an ageing uvrld (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1989), p2. One interesting point that I do not consider here is the tendency of older people in Western 
societies to be white, while the incidence of poverty among children is disproportionately among racial 
minorities. 
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right, and from state controlled public policies to a reliance on the market. As a result 
some commentators like Alan Walker perceive the moral panic concerning an 
increasingly large and dependent older population as having been largely invented by 
46 governments seeking to retrench public spending. He argues that the 'political 
concern about the cost of ageing has been amplified artificially in order to legitimate 
policies aimed at diminishing the state's role in financial and social support for older 
47 people'. Moreover, governments 'have used the concept of intergenerational equity 
to legitimate those actions; the result will be to widen the division between market 
based affluence and publicly administrated poverty in old age. 48 
In an early critique of the generational equity debate R. H. Binstock argued that the 
claims of those who saw the old as socially parasitic was built upon three basic 
components: the demographic changes in Western society resulting in an increase in 
their numbers, the economic well-being of the elderly relative to other age groups, 
and the political behaviour of the elderly in supporting their self-interest as an age 
groUp. 49 Binstock argues that each of these components can be refuted. I have already 
briefly shown how the first has been contested by academics, and I will deal with the 
political behaviour of the elderly in the next subsection. However, the rest of this 
subsection will examine the economic well-being of the elderly relative to younger 
age groups. 
46 Alan Walker, 'The Economic 'Burden' of Ageing and the Prospect of Intergenerational Conflict,, 
, 4geingandSociety 10 (1990): 377-396. 
47 lbid, p378. 
48 lbid, p393-3. 
49 FLIL Binstock, 'The Aged as Scapegoat, ' The Gerontologist 23: 136-143. 
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The assumption that the old are taking more of their fair share of available resources 
cannot be easily assessed from simply comparing the number of children in poverty 
with the number of elderly. 50 The relatively higher and increasing levels of poverty 
among children are related to other social trends like the fact that more children are 
now being brought up by single mothers (exacerbated by the fact that divorce rates are 
increasing, and that more children are bom outside stable relationships), and single 
women have a decreased earning capability due to their own societal discrimination 
and lack of affordable child care. Therefore, Binstock argues that 'the elderly have 
become scapegoats for the economic deprivation of children with the result of 
increasingly hostile attitudes towards the old. 51 However, what the views of Binstock 
and Walker suggest is that negative cultural stereotypes are used by political leaders 
in order to support public policy changes that they favour. 
But cultural ageism and cultural stereotypes are not the only source oflustification for 
political agendas designed to reduce public spending. The debate over generational 
equity would also suggest that age discrimination may be justified on the moral 
grounds of 'fairness'. If the old are thought to be enjoying more than their fair share 
of the available benefits of society then it may be just to restrict their access to them, 
especially if it is to the detriment of the young. Again, as with the FIA in health care, 
these moral arguments about fairness may also be used as a way of masking 
intrinsically ageist judgements about the old. Indeed, advocates of egalitarian ageism 
may themselves be influenced more by cultural ageism than a desire to ensure 
fairness. 
50 In 1990 the percentage of children (under 18 years) living under the poverty line in the US was 
20.6%, while the number of elderly (65 years and older) was 12.2% (U. S. Bureau of the Census). 
31 Binstock, 'The Aged as Scapegoat, ' p139. 
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As we shall see in chapter four, many thinkers either implicitly or explicitly assume 
what has been called the complete life view (CLV), which extends the ageist 
52 implications of the FIA outlined in the last subsection to the distribution of income. 
If we accept that an egalitarian distribution of benefits should be equal between the 
complete separate lives of persons, then any less well off part of one's life may be 
legitimately compensated for, either before or afterwards, by another period of 
affluence. In contrast to the FIA, the CLV is relevant to material goods rather than the 
length of one's life, so it does not by itself justify discrimination against the old any 
more than it does the young. Only if it can be shown that the old have already had 
their approximate fair share of life-time benefits does it justify age discrimination 
against the old. 
However, there has been a large number of writers involved in the generational equity 
debate who have sought to identify the present old age-group as privileged, not just 
relative to previous generations of the old, or even just relative to many younger 
people today, but that they are privileged relative to how well off the next generation 
of old will be in a couple of decades time. Even if the young of today are not as 
poorly off as today's old were when they were young it is possible that the CLV may 
justify age discrimination against the latter because the old of tomorrow will be worse 
off than the old of today. I will save further discussion of the CLV until chapter 4 in 
the thesis, suffice to say that an obvious implication of the CLV is that the old can, 
and even perhaps ought, to be allowed to suffer destitution if they have in the past 
For discussions of the CLV see Larry Temkin, Inequality (New York & Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), ch 8; Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time, ' Ethics 99(1989): 492-502; Mckerlie, 
'Equality Between Age-Groups, ' Philosophy andPublic, 4ffairs 21 (1992): 275-95. 
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enjoyed significantly greater wealth than the young do today, or if they currently 
enjoy greater wealth than the old will tomorrow. 
(iii) Voting rights 
This subsection examines the justifications that have been presented by some 
commentators and political philosophers for the introduction of age-differentiated 
political rights, the aim of which is to reduce the electoral power of the elderly. 53 ne 
source ofjustification lies in the underlying fear that, because demographic trends are 
steadily increasing the median age of the voter, and because older voters tend to be 
more active, older voters will use their electoral strength to finther their own short- 
term self-interest at the expense of younger citizens. They may vote for increases in 
public expenditure to benefit themselves, and will leave the long-term consequences 
of their selfishness to younger age groups to pay after they are dead. Such fears seem 
to be given credence by the figures of politically active elderly. As Matthew Price 
points out, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is the second largest 
organization in the Unitcd Statcs aftcr the Catholic Church, with over 33 million 
members; one in four of registered voters is a member of it. 54 This then represents part 
of the wider concern about generational equity examined in the last subsection, and 
the worry is that in a democracy where political parties and leaders are hungry for 
power, policies that favour the elderly will be pursued in order to secure the support 
of that large electoral lobby. 
5' Phillippe Van Parijs, 'The Disenfranchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to secure 
Intergenerational Justice, ' Philosophy and PublicAffairs 27 (1999): pp292-333. Douglas J. Stewart, 
'Disenfianchise the Old, 'New Republic 29 (1970): 20-22. 
54 Matthew C. Price, Justice Between Generations: The Growing Political Power of the Elderly in 
America (New York: Praeger, 1997) 88-9. 
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PhiHippe Van Parijs gives expression to these fears, though he does not attempt to 
assess the extent to which they are justified, and he examines instead a wide range of 
possible institutional methods to limit the electoral power of the elderly. 55 Van parijS 
adopts what he calls a 'Rawls-Machiavelli' strategy, which combines a Rawlsian 
component that claims we can determine a publicly defensible vision of social justice, 
and a Machiavellian component that shapes institutions in such a way that those 
acting within society will end up generating the necessary conditions of that social 
justice. He claims that although we can know what social justice requires, the 
electoral power of one particular age group, the 'elderly', who vote mainly out of self- 
interest, means that our current democratic arrangements will not deliver the 
conditions for that vision. 
Van Parijs discusses a number of possible institutional changes that would reduce the 
age of the median voter and balance the electoral power between different age 
categories. We might simply disenfranchise older citizens at perhaps 70 years of age, 
or reduce the voting age to 16 or even 14. Other possibilities include: plural voting, by 
which we might give more weight to the votes of younger voters, or increase the 
number of votes that they have; asymmetrical compulsory voting, which is to say 
either young people are legally required to vote while the old are exempt, or a poll tax 
may be introduced to discourage the older voters from exercising their rights, or else 
we could require each age-group to elect its own representatives in separate 
constituencies. Alternatively, parents n-ýight be given a proxy vote for each child they 
have, or society rnight appoint 'guardians' to represent the interests of younger and 
55 Van Pariis, 'The Disenfi-anchisement of the Elderly. ' 
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unborn generations in the legislative assembly and thereby challenge any policy 
proposals that significantly harm the interests of youth. 
There seems to be a prima facie case for thinking these fears are legitimate because it 
is in the nature of democracy that the more people with the same interest the more 
politically powerful that group will become. Each vote counts equally so the majority 
interests are the ones that prevail. However, that power is crucially dependent upon 
the members of the group actually identifying with one another and voting for the 
interest of the group. I think we can show that in the case of the elderly that these are 
wrongly assumed. In fact, I would say that the arguments that justify the withholding 
of the franchise from the old are themselves based upon two falsifilable stereotypes. 
Firstly, the assumption that the elderly as an age-group is comparatively more 
homogenous than other age groups, and secondly, the assumption that the old are 
more selfish and short term in the political decisions they make. 
We have access to empirical evidence concerning the extent of older people's power 
as a political pressure group in the work of Exeter University's Older People and 
Politics Project (OPPOL), which conducted a study of how older people voted in the 
1997 General Election . 
5' OPPOL investigated three main concerns within the study: 
firstly, to determine how effective pressure groups are for older people; secondly, how 
the power of and influence of older people is perceived by themselves and the general 
public; and thirdly, the extent to which politicians have responded to the supposed 
increased power of older people. 
"' The study is reported and analysed in John A. Vincent, Guy Patterson & Karen Wale, Politics and 
old, 4ge: older Citizens and Political Processes in Britain (Aldershot: Ashgate, 200 1). 
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With reference to the supposed homogeneity of the elderly OPPOL identified three 
key obstacles that inhibit the old from acting as a coherent political force. Firstly, of 
course, their interests are in fact quite diverse, as diverse in fact as any other age 
group. If we think of the single issue of the state pension, which would seem to be one 
central concern around which all elderly could unite, we find that even in this most 
central issue self-interests actually differ widely. There is extensive diversity in the 
levels and sources of older people's incomes, and the impact of the state pension on 
many of their household budgets would not be a strong motivation in the sense of 
self-interest. Nevertheless, the pension is a potent symbol of the society's recognition 
of a life-time contribution, and it is actually thought of by many pensioners as a 
universal right of citizenship rather than a benefit for the old per se. Indeed, many 
within the pensioner movement have sought to prevent it from becoming exclusively 
organized by and for older people, and prominent members like the late Barbara 
Castle and Bruce Kent (among others) have expressed concerns that the movement 
should not only be about senior citizens but about the rights of all citizens and of 
citizenship itself 
Thus, far from being purely interested in pursuing sectarian self-interests, as the old 
are often stereotyped, older people often seek to strengthen the ties between 
themselves and younger citizens by pointing out that such universal rights as a state 
pension is in everyone's interests, and is a fundamental aspect of what it means to be 
a citizen. Moreover, Vincent et al. found that older people themselves 'usually 
justified their political actions in terms of an ideology of the greater good', 57 and far 
57 lbid, p 154. 
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from being inherently selfish they were often found to vote on issues with the interests 
of their children and grandchildren in mind. Indeed, one important way in which older 
people find meaning in their lives after their careers and long-term life plans are near 
completion is within concerns that transcend the individual ego and embrace the 
health of the community as a whole . 
58 Such transcending concerns will differ from 
those of the young and middle aged whose concerns will tend to be more immediate 
and material in nature. It is these age groups, after all, who are involved with 
developing careers and bringing up children. If the ideal of an inclusive citizenship 
was strengthened then the political voting power of the elderly might be something to 
be welcomed rather than feared. 
However, in addition to the diversity of the membership there are several other 
obstacles that mitigate against the old age group from being able to mobilize as a 
coherent and formidable political force. Firstly, there are the negative cultural issues 
that concern the old, and what was found to be particularly important by OPPOL's 
research was the negative cultural evaluations of old age itself Because the dominant 
culture of the 'West' devalues age it is difficult to create a positive identity for old age 
as a symbol that older people wish to internalize, and to which they want to commit 
themselves. This, in turn, means that '[t]here is a reluctance amongst older people to 
defme themselves as old, and it is possible that this prevents them from identifying 
with the age-group issues. 59 The cultural devaluation of old age also makes it more 
difficult for old people to organize, because access to the media, which is necessary to 
Is See for example Robert C. Peck, 'Psychological Developments in the Second Half of Life, ' in B. 
Neugarten (ed. ), MiddleAge andAging (Chicago, 11: Chicago University Press, 1965): 88-92. 
59 vincent et a], Politics and OldAge, p 15 1. 
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convey their message, is restricted and distorted by the negative images that abound in 
our society, which means the media does not take them seriously. 
Secondly, while there may be some truth to the claim that political parties and 
political leaders might airn to further the interests of the old in order to get their votes 
in the short-term, political parties are at least as interested in attracting younger voters 
who will have the franchise for four or five decades to come. Thirdly, as political 
campaign managers admitted during interviews with OPPOL, the older a person is the 
less likely she is to be a 'swing' voter, and evidence from the British Election Survey 
(BES) shows that people over 60 years are less likely to change their vote mid- 
campaign than younger people . 
60 For this reason political parties will not target the 
old to the same extent and will consequently not show as much interest in their views. 
Finally, as Vincent et al point out, an examination of the major political studies of the 
1997 General Election reveals that the issue of an ageing electorate and its interests is 
totally absent from their discussions. For example, while the studies of Dunleavy et 
al61 and Evans & Norris 62 provide exhaustive analysis about the influence of the 
numerous sectional interests in the country in the lead up to the election, none of them 
mention the old in any detail. The obvious point 
being that if leading academics are 
unable to identify an increasing level of political power being wielded by an 
organized lobby of older voters then it probably 
does not exist. 
"' lbid, p75. 
61 P. Dunleavy, A. Gamble, I. Holliday, & G. Peele (eds. 
), Developments in British Politics 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
62 G. Evans &P Norris (eds-), Critical Elections (London: 
Sage Publishers, 1999). 
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(iv) Employment 
The context in which the ageist debate has been perhaps most prominent is within the 
field of employment, and it has been within this field that there has been much recent 
anti-ageist legislation. There are two reasons for this recent emergence of anti-ageist 
legislation in employment, one of which is concerned with efficiency and the other 
with ethics. The efficiency reason for anti-ageist legislation derives from a growing 
awareness amongst governments and industry of the macro-economic issue of an 
ageing workforce. 63 If the economies of Western nations are to remain efficient in the 
face of current demographic trends governments need to overcome entrenched ageist 
ideas and encourage older workers back to work and to prevent the ageist 
employment practices which undoubtedly take place. 
The idea that ageism is bad for business is the central message of the Employers 
Forum on Age that was set up in May 1996 to combat age discrimination in 
employment. This efficiency reason for anti-ageist policy is known as the 'business 
case for age diversity', and in the preface to the voluntary Code on Age Diversity in 
Employment (1999) the government minister Patricia Hodge recognised that to base 
employment decisions on pre-conceived ideas about age rather than on skills and 
abilities is to waste the talents of a large part of the population'. 64 But what is being 
judged wrong here is not the fact that employers have acted on ageist principles, but 
I One third of the British workforce is now over forty years of age. See Colin Duncan, 'Ageism, early 
exit, and the rationality of age-based discrimination, ' in Ageism in Work and Employmeta (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 200 1). 
64 Code onAge Diversity in Employmera (1999), quoted in Bob Hepple, 'Age Discrimination in 
Employment: Implementing the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC, ' in Sandra Fredman & Sarah 
Spencer (eds. ),, 4ge as an Equality Issue (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003): 71-96, 
p73. 
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that by doing so they waste a valuable resource. Thus, the UK goverment (along 
with a number of other advanced industrial states) has come to realise that the demand 
for skills in the labour market outstrips supply, and this, combined with the direct cost 
to the exchequer of paying various benefits to people under the age of retirement, 
means that both indirect and direct discrimination may be detrimental to macro- 
economic growth. 65 Government initiatives are therefore thought necessary to 
counteract this collective action problem presented by private individuals and firms. 
Consequently, the government's employment policy objectives towards older workers 
seem to converge with the objectives of Age Concern. and the general anti-ageist 
lobby, but, as we shall see, this convergence is only contingent. 
This, then, is the efficiency case for anti-ageism in employment. It may also be 
described in utilitarian terms in the sense that the greater wealth created by a more 
efficient economy will, in turn, produce a greater sum of utility among members of 
the population. We therefore have a utilitarian reason to support legislation that 
challenges ageism in the field of employment to match the utilitarian argument that 
Shaw presents which defends ageist policies in healthcare. In 1997 this 
efficiency/utilitarian justification of anti-ageism in the work environment prompted 
the English Law Society to recommend that legislation should be introduced as 'a 
matter of urgency'. 66 However, the efficiency reason for anti-ageism is only 
concerned with the consequences of discrimination for business, and this suggests that 
65 Direct discrimination might involve not employing a candidate or training an employee on the basis 
of her age alone. Non-direct discrimination might involve the same practice but on the basis that the 
individual is perceived to be less adaptable as a proxy trait of their being older. 
66 Law Society, 'Age Discrimination and Employment Law Report, ' (Law Society, 1997). 
42 
the wrongness of age discrimination in employment is only contingently wrong. This 
of course has nothing to do with morality or the particular harms done to the 
disfavoured individuals. Indeed, if it were rational to so discriminate then logical 
consistency would mean that it would no longer be wrong, and the concern for 
efficiency would instead defend ageism in employment as well as in healthcare. 
Moreover, if it could be shown that productivity would be higher within an ageist 
employment sector, and the additional wealth increased the utility of a majority within 
the economy, then this would further strengthen the utilitarian defence of ageism in 
employment. There are those who argue that, as older workers usually earn more than 
a comparable younger worker, and as they will tend to be less easy to move around or 
sack as the interests of the company change, it is therefore individually rational for 
firms to indirectly discriminate against older workers because they represent higher 
transaction costs. 67 
S 
However, there is a second, less cynical, reason for the rise in interest in an anti-ageist 
legal framework in employment. The ethical argument for anti-ageism views it as 
morally right for older citizens to have as much access to employment as younger 
citizens. Bernard Boxill argues that 'the interests of the aged in finding rewarding 
employment are routinely treated as being intrinsically less important than the similar 
interests of younger people, and for this reason they are often denied rewarding 
employment, even when they are the best qualified. "68 Boxill argues that age- 
67 Colin Duncan, 'Ageism, early exit, and the rationality of age-based discrimination. ' 
68 Bernard PL Bloxill, 'Equality, discrimination and preferential treatment, ' in Peter Singer (ed. ) A 
Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993): 333-342, p335. 
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discrimination in employment practices violates the moral principle of showing equal 
concern for the interests of older persons. 69 
Boxill's claim is important because it captures the first part of two distinctions that are 
fundamental to this thesis. Firstly, he captures part of the idea behind cultural ageism 
(in the sense that the interests of the old are seen to be intrinsically less important), 
but it does not acknowledge that there might be an egalitarian argument for age 
discrimination. It would, in fact, be quite possible to construct an egalitarian argument 
for age discrimination in employment along the same lines as with other social 
contexts. According to the CLV it might be suggested that older persons have had 
their fair or equal share of employment opportunities and that it is now time for them 
to make way for younger persons. This egalitarian argument for age discrimination is 
separate from the cultural one, identified by Boxill, which views the interests of the 
old as intrinsically less important. 
Secondly, Boxill's claim recognises the importance of the synchronic interests of the 
aged that can be harmed by age discrimination, but it is silent on the possibility that 
persons might have diachronic interests that would benefit from age discrimination. It 
might be argued that it is in the diachronic interests of persons that ageist employment 
policies prevail if that discrimination meant that each person had an equal or fair share 
of those opportunities over their complete lives. 
I believe that the emergence of an ethical concern for an anti-ageist legal framework 
partly reflects a growing appreciation of the synchronic interests of older workers, as 
69 Ibid. 
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opposed to their diachronic; interests, and their moral right to the protection of their 
dignity and self-respect. As Sandra Fredman notes, increased poverty, ill health and 
depression, as well as low self-esteem and social isolation are themselves strong 
justifications for legal interventions against age discrimination. 70 This ethical 
justification, which of course is not contingent upon questions of demographic trends 
or macro-economic efficiency, is reflected in the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. This Charter proclaims the right of all elderly persons 'to lead a life of dignity 
Cultural lif 9.71 and independence and to participate in social and e 
The ethical argument emphasises the view that, within a liberal society, the law ought 
to embody the community's sense of fairness. Moreover, the law may have a 
powerful symbolic function and, as Lawrence Friedman suggests, 'the law often gives 
both culture and behaviour a good swift shove in a certain direction. 72 It is possible 
over time for laws to change the negative cultural biases and inaccurate, irrational 
stereotypes that some people hold and which can be quite resilient to individual 
personal reflection. The law has already done this to some degree for racial 
minorities, women and the physically handicapped, and there is no question that there 
is less racial and sexual discrimination now than there was before the advent of 
legislation that outlawed such practices. 73 Therefore, as the Director of the Camegie 
Third Age Programme pointed out in 1995, there would be a "danger that if age is left 
70 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p62. 
71 European Charter of Fundamental Rights 1950, (Art 25). 
72 Lawrence M. Friedman, 'Age Discrimination Law: Some Remarks on the American Experience, ' in 
Age as an Equality Issue (eds. ) Fredman & Spencer, p 189. 
73 Sex Discrimination Act (1975); Race Relations Act (1976); Disability Discrimination Act (1995). 
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as the only major cause of discrimination not regulated by law, people will think that 
it doesn't matter"' . 
74 
1.4 The emergenee of anti-ageist legislation 
The first country to introduce anti-ageist legislation was the United States, which did 
so only three years after the 1964 Civil Rights laws were enacted. The 1967 Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is confmed to age discrimination in 
employment while the civil rights laws against racism and sexism also cover public 
accommodations, housing and education as well. Cases of age discrimination are dealt 
with by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) as are cases of all 
other forms of discrimination in employment including racism and sexism. To give an 
impression of the extent of the problem of ageism in employment, out of the 80 840 
cases that were filed with the EEOC between 2000 to 2001 some 21.5% were related 
to discrimination on the basis of age, while 35.8% were on the basis of race and 
31.1% on gender. 75 It should be noted, however, that the ADEA has been heavily 
criticised and it has been claimed that it cannot be defended on the grounds that it 
protects a disfavoured and relatively powerless minority group. The reason for this, as 
George Rutherglen has shown, is that an examination of the empirical data reveals 
that claims under the ADEA are predominantly brought by white males who hold 
relatively high-status and high-paying jobs. 76 
' Richard Worsley, 'Carnegie Third Age Programme,, Equal Opportunities Review 60, (1993). 
75 Public Employment Law Report, May 2002. 
76 George Rutherglen, 'From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of EmploYment Discrimination Law, ' 
Journal oftegal Studies, 24 (1995): 491-52 1. 
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There have been similar anti-ageist legal developments in many European and other 
Western countries with Australia's Workplace Relations Act 1996; New Zealand's 
Human Rights Commission Amendment Act (HRCA) of 1992; Finland's Contract of 
Employment Act 2001; and the Northern Ireland Act 1998. While most of these 
national laws make the dismissal of an employee on the basis of age unlawful, they 
often permit age discrimination. for 'acceptable' reasons, and this leaves the 
implementation of the law vague and ambiguous. The Northern Ireland Act goes 
further than the others in that it actually gives public authorities a positive duty to 
promote equality of opportunity on the grounds of age, rather than simply the negative 
duty to not discriminate against thenL77 
However, while most of the national political and legal responses to age 
discrimination have been driven by the utilitarian case for efficiency rather than for 
ethical reasons, there is one exception to this trend. The Republic of Ireland has 
recently introduced new comprehensive age equality legislation which extends 
coverage beyond the employment sector to the distribution of goods and services, and 
there is a single equality commission (the Equality Authority) that has overlapping 
responsibilities for the multiple listed illegitimate grounds for discrimination. This 
'single equality' legislation lists eight illegitimate grounds of discrimination 
(including age) each of which is equally covered. There are two acts that apply to the 
single equality legislation, the Employment Equality Act (EEA) of 1998, which 
prohibits discrimination in the employment context, and the Equal Status Act (ESA) 
2000 which prohibits discrimination in the provision of such goods and services as 
77 For a discussion on the comparative approaches to structuring legislation against age discrimination 
see Colm O'Cinneide, 'Comparative European Perspectives on Age Discrimination Legislation, ' in 
Fredman & Spencer,, 4ge as an Equality Issue. 
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housing, education and admission to private clubs. This equality legislation therefore 
represents a combination of both efficiency and ethical reasons for anti-ageist 
legislation. 
On top of these national responses to age discrimination, there has now been a recent 
EU Council Directive that requires all European Union member states to introduce 
legislation outlawing age-discrimination in employment by 2006.78 In order to comply 
with this requirement each state must introduce legislation outlawing direct and 
indirect discrimination in employment, including recruitment, promotion, terms and 
conditions of employment, pay and dismissal, and compulsory retirement must be 
prohibited unless it is 'objectively justified' . 
79 However, this initiative is again 
confined to age discrimination in the workplace, and the primary aim of the Directive 
is to improve business efficiency. The Directive only views age stereotyping and 
prejudice as wrong to the extent that it is inefficient for business rather than any 
unfairness it may cause the individual. 
A consequence of the contingency of this anti-ageist legislation being based on 
inefficiency is reflected by the biggest practical challenge it faces, which is to say the 
kinds of justification that are considered acceptable in order for states and employers 
to ignore the law. Just as the national laws allow exceptions that are vague so too does 
the Directive, which permits member states to treat people differently on grounds of 
78 Council Directive 2000/78/EC Establishing A General Framework for Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation. The Directives provisions in respect of discrimination on grounds of 
religion and sexual orientation are to be implemented by December 2003, and by 2006 for Disability 
and Age. 
79 objective justification' would be where because of the nature of a job it is thought reasonable and 
rational to require a compulsory retirement age, i. e. that airline pilots should retire at 55 years., 
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age if such policies are 'objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim, 
including legitimate employment policy. '80 This phraseology is of course quite 
ambiguous, and at least one eminent lawyer has confessed that he has 'no idea [what] 
legitimate employment policy is supposed to mean. '81 The conditions of legitimacy 
are not explicitly expressed, and what constitutes 'reasonable justification' must 
surely be subjective. 
However, it has been argued that even if the aim were only to achieve equality in 
employment it could not be achieved without legislating on a far wider range of social 
contexts, and the reason for this is that many aspects of age discrimination interact 
and reinforce one another. This means that in practice both the ethical and efficiency 
approaches imply broadly the same wide coverage. If older people enjoyed better 
healthcare then their employability would be enhanced, and while people are in 
constructive employment their health is often better than if they were idle and bored at 
home. Better social housing and access to public transport for older people would 
make it easier for them to participate actively in society whether in paid employment 
or the volunteer sector, and better education and training facilities would enhance re- 
employment. In addition, Sandra Fredman believes that in order to facilitate effective 
change there must also be promotional and educational measures to help dispel the 
image of older people as dependent or inferior. 92 Therefore, legislation focussing on 
employment will be ineffective unless it is also able to address these wider issues, and 
Fredman proposes a 'proactive' approach that would facilitate a systematic and 
80 Quoted in Friedman, 'Age Discrimination Law: Some Remarks on the American Experience, ' p 177. 
" Ibid. one possible justification might be positive discrimination which will be looked at in chapter 2. 
" Sandra Fredman, The Age of Equality, ' in Fredman & Spencer (eds. ),, 4ge as an Equ, 71ity Issue. 
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strategic approach in which employers, the state, and other bodies participate actively 
in resolving the problem of ageism. 83 
1.5 The chaHenge for anti-ageists 
Throughout this chapter we have reviewed some of the arguments for and against 
ageist policies, particularly within the contexts of health care provision, income 
support, voting rights, and employment practices. What we have found is that there 
are three broad sources of justification for age discrimination and it is often difficult 
to determine whether certain discriminatory policies are motivated by negative 
cultural stereotypes, by a concern for efficiency, or normative moral reasons of 
equality and fairness. Indeed, most of these policies could be driven by at least two of 
these sources. 
Within healthcare provisions we have seen that negative cultural stereotypes 
concerning the moral value of older persons is often assumed to mitigate against the 
seriousness of violence and physical harm perpetrated against the old, and that it can 
even justify this activity in the minds of the perpetrators. Negative cultural stereotypes 
about older people being obsolete also underlie much of the use of chronological age 
as a means to control access of persons to healthcare options. Moreover, the negative 
value inherent in these stereotypes is even projected on to those who work with older 
people, devaluing the worth of their work as well. We have seen that unexamined, and 
thus contestable, negative cultural stereotypes, which portray the old as taking more 
than their fair share of public resources, and imply that older voters are inherently 
13 lbid, p23. 
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selfish and short term in their thinking, have been presented by both academics and 
political leaders as reasons to restrict income distribution to the old and even to strip 
them of their right to vote. On closer examination these stereotypes are found to be 
fallacious, but, as Walker has noted, such stereotypes present a ready tool for political 
leaders to manipulate the thinking of the public and to rally support for undemocratic 
and unjust public policies, and that they therefore need to be challenged. 84 
The stereotypes themselves are bolstered by equally contestable demographic and 
social assumptions that on the one hand there is a demographic time-bomb and on the 
other that the old constitute an homogenous social group, and the implications of 
these assumptions is that the ever growing numbers of old can and will act in a 
coherent political fashion in order to further their short-term, selfish interests. Again 
the fact that these assumptions are so often accepted as facts, and that they are so 
rarely challenged, give credence to both the ageist stereotypes they support and the 
necessity for radically discriminatory practices. 
However, as we have seen, cultural ageist prejudice is not the only source of 
discrimination the old face, and the arguments of liberal academics often justify the 
same policies as cultural ageists, though they base them instead upon either utilitarian 
principles or an ethical concern for fairness. As noted above, utilitarian principles can 
both justify ageist policies in healthcare while at the same time challenging them in 
employment practices, provided that in each case either aggregate or total utility can 
be calculated to result from them. On the one hand, what underlies the utilitarian 
ageist defence in health is the calculation that because the old are 'nearly dead', they 
"Alan Walker, 'The Economic 'Burden' of Aging and the Prospect of Intergenerational Conflict. - 
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consequently have fewer years of happiness than younger people, and so less relative 
weight should be given to their utility. On the other hand, the utilitarian calculation 
that defends anti-ageism within employment claims that although 'nearly dead' the 
old should nevertheless be allowed to continue working because (within the current 
demographic environment) that will maintain the aggregate and total wealth of the 
country. However, the latter calculation is based upon a contingency that could 
feasibly change (i. e. demographic trends), while the former calculation, that old are 
nearly dead and their well-being less important, is immoral because the well-being of 
human lives should be valued equally irrespective of their projected duration. I do not 
suggest that all utilitarians make these calculations, and there may be many who do 
not, I am merely making the point that it is wholly consistent with utilitarian theory to 
calculate in this way. 
In contrast with utilitarian theory the FIA and the CLV do not make judgements based 
upon contingencies, and in contrast to cultural ageism they do not involve false 
judgements concerning the moral and social value of people's lives. Consequently, 
there is nothing obviously morally wrong with the discriminatory practices based 
upon them. What they are based upon is the normative principle of fairness; that for 
the FIA, human life should be distributed in as fair a way as possible; and for the 
CLV, that material benefits should be distributed equally between the complete lives 
of separate persons. 
What is needed to challenge the ageism within these contexts and others, therefore, is 
an ethic that defends anti-ageist policies in a moral and non-contingent way and 
which is consistent with the broader objectives of egalitarianism and liberalism. But 
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to do this we must challenge more than just cultural stereotypes. We also need to 
challenge the egalitarian defences of age-discrimination, and particularly the FIA and 
the CLV. If it can be shown that these principles have morally unjustifiable 
consequences even within the premises of egalitarian liberalism itself, then we can 
refute them in favour of a moral principle that respects the lives of individuals 
irrespective of their age. In addition, we also need an egalitarian public ethos that can 
dctcnninc the limits for which cfficiency can bc uscd as a rcason to justify 
discrimination on the basis of age. 
In 1998 Age Concern initiated and coordinated the 'Millennium Debate of the Age'. 
The report of the working party examining social values claimed that the anti-ageist 
argument was 'a position which has, perhaps surprisingly, been much less widely 
articulated or disseminated' than the defences of ageism. 85 This is surprising because 
as the report claimed, an anti-ageist principle is 'firn-Ay grounded in established moral 
theory', and is itself derived from the more general moral principle of equal concern 
for the like interests of all. The report articulated this underlying anti-ageist principle 
thus; 'an individual's entitlement to the respect and protection of the community, and 
to equal access to its opportunities, does not vary with age or life expectancy'. 86 The 
claim that this argument makes is that individuals are entitled to a synchronic equality 
of opportunity. At each stage of an individual's life he or she is entitled to an equal 
access to opportunity. However, as we shall see below, synchronic equality of 
opportunity will interfere with the equality of opportunity between separate complete 
lives. And what the anti-ageist argument does not explain is why a synchronic access 
35 Age Concern England, Me Millennium Papers: Values andAtfidues in an Ageing Society (London: 
Age concem England, 1999), p28. 
"' Ibid. 
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to opportunity for older persons should overrule the view of many egalitarians that 
what is morally important is diachronic equality. 
Another form of the anti-ageist argument has been defined by John Harris, which 
denies absolutely the relevance of age as a criterion of discrimination within the 
distribution of healthcare resources. 87 This anti-ageist argument claims that there is 
something that each of us values equally no matter how old we are, and that thing is 
'the rest of our lives. So long as we do not know the date of our deaths then for each 
of us 'the rest of our lives' is of indefinite duration, and we each suffer the same 
injustice if our wishes to continue living are deliberately fi-ustrated. 88 Harris thinks 
that; 
the anti-ageist argument has much plausibility. It locates the wrongness of ending an 
individual's life in the evil of thwarting that person's desire to go on living and argues 
that it is profoundly unjust to frustrate that desire merely because some of those who 
have exactly the same desire, held no more strongly, also have a longer life 
expectancy than others. 89 
However, Harris's argument is pertinent only for the context of healthcare and of life 
and death situations. The challenge for those who oppose ageism, therefore, is to 
further develop the anti-ageist argument so that it incorporates all social contexts not 
just health, and to strengthen that argument we also need to situate it within an 
egalitarian political theory. By doing this we can challenge all forms of wrongful age 
discrimination wherever and whenever they occur, and do not need to rely upon 
contingent arguments for each particular social context. 
"" Harris, The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics, chapter 5. Harris was in fact the 
chairperson of Age Concern's Millennium Debate working party examining social values and attitudes. 
"' lbid, p89. 
39 lbid, p90. 
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Chapter Two: Categorising age discrimination 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline a taxonomy of age discrimination. This is 
necessary in order to establish a better understanding of the moral and social issue that 
is to be challenged. As noted in the Introduction, few of those who either justify or 
condemn ageism actually examine what it really constitutes. One exception is Harry 
Lesser who distinguishes three kinds of ageisrm (1) using the mere fact of 
chronological age as grounds for adverse discrimination; (2) attributing to members of 
a particular age group a characteristic they do not in fact posses and using it as a 
ground for adverse discrimination; and (3) attributing to members of a particular age 
group a characteristic possessed by only some of thern, and using it as a ground for 
adverse discrimination. 90 But this definition raises at least three separate yet closely 
related questions. Firstly, what actual harm is created by 'adverse' discrimination? 
Secondly, should our concept of ageism be limited only to the old or should it also 
include the young? And thirdly, to what extent is it appropriate to model ageism on 
the other forms of wrongful discrimination like racism and sexism? The first two 
questions will be examined within this chapter in order to help construct the 
taxonomy of age discrimination. The third question I examine in chapter 3 where I 
challenge the cultural form of ageism. 
The next two sections outline the two fundamental distinctions of the thesis; the 
distinction between the moral and social worth of persons, and the distinction between 
a person's diachronic and synchronic interests. The first distinction is fundamental to 
90 Harry Lesser, 'Ageism, ' in Ewyclopedia of. 4pplied Ethics, Volume I (Academic Press, 1998): 87- 
94, p87. 
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understanding cultural ageism, the second distinction has most significance for 
egalitarian ageism. 
2.1 The moral and social worth of persons 
We can make sense of the distinction between moral and social worth by examining a 
question that Ronald Dworkin raises regarding the value of a human life. Dworkin 
asks the question: 'Is human life subjectively or instrumentally or intrinsically 
valuable? '91 Firstly, something is subjectively valuable to people only if they 
personally value it and want it, rather like Dworkin's own preference for Scotch 
whiskey. 92 Secondly, Dworkin argues that 'we treat someone's life as instrumental 
when we measure it in terms of how much his being alive serves the interests of 
others: of how much what he produces makes other people's lives better, for 
example'. 93 And thirdly, something has intrinsic value if that value is independent of 
whether or not it also has instrumental or subjective value. We treat human life as 
intrinsically valuable if we believe that 'we should respect and honor and protect' it 
, as marvellous in itself, accepting it to be sacred and inviolable. 
94 It is the 
instrumental and intrinsic forms of value that are important to the distinction between 
moral and social worth, and I shall examine each in turn. 
91 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: AnArgument aboutAbortion and Etahanasia (London: 
HarperCollins, 1993), p72. 
92 It is a stereotype of the elderly that they do not put much value on their own lives, but I will put this 
to one side because it is not relevant to the distinction I am making here. 
93 Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p72. 
94 lbid, p73. Dworkin actually makes a further distinction between two kinds of intrinsic value. Firstly 
an object may be intrinsically valuable and at the same time have incremental value in the sense that 
the more we have of that valuable thing the better. The second form, more obviously connected to the 
value of human life, is that intrinsic value an object may have which means it is sacred and inviolable, 
but not incremental. 
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The moral equality of persons is a common premise among most modem ethical 
positions, though it is the Kantian tradition that ascribes them non-derivative intrinsic 
value. 95 Every human 'exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means', and 
every human is of 'absolute worth' and hence equal worth. 96 This does not rule out 
the possibility that some people may acquire superior worth in other respects, but at a 
fundamental level all persons are equally worthy and deserving of a good life. To 
judge that a person has negative moral or intrinsic worth is to assume that her life is 
not sacred, inviolable or 'marvellous in itself'. The intrinsic moral worth of a person 
is therefore non-comparative in the sense that one either has it or does not. 
As with other forms of discrimination ageism would seem most obviously wrong 
when it is based on a false judgement concerning the intrinsic moral worth of a 
person. Equal intrinsic worth applies to all persons irrespective of national or 
community barriers, and it is essentially what separates all humans from other animals 
and marks humans out as those beings with special moral claims and to whom we all 
owe special duties. 97 A person holds equal moral status to all others for her entire life, 
which is to say that persons enjoy diachronic moral equality. It is diachronic because 
at no synchronic point in a person's life would it be ethical to deny their equal moral 
worth. The strength of liberalism is that it involves the basic premise that each person 
95 Although utilitarians may deny the non-derivative value of human life they would nevertheless 
honour an equal moral value of individuals in the sense of requiring that each individual be given equal 
consideration. However, without accepting that human life has intrinsic value we cannot escape the 
implication that certain people could be sacrificed for the benefit of others, and, as we have already 
seen in the context of health care, this utilitarian implication presents serious problems for anti-ageists. 
" Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, Translated by Peter Heath. Edited by 
Peter Heath & J. B. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp428,435. 
97 Among utilitarians there are some who believe that moral equality should be extended to include 
animals rather than think of it as a quality that defines the difference between 'lower' animals and 
humans. See Peter Singer,. 4nimal Liberation (New York: Avon Books, 1975). 
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should enjoy equal treatment, and no liberal would admit to holding judgements that 
certain individuals have less moral or intrinsic worth by virtue of their membership of 
a socially defmed group. 98 
To hold a moral bias is to hold judgements concerning the moral inferiority of a class 
of persons in virtue of some feature they posses. To be thought to lack moral worth 
involves others believing that your life is worthless and in the context of ageism the 
belief in one's negative intrinsic value would be in virtue of one's chronological age. 
A racist's moral bias would hold that it is less wrong to kill a black person than a 
white person, and an ageist moral bias would hold that it is less wrong to kill an 
elderly person than a youth. 99 In some racist societies the penalties for killing 
members of racial minorities have been very lenient while it remained a capital 
offence to kill a white. '00 In other societies, most notably that of the Eskimo, 
geronticide has been accepted practice-101 In a liberal society, in which all persons are 
judged to have moral equality, the killing of anyone is thought to be equally abhorrent 
irrespective of age, race or sex. This is despite the fact that, as Dworkin points out, 
most people are not outraged by the death of an elderly person in the way they would 
be in the case of a child. 102 
98 1 will leave aside the problem of whether individuals suffering conditions such as dementia or 
permanent vegetative syndrome constitute 'persons', though this question has obvious importance. 
99 Although racists and cultural ageists may think it not intrinsically wrong to kill a black or an old 
person it may nevertheless be extrinsically wrong to do so because such actions would have 
consequences detrimental to society. 
100 jEstorical examples would include South Africa until the end of the Apartheid era, and the Southern 
states of the United States before the civil war. 
"' See Simone de Beauvior, OldAge (Harmondsworth: penguin, 1977). 
11 Dworkin, Life's Dominion, p8g. Of course people are often outraged at the mugging of an old 
person than someone in their prime. However, we might speculate that at least some of this outrage is a 
manifestation of the perceived cowardliness of the crime rather than simply sympathy for the 
individual. 
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Moral bias may also be held unconsciously. 103 Larry Alexander points out that '[o]ur 
tastes are so heavily culturally influenced, and culture itself is so much a product of 
morally unrespectable views now discarded that the counterfactual. world of untainted 
preferences is hard to imagine. "04 Thus, unconscious moral biases may continue to be 
held by people even after personal reflection and they will tend to manifest 
themselves in the same way in society as conscious biases. So although unconscious 
bias may be less reprehensible than conscious bias, it may also be more recalcitrant 
and impervious to criticism. Unconscious prejudices are unlikely to be challenged by 
personal reflection on an individual basis because the individual is often unaware of 
having the prejudice in the first place. If such unconscious bias is thought to be widely 
held collectively, then it may be necessary to employ some form of positive 
discrimination in favour of members of the oppressed group and to make long-term 
changes in the social structure. 
In contrast to intrinsic worth, social worth is only relevant to citizens of the same 
society, and it involves the degree to which others in the community judge one's 
value and contribution to others and to the society generally. A judgement that a 
person has negative social worth would mean that they are viewed by others to be of 
little social value, that they provide little or nothing towards the economy, and that 
they take more from the other members of society than they contribute. They would, 
in short, be a burden. Unlike moral worth, which is a status equally held by persons 
diachronically, the social worth held by persons is not necessarily the same 
103 See C. R. Lawrence, The ego, the id, and equal protection: Reckoning with unconscious racism,, 
Stanford Law Review 38 (1987): 317-3 89. 
Larry Alexander, 'What Makes Wrongful Discrimination wrongful? Biases, Pref erences, 
Stereotypes and Proxies, ' University ofpennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992): 149-219, p 192. 
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throughout their lives and it makes sense to say that a citizen might be perceived as 
having more social worth at one point in their lives than another. There is, therefore, a 
synchronic dimension to social worth that is potentially changeable, and it is a 
fundamental premise of many culturally oppressive stereotypes, and of cultural 
ageism in general, that the social worth a citizen has in old age is significantly lower 
than that which she held in her youth or middle-age. 
It is important to note that the moral and social status of a person are independent of 
one another. Even if people think that a particular individual is socially worthless or 
even parasitic as a citizen, they may still accept her intrinsic moral worth as a person. 
Criminals, for example, are socially parasitic, but after imprisoning them we continue 
to respect their humanity by providing them with the means to live, and most People 
would think it morally wrong to deprive them of the means to satisfy their most basic 
needs and interests. 105 
Likewise, it is sometimes assumed by younger people that while an elderly person is a 
moral equal they are nevertheless of limited or negative social worth. This cultural 
assumption is often reflected in the decisions made in distributing emergency and 
intensive medical care, and it is a stated reason that A. B. Shaw gives for his utilitarian 
defence of ageism in healthcare. '06 In a study examining decisions made in intensive 
care departments Renee Anspach claims that 'those perceived as having less social 
103 Thus individuals are sometimes simultaneously perceived to embody both equal moral worth and 
negative social worth, but the reverse is also possible: the position of slaves in some historical societies 
might suggest examples of where social value exists but where moral equality does not. Ancient Greek 
society could not have functioned without slaves, and we can imagine that many of the skilled slaves 
would have had great social value. But even slaves with high social value remained slaves, could be 
bought and sold, and did not therefore enjoy equal moral value with their masters. 
10'6 A. B. Shaw, 'In Defence of Ageistn, 'BritishMedicalJourna120 (1994): 188-91. 
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worth - the old and the deviant (drug addicts, alcoholics, and prostitutes) - were less 
likely to be resuscitated'. 107 Such life and death decisions are thus influenced by 
widely held assumptions that older people have negative social worth in the same way 
as other 'deviants' like criminals, and these are usually related to the false 
assumptions that older people are non-productive in either an economic or a social 
sensc. 
These are 'false' assumptions to make about the elderly as a group because while it 
may be true that some elderly individuals do not have much instrumental value many 
others are both economically and socially useful. Even if older people are not in paid 
employment many of them contribute substantially to the care of either old and infirm 
relatives or friends, or of grandchildren. In both cases they indirectly deflect the 
financial cost away from society which would otherwise have to pay for that care. 
t 
Moreover, we should not simply measure social worth in economic terms, and many 
older persons are socially useful in the sense that they share meaningful relationships 
with others (both young and old) that sustain mutual well-being and provide moral 
support. An example of this supportive role played by the elderly is illustrated in a 
study that shows that where grandparents are involved in the care of a child there is 
less likelihood of that child being taken to an A&E department 'with minor or trivial 
conditions considered not to need treatment'. 108 The broader level of maturity and life 
experience that a grandmother has means the problem can be solved within the home 
environment to the benefit of both the family and the health services budget. Thus, it 
is wrong to assume that a person is of negative social worth in virtue of their 
"I Renee R. Anspach, Deciding Who Lives. * Fateful Choices in the Intensive Care Nursery (Berkley, 
University of Califomia Press, 1997), pp44-45. 
Jos E. Fergusson, I Li & B. Taylor, 'Grandmothers' role in preventing unnecessary accident and 
emergency attendances: cohort study, ' British Medicaldburnal 317 (1998): 1685-6. 
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chronological age. And it is intrinsically wrong to discriminate on that basis because it 
is wrong in itself regardless of any unjust consequences that it may also have. The 
figure below summarises some of the features of the moral and social worth of 
persons. 
Social status Moral status 
1. Designates the instrumental worth 1. Designates the intrinsic worth of a 
of citizens to society and each other. person. 
2. Pertains only to citizens. 2. Pertains equally to all persons. 
3. Changeable and may hold at different 3. Equal and continuous throughout a life. 
levels at different synchronic points 
within a life. 
4 To falsely deny this on the basis of 4. To deny this of any person is 
chronological age alone is intrinsically intrinsically wrong. 
wrong. 
We have said that it is intrinsically wrong to provide someone with inferior treatment 
on the basis of afalse judgement of negative social worth derived from her supposed 
membership of a social group. But this raises the interesting question of whether it 
would be justifiable to provide that same individual with inferior treatment if she were 
infact of negative social worth to the community. Harris examines this problem in the 
form of what he calls the 'moral advantage of usefulness': whether the useful have a 
greater claim to life-saving treatment than the less useful. Harris concludes that I[a]ll 
that can safely be said is that all whose continued existence is clearly required so 
others might live have a good claim to priority', and the one possible example he 
gives of such class one usefulness is that of 'leading surgeons'. 109 Although this is 
not an entirely uncontroversial classification, and would not convey an absolute claim 
"I Harris, The Value of Life. -An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London & New York: Routledge, 
1985), p107- 
62 
to priority, any other kind of useftilness is doubtful. There are a number of reasons for 
this conclusion. Firstly, there is the problem of how we are to measure the respective 
levels of social usefidness, e. g. is the Managing Director of a large corporation as 
useful or more useful than a fire fighter? Secondly, those who are less socially useful 
may be so reluctantly, e. g. those with debilitating diseases or even those who are 
perhaps genetically lazy. It would seem wrong to penalise those who through no fault 
of their own are unable to contribute to the lives of others. Thirdly, there is the related 
problem of free will and of determining the level of responsibility each person has for 
his or her degree of social uselessness. Even criminals and drug addicts may have 
mitigating circumstances for their behaviour in the form of environmental influences 
on their character. Finally, and most importantly, in order to discriminate on an 
individual basis between the useful and useless requires that we arrogate to ourselves 
the punislunent of the socially useless, and many people would fmd that morally 
abhorrent. 
2.2 The synchronic and diachronic interests of persons 
We have already come across the concepts of the diachronic and the synchronic 
aspects of a person's life when discussing the distinction between moral and social 
worth in the last section. This section now looks at a distinction between the 
synchronic and diachronic nature of our interests. My argument will be that these 
fundamental interests are linked to our intrinsic moral worth as human beings and that 
the fact that both egalitarian and cultural ageism neglect the fundamental synchronic 
interests of older people gives us reason to think the egalitarian justifications of such 
discrimination are flawed. 
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The distinction between the diachronic and synchronic; has been developed by several 
thinkers. ' 10 Elizabeth Anderson, for example, has incorporated the distinction within 
her 'expressive theory of rational action'; a theory which claims that in order to 
express our concern for what we value we must generally follow social nornis, which 
direct our decisions and the actions we take. Anderson calls the various ways a person 
could describe her relevant options, and the conception she has of her choices at any 
given time, as her decision frame. Within a decision frame there are 'two global 
norms for making sense of one's actions: one synchronic, the other diachronic'. "' 
The synchronic norm tells a person at any given time to act in certain ways towards 
the things and persons she values. The 'diachronic norm tells a person to act in such a 
way that over time her actions can fit in to a coherent narrative. ' 112 
Individuals thus have two dimensions to their moral psychology. They may act in 
ways that express the value they give to subjects and objects, but they also hold 
synchronic and diachronic interests and may act in ways that affect the synchronic 
and diachronic interests of others. David Velleman agrees that individuals have both 
synchronic and diachronic interests, and argues that these interests are irreducible to 
one another. 113 An individual has a synchronic interest in securing maximal well- 
being at each temporal moment, and a diachronic interest in securing maximal well- 
110 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics andEconomics (Cwnbridge, Mass.: Harvard university Press, 
1993); J. David Velleman, 'Well-being and Time, ' in his The Possibility ofPractical Reason (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000); Alasdair MacIntyre,, 4fier Virtue. 4 Study in Moral Virtue Second Edition 
(London: Duckworth, 1985), chapter 15. 
... Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics, p23. 
"' Ibid, p24. 
113 J. David Velleman, 'Well-being and Time. ' 
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being over a complete life. And, as Velleman argues, '[a] person's synchronic 
interests ... strike me as having an 
independent claim that is not necessarily 
overridden by that of his diachronic interests. The reason, I think, is that a person 
himself has a synchronic and diachronic identity. ' 114 
If certain interests of a person must be recognised as claims ofjustice on society then 
what exactly are they? How do we distinguish between the synchronic and diachronic 
interests of a person? And how do those interests create obligations on the part of 
society to provide individuals with the necessary benefits to fulfil those interests? 
Naturally any list will be contentious and open to interpretation and is unlikely to be 
exhaustive. Nevertheless, the idea that certain interests people have act as normative 
preconditions for, or constraints on, distributive principles of justice is not alien to 
liberal philosophy. Ronald Dworkin uses a similar strategy in his search for the ethical 
foundations of liberalism. 115 Dworkin outlines an account of what he calls people's 
critical interests, and he argues that those who accept that account and care about 
their own and other people's critical interests and critical well-being will be led to 
egalitarian liberalism. 
As I am not associating the interests I am outlining with Dworkin's account I will not 
explain it in depth. However, Dworkin argues that while volitional well-being and 
critical well-being are not the same as objective and subjective, critical well-being has 
an objective dimension while volitional interests do not. Although these two forms of 
interest may often track one another (because people often want what they believe to 
114 lbid, p78. The word 'identity' is used here in the context of the moral psychology of a person rather 
than involving a thesis concerning the metaphysical nature of a person. 
"s Ronald Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality,, in 7he Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
Volume XI (University of Utah Press, 1990). 
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be in their criticial interests) they cannot be subsumed in to one another, just as 
Velleman's theory considers diachronic and synchronic interests to be non- 
reducible. 116 My account of the interests of the person, like that of Dworkin's, focuses 
on what might be taken as the critical interests of the person, but it further claims that 
there are synchronic, and diachronic dimensions to these which may conflict. Similarly 
I argue that one dimension of both our diachronic and synchronic interests incorporate 
the concept of needs. 
The three particular interests that I identify for the purposes of this thesis are: basic 
needs, autonomy, and access to the social bases of self-respect, though these will 
often overlap. 117 To take basic needs first, many contemporary liberal philosophers 
will deny that much sense can be made of the concept of need as a principle of 
distributive justice, and indeed it is subject to a number of objections. 118 Firstly, 
Gneed' is thought to be a morally loaded term which has pretensions to objectivity but 
which is often used by politicians and others simply for its rhetorical force. Secondly, 
the concept arguably has no cross-cultural content which lends to it certain relativism. 
Thirdly, it is ambiguous as to how an agreed schedule of urgency of need might be 
determined. Fourthly, there are the questions of how we should balance between 
different needs, and when enough of something can be said to have satisfied these 
needs. Finally, a distinction can also be made between the idea that people have needs 
116 Dworkin argues that a fuller exposition of well-being would distinguish a third category of 
elemental or biological interests (or fundamental needs) but that these can figure within the two 
categories of critical and volitional interests. See Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal Equality, ' footnote 
3, p240. 
I" Some conceptions of the principle of need would incorporate self-respect and autonomy. Here I 
accept that they may be separate. 
"" The concept of need is of course fundamental to the Marxist tradition. 
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and the separate question as to the degree to which a political community should 
distribute benefits to meet those needs. 119 
There are several ways that a list of the needs that support claims of justice might be 
determined. However, I shall understand needs as being defined as those fundamental 
benefits that are preconditions of human living, and they would include such goods as 
shelter, nutrition and medical care. They are also benefits to which all human 
individuals that constitute equal moral worth have claims to. Needs are critical 
interests rather than volitional because we do not necessarily want what we need or 
need what we want, and needs obviously have a synchronic element because there are 
things I need for survival today irrespective of the goods I have enjoyed in the past or 
hope to enjoy in the future. For example, if I am injured today then I need medical 
attention today, not tomorrow or yesterday. The synchronic interest people have in 
fulfilling their basic needs will be particularly important within the discussion of 
egalitarian ageism in chapters 4 to 6. 
The second fundamental interest I will be referring to is that of autonomy. Gerald 
Dworkin defines autonomy as the 'second-order capacity to reflect critically upon 
one's first-order preferences and desires, and the ability to either identify with these or 
to change them in light of higher-order preferences and values. 120 Caroline Dunn 
notes there are internal and external constraints on autonomy, the former involving 
119 one contemporary philosopher who does use an account of needs as a distributive principle within a 
conception of social justice is David Miller. See his Principles ofSocial Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999). Miller expounds a plural theory embodying the three principles of 
desert, equality and need. 
120 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory andPractice ofAutonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p108. 
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limitations on oneself, and the latter by the actions of others. 12 1 Dunn argues that the 
various threats to the autonomy of the elderly include both the internal constraints of 
mental and psychological decline and the socially generated threats involving the 
widespread set of negative perceptions of old age. Moreover, as we shall see in 
chapter 3, socially generated threats in the form of many negative cultural stereotypes 
affect the psychology of older persons if the negative meanings they involve are 
internalised. The capacity to enjoy autonomy therefore relies heavily upon the 
attitudes and activity of others, and it has a synchronic dimension in the sense that a 
person can have more or less of it at different points in their lives. We nevertheless 
always have a synchronic interest in being autonomous. 
The third interest that I refer to in this thesis is that which we have in enjoying what 
Rawls has described as the 'social bases of self-respect', the importance of which he 
views as being at the core of a theory ofjustice. 122 Rawls views self-respect as being 
the most fundamental of the primary social goods, i. e. those goods that anyone 
rationally wants whatever else he wants, and he argues that this is significantly 
affected by the 'basic structure of society'. 123 As Robin Dillon argues, '[w]hether 
individuals respect themselves or not is very much a fimction of their social 
relationships and of the structure and functioning of the institutions among which they 
live; when these relationships and institutions are unjust, discriminatory or oppressive, 
self-respect can be diminished, distorted or destroyed. ' 124 Moreover, 'the very nature 
121 Caroline Dunn, 'The effects of ageing on Autonomy, ' in Harry A Lesser,, 4geing, 4utonomy and 
Resources (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 7-22. . 
11 John Rawls,, 4 Theory q(Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, Revised edition 1999). 
123 Ibid, p62. 
124 Robin S. Dillon (ed. ), 'Introduction, ' in Dignity, Character andSey-'Respect (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), p3 6. 
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and meaning of self-respect and how it is constituted and secured are subject to social 
construction, and the evaluation of such construction involves issues of social 
justice. ' 125 Self-respect is vital to an individual's ability to pursue and fulfil their life- 
plans, and since its bases are social, it is a matter of social justice that institutions and 
policies must be designed to support rather than to undermine self-respect. 
Two questions arise, however. Firstly, what do we mean by self-respect? It might be 
argued that the concept is somewhat elusive, and in any case it may be regarded as a 
personal responsibility of an individual to promote her own self-respect rather than it 
being an obligation of society. To make sense of the concept we must first 
acknowledge that there are two uses of term 'respect' in ordinary discourse. One can 
use respect in the sense that a moral theory respects all persons equally, and one can 
use it in the sense that we can respect a person who performs his job well. While 
Rawls conflates the two senses Larry Thomas calls them 'respect' and 'esteem' 
respectively. 126 David DeGrazia outlines the following analysis of the two concepts. 
Respect: A respects B if and only if A believes B possesses moral status, i. e. believes 
that B's interests, especially B's most fundamental interests, must be defended and 
upheld. 
Esteem: A esteems B if and only if A regards the abilities, achievements, or character 
traits of B as impressive or valuable and, other things equal, worthy of emulation. 127 
Defming self-respect and self-esteem just requires the case where B is at the same 
time person A. Thus: 
125 Ibid, p37. 
116 Larry Thomas, 'Morality and Our Self-Concept, 'Journal of Value Inquiry 12(1978): 153-178. 
127 David DeGrazia, 'Grounding a Right to Healthcare in Self-Respect and Self-Esteem, ' Public Affairs 
Quarterly 5 (October 1991): 301-318, p303. 
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Setf-Respect: A has self-respect if and only if A believes herself to posses moral 
status, i. e. believes that her interests, especially her most fundamental interests, must 
be defended and upheld. 
While esteem may be held in degrees, respect in the moral sense contains the notion 
of full respect as a finite quantity, or what is normally understood as what all persons 
are due. The concept of respect is therefore closely related to the intrinsic moral worth 
of all persons outlined in the previous section. Although respect and self-respect are 
logically independent they will nevertheless tend to be closely related, and as Rawls 
argues, if we do not enjoy the respect of others then we are unlikely to respect 
ourselves. 128 Our convictions about our moral status can be affected by others 
including their belief that we have inferior moral status. Self-respect is also affected 
by one's self-esteem, and when the latter is low this may in turn diminish the former. 
The second question that arises in this discussion of the interest of self-respect is how 
society would go about promoting it. The question arises especially as some people's 
self-respect, like some people's happiness, will always be lower than that of others, 
and while some people will have a predisposition for depression others will have one 
for self-loathing. Nevertheless, although society may not be able to ensure that 
everyone enjoys self-respect they can provide for the social bases of such a good, or at 
least remove or prevent institutional and ideological obstacles to the holding of self- 
respect by individuals. 
"' It is of course perfectly possible that a person could have such disdain for the opinions of others that 
they could continue to have self-respect while at the same time aware that others held them in 
contempt. 
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Rawls defines the social bases of self-respect as things like the institutional condition 
that citizens have equal basic rights and the public recognition of that fact, 129 and 
DeGrazia argues that these should include an equal right to healthcare. 130 Among the 
social conditions that DeGrazia believes significantly undermine both self-respect and 
self-esteem are; bigotry (i. e. attitudes and negative cultural stereotypes); 
unemployment; and lack of access to healthcare. Imagine, therefore, the following 
two examples. Firstly, as we noted in chapter one, GPs regularly apply age limits to 
older patients when arranging such treatments as knee replacements, kidney dialysis 
and heart bypass operations. These are of course needs that are being denied, but the 
self-esteem and self-respect of an older patient will also surely be affected by her 
perception of society's low regard for her health needs. Needs for medical treatment 
to prolong one's life are fundamental if the person in question wishes to continue 
living, whatever their age. If society is not prepared to defend and protect that 
fundamental interest because a person is older then, by DeGrazia's definition at least, 
it does not respect her. And, if we accept that Rawls is correct in thinking that one's 
self-respect is linked to the respect that we perceive others to have for us, then it 
seems inevitable that the self-respect of the older person denied treatment on the basis 
of their age will consequentially be diminished. 
Equal access to healthcare would of course obviate an older person's perception that 
society disrespects her, and her self-respect could be preserved even if her health did 
not improve as a result of treatment. Thus, for example, if a lottery system was to be 
used as a rationing device for health care rather than age, whereby each citizen had 
equal access to that lottery and equal chances of treatment, then even if those 
129 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, pp59-60. 
130 DeGrazia, 'Grounding a Right to Health Care in Self-Respect and Self-Estecm. ' 
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individuals were not chosen the self-respect of those denied treatment would have no 
reason to feel they were disrespected. 131 
A second example is taken from Bill Bytheway's book Ageism in which he 
interviewed a fit and healthy 58 year old ex-steelworker who was retrenched in 
1980.132 This older worker, we'll call him Bob, first sought employment at the Job 
Centre but was told that there were few firms willing to take on workers over 40, and 
that in effect he was 18 years too old to find employment. Bob then applied for a 
vacancy on a bricklaying course. He passed a physical and written exam and was 
accepted on to the course before the somewhat unobservant instructors fmally noticed 
his age. But once they did become aware that he was 58 they applied informal 
pressure on Bob in the form of constant supervision until he agreed to drop out. Bob 
was denied access to one of the social bases of self-respect, Le. access to meaningful 
employment, purely on the basis of his age and despite his proven ability to do it. And 
his self-esteem and self-respect may well have been damaged as a consequence. 
Therefore, the self-esteem and self-respect of older individuals may well be 
diminished by being denied goods and liberties such as employment, health care, 
voting rights, and sufficient income support. The fact that each person has a 
fundamental synchronic interest in enjoying self-respect, which, in turn is connected 
to their moral worth as persons, gives society reason to ensure older individuals 
access to those goods. 
"' See John Broome, 'Selecting people randomly,, Dhics 95 (1984): 56-67; Jon Elster (ed. ), Justice 
and the Lottery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
132 Bill BythewayAgeism (Buckinghain: Open University Press, 1995), pp34. 
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The diachronic interests each person has are those interests in their lives going well as 
a whole over its complete duration. They include whether goals and plans give a life 
meaning and coherence, and will include such things as; the pursuit of a meaningful 
career, longstanding personal relationships, raising a family, and other long-term 
projects that involve large investments of effort over time. 133 Naturally many of the 
interests I perceive myself to have at any temporal moment will be shaped by the 
long-term projects I am pursuing, but they certainly won't all be. It is often assumed 
by thinkers and lay people alike that the diachronic interests of people will be more or 
less fulfilled, or as substantially fulfilled as is likely, by the time they reach old age. 
This is one of the 'instinctive assumptions' that Dworkin makes when explaining his 
'frustration theory' as to why people feel that it is a greater tragedy when a young 
person dies than when an old person dies. 134 But this assumption implies that 
synchronic interests are reducible to one's diachronic: interests, and if so then it also 
implicitly justifies the restricting of benefits from the old on the basis that they have 
very limited interests. If we assume that, on the one hand, our diachronic interests are 
all but fulfilled by the time of old age, and if, on the other hand, we believe that all 
our synchronic interests are entirely shaped by our long-term interests, then we would 
have to say that old people could not be thought to have any interests at all. The only 
way they could be thought to have synchronic interests would be if they had the 
capacity to develop new diachronic interests in their old age, but it is another ageist 
assumption that old people naturally do not have this capacity. Moreover, it is 
"' Of course I may choose to neglect some of my synchronic interests for a period while I pursue 
certain diachronic goals. For example, I might wish to work feverishly to finish a work of art and 
neglect to maintain my nutritional status. 
134 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion, chapter 3. Basically there is a greater frustration of the 
investments made by both the person themselves and others to the extent that those investments are not 
fulfilled. As old people are assumed to have substantially fulfilled those investments, the frustration 
caused by their deaths is relatively benign. 
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assumed that they would not want it. Thus, old people are often thought to have no 
interests at all whether synchronic or diachronic. What I have argued in this section is 
that each person does have fundamental synchronic interests, that they are related to 
our intrinsic moral worth as persons, and for that reason they should not be neglected. 
2.3 Ageism and youthism 
The second question I identified at the beginning of this chapter that arises in any 
discussion of ageism is whether or not the concept should include discrimination 
against young people. There would seem to be few grounds in principle for confining 
the concept of ageism to older age groups, and some definitions of ageism are 
ambiguous because it is not made explicit whether they ought to be thought of as 
inclusive in this way. Bytheway, for example, argues that the ageism experienced by 
young people is the same phenomenon as that experienced by older people, but the 
experience itself is radically different. ' 135 But he does not explain why it is radically 
different. 
Sandra Fredman does explicitly restrict her discussion of ageism to that directed 
against the old, and points out that while the young will grow out of their age group 
and escape youth discrimination, older people cannot escape their age and the 
attached stigma and stereotyping, material disadvantage and social exclusion. 136 Old 
age can therefore be thought of as immutable in a way that youth is not, and 
consequently 'discrimination against older people has closer links with gender 
discrimination and disability discrimination than it has with discrimination against 
135 Bytheway, Ageism, p 13. 
136 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p6o. 
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younger people. ' 137 Nevertheless, Fredman's observation that ageism against the old 
and that against the young are in some ways qualitatively different for those who 
experience them does not explain why it is relevant that young people have afuture 
that is free from being affected by stigma and stereotypes, while it is not relevant in 
the case of the old that they have had a past that was free of such oppression. 
On the face of it there would seem to be many issues that although perhaps 
138 
experienced differently, are nevertheless similar in both ageism and youthiSM. 
Firstly, ageing is a process rather than a fixed feature about individuals, and a process 
that is different for each individual. Thus, while there is no biological or 
psychological point at which old age begins, so too is there no point at which 
childhood ends and adulthood begins. Secondly, both groups are the subjects of moral 
panics that regularly develop within society. In chapter II described the currently 
ongoing moral panic over the perceived 'demographic time-bomb' facing society with 
the large increase in the proportion of old people relative to young, and the attendant 
worries of an increase in the power of the old to consume more than their fair share. 
Similarly there are regular panics concerning young people who are often perceived 
as a threat to social order and established morality. Just as the old are often seen as out 
of date, obsolete, burdensome, and redundant to a productive society, so the young are 
often seen as immature, impressionable, idealistic and lacking insight into how the 
real world works. For both groups these characteristics would seem to make them ill- 
suited to have much control on the destiny of society, but rather that they themselves 
need controlling. 
"' Ibid. 
138 These similarities will often be ignored by those who defend the interests of either one or the other 
group- 
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A third similarity between the two groups of young and old is that they are both 
perceived to be vulnerable to harm from others and at the same time dependent upon 
others for the satisfaction of their needs. Just as Help the Aged and Age Concern 
regularly remind us of the poverty and physical abuse experienced by many older 
people, so to do groups that represent the interests of children regularly remind us of 
the poverty and abuse experienced by many children. Figures released by the Child 
Poverty Action Group show that Britain had 3.9m children living in poverty in the 
year 2000/0 1,139 while some 7% of children suffer physical abuse in their own homes 
from their parent or carers. 140 
A fourth similarity, related to vulnerability and dependence, is that both the old and 
young must make 'trade offs' between their synchronic and diachronic interests. And 
this introduces the idea of paternalism because, while both a very old person and a 
very young person each have a synchronic interest in autonomy, it will not always be 
in the interest of their well-being to exercise it. For that reason it is sometimes 
difficult to determine the correct balance between their autonomy and their safety. 
Some degree of autonomy is good for a child's development but he cannot be allowed 
to choose whether or not he goes to school each day, because that would obviously 
not be in his long-term diachronic interests. The synchronic interests he has in 
autonomy is sometimes therefore in conflict with his diachronic interest in reaching 
adulthood with as many options open to him as possible, and so in having as good a 
life as possible as a consequence. Similarly, an old woman in her 80s may wish to 
139 Child Povcrty Action Group, Child Poveqv Figures: Very Disappointing (London: CPAG, II April 
2002). 
140 NSPCC, Child Maltreatment Survey (London: NSPCC, 2000). 
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embark on a long trip that her family and GP believe will irreparably damage her 
health, and they may try to prevent her from exercising her right to autonomy for this 
reason. This conflict between synchronic and diachronic interests, and the recognition 
of vulnerability and dependence as a condition of both adults and children, is 
particularly significant as parallels between the two phenomena of ageism and 
youthism. 
Child liberationists, or 'kiddie libbers' as they have been called, like John Holt, argue 
that children should have the same rights as adults including the right to vote, to 
detemine their own education, engage in sexual activities, and to use drugs. 141 He 
argues that to deny children these rights is both paternalistic and oppressive. The 
usual response to suggestions like Holt's is that children should not have these rights 
because they lack the ability to exercise them in a responsible way, and that enjoying 
such rights would be detrimental to both their immediate as well as their long-term 
well-being. Children undoubtedly lack the foresight and insight that comes from 
maturity and life experience to weigh their synchronic and their diachronic interests. 
Therefore, rather than releasing children from oppression, giving them equal rights 
with adults would leave them open to abuse and exploitation by manipulative 
manufacturers and paedophiles. Such liberty would inevitably lead to the oppression 
of children rather than their release from it. 
In line with the temunology within this thesis we can characterise these different 
views about paternalism and child liberation in the following way. Holt believes that 
the traditional paternalist approach to the protection of the interests of children is that 
141 john Holt, ESCapefrOM Childhood.. The Needs and Rights of children (London: Penguin, 1974). 
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it gives too much weight to their diachronic interests and insufficient concern for the 
synchronic autonomy. However, Holt's answer is to give exclusive weight to a child's 
synchronic; interests to autonomous choice and this would bring them predictable 
harm. The problem has parallels with a criticism I raise against egalitarian ageism in 
chapters 4 and 5 in that, by implicitly or explicitly assuming the CLV and giving 
exclusive weight to the diachronic interests of persons, the synchronic interests of the 
elderly may be consequently harmed. 
One approach to the problem that focuses upon the interests of the child is that of 
John Eekelaar. 142 This approach identifies three different interests that the child has; 
basic interests necessary to the child's well-being such as adequate food, clothing and 
shelter, and the promotion of her physical, emotional and intellectual care; 
developmental interests such as education and a rational socialisation; and autonomy 
interests that a child has in making decisions for herself While basic and 
developmental interests are unlikely to conflict, there is a strong possibility that both 
will come into conflict with the child's interests in exercising her autonomy. 
However, where a clash between these interests does occur, Eekclaar argues that 
developmental and basic interests should trump the interest of autonomy. 
That children have an interest in being able to make decisions for themselves, 
Eekelaar believes, should be respected by adults provided those decisions do not 
infringe their basic or developmental interests, or endanger their diachronic interests 
in having as good a life as possible. The aim of this approach is '[t]o bring a child to 
the threshold of adulthood with the maximum opportunities to form and pursue life- 
1,12 John Eekelaar, 'The Interests of the Child and the Child's Wishes: The Role of Dynamic Self- 
Determinism, ' Irdemational Joumal ofLaw and the Family 8 (1994). 
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goals which reflect as closely as possible an autonomous choice. ' 143 Children should 
be allowed to make even bad decisions for themselves, and allowing them this 
experience will also help to develop their skills in making choices and predicting the 
consequences of those choices, but also develop their self-respect and self-confidence. 
Eekelaar calls this a dynamic of self-determination, and 'the process is dynamic 
because it appreciates that the optimal course for a child cannot always be mapped out 
at the time of decision, and may need to be revised as the child grows up. It involves 
self-determination because the child herself is given scope to influence the 
outcomes. ' 144 
PresumablY, however, this approach would continue to involve some level of 
paternalism until such time that the individual is deemed to be sufficiently mature that 
their various interests no longer need to be balanced by a third party. Otherwise, as 
Jonathan Herring points out, the approach could be extended to justify restrictions on 
the rights of individuals to autonomy throughout their lives. 145 For example, a twenty 
year old who enjoys a hedonistic lifestyle rather than studying or developing her 
career is restricting her interest in autonomy in later life, as is a middle-aged person 
failing to provide fmance for her retirement. If there is no biological or psychological 
cut off point when people become adults then perhaps paternalism is an approach that 
should be followed throughout life. However, Herring argues that Eekelaar's 
approach provides us with a reason for distinguishing between the treatment of those 
incapable of decision-making as children and those whose incapacity is due to illness 
143 lbid, p53. 
I" ibid, p48; fi162 on p156. 
"' Jonathan Herring, 'Children's Rights for Grown-ups, ' in Sandra Fredman & Sarah Spencer (eds. ), 
Age as an Equality Issue (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), p 157. 
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in old age, because 'Eekelaar's emphasis on leaving the child with an open future 
would have no application for an incompetent person near the end of their lives. ' 146 
Thus, although there is no obvious reason why a theory of ageism and old age should 
not also be applicable to youth there has nevertheless been a tendency for writers and 
commentators to examine the two temporal ends of human life as different entities 
and in isolation from one another. Nevertheless, there are strong parallels between 
Eekelaar's theory and the one that I present in this thesis, i. e. that individuals have 
both temporal and complete life interests and that these might conflict and may 
require a degree of balancing. Thus, while it is not possible to come to a definitive 
conclusion it is important to recogr; ise the parallels that exist between ageism and 
youthism, and the taxonomy of ageism outlined below would be applicable to 
I 
youthism as well. 
2.4 Is ageism the problem or just poverty? 
There are of course those who argue that the concepts of ageism and age 
discrimination are really not problems for society or any of its citizens. Richard 
Posner, for example, argues that ageism is not really something that exists outside the 
minds of 'some radical egalitarians' who 'see discrimination everywhere'. "7 It is 
undeniable that there are many older persons who are materially comfortable, 
especially with the final salary pensions enjoyed by the professional classes up until 
recently, and along with acronyms like 'Yumpies' (young upwardly mobile people) 
146 lbid, p156. 
147 Richard Posner, Aging and OldAge (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
p204. 
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there have been 'Jollies' (Jet-setting oldies with lots of loot), 'Opals' (older people 
with affluent lifestyles), and 'Woopies' (well-off old people). Indeed, as we have seen 
in chapter 1, there is a particularly prominent stereotype in the United States which 
holds that a comparatively well-off elderly social group uses its electoral power to 
systematically divert public funds away from destitute children for their own selfish 
benefit. However, these well-off individuals have in fact always been in the minority 
and their existence does not detract from the very real poverty of many very old 
people (as opposed to the recently retired), or the many others who are from less 
affluent social classes. To point to the Jollies does not disprove the existence of 
ageism as a form of cultural oppression any more than a minority of wealthy blacks 
disproves the existence of racism. 
Nevertheless, these criticisms of the concept of ageism rather miss the mark as far as 
the purpose of this thesis is concerned. The question might be posed as to why we 
should examine ageism when what we should really be concerned with is poverty. 
Those that defend the interests of the old will often use the stereotype that members of 
that group suffer poverty to a proportionately higher degree, or else they argue that 
the generational equity debate is itself based upon the stereotype that the older age- 
groups are proportionately better off than other needy groups. However, this is 
precisely the confusion and conflation of stereotypes and issues that makes any 
discussion of ageism, both its nature and wrongfulness, problematic. What this thesis 
seeks to do is to tackle the two substantive conceptions of wrongfiil age 
discrimination, or ageism; the egalitarian justification on the basis of age alone 
(subject to the acceptance of the CLV or FIA), and the culturally oppressive ageism 
that involves cultural stereotypes which convey negative judgements regarding the 
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moral and social worth of older people. My claim is that much of the confusion over 
the nature and wrongfulness of the concept of ageism may be the consequence of 
failing to make these two conceptions more explicitly separate. Neither of these 
conceptions of ageism can be reduced to the idea that the old are either rich or poor, 
or that they perceive of themselves as a self-interested social group. 
2.5 The ageism taxonomy 
The aim of this section is to construct a taxonomy of the different forms of age 
discrimination, both those that are wrongful and those that are benign, and to briefly 
outline the main distinctions between them. Age discrimination may either be 
intrinsically wrong because it is based upon and motivated by moral or social 
judgements of negative worth, or else it can be extrinsically wrong in the sense that it 
involves the neglect or thwarting of certain fundamental synchronic interests of the 
elderly. The term 'ageism' is defiried here as uTongful age discrimination. The 
taxonomy to be developed can be summarised in the figure below. 148 The most 
wrongful forms are then discussed in much greater depth over the rest of the thesis. 
Cultural ageism is examined in chapter 3, and egalitarian ageism over chapters 4 to 6. 
The wrongfulness of ageism motivated by reasons of efficiency can be subsumed into 
egalitarian ageism insofar as the extrinsic reasons for its wrongfulness are the same 
(although of course the reasons that motivate it are different). 
"s I do not suppose that this taxonomy is exhaustive, and there may be further forms of age 
discrimination that I have not thought of Note also that idiosyncratic ageism has been defined as 
extrinsically benign to the extent that those individuals holding intrinsically wrong judgements do not 
act on them in such a way as to harm the interests of older persons. It is, however, likely that they 
would. 
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Taxonomv of Age Disciimination 
Extrinsically wrong 
Intrinsically (i) Cultural ageism; based on 
wrong (a) Negative moraIjudgements 
(b) Negative sociaIjudgments 
Intrinsically 
benign 
(iii) Egalitarian ageism 
(iv) Ageism motivated 
by reasons of efficiency 
(i) Cultural ageism 
Extrinsically benign 
(ii) Idiosyncratic 
ageism 
(v) Positive age 
discrimination 
(vi) Egalitarian based age 
discrimination 
What I have called cultural ageism is wrongful for the two reasons set out in the first 
paragraph of this section. Firstly, it is intrinsically wrongful because it is based upon 
false negative judgements regarding either the moral or social status of individuals 
merely in virtue of their age. Secondly, cultural ageism is extrinsically wrongful 
because when people are motivated by those false judgements to act in certain ways, 
these actions will lead to unjust consequences for older persons. Such negative moral 
and social judgements about other people are rarely if ever held by persons on a 
random basis, and would usually be secondary to a more widely held set of beliefs or 
ideology in society. As we have seen in the previous chapter, there is much evidence 
to suggest that such an ageist ideology does exist, and because it involves cultural, 
stereotypes and the assumed existence of social groups this ideology is a form of 
cultural oppression. 
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The consequences of cultural ageism for older people may run along a continuum. At 
one end of this continuum minor preferences of older persons may be thwarted by 
those who hold negative judgements regarding their worth, while physical violence 
and death may result at the other end depending upon the virulence of the moral bias 
held against them by others. Nevertheless, as we shall see in chapter 3, the 
consequences of cultural ageism are not limited to the restricting of the rights of older 
people to access various social and private goods, or even to those things necessary to 
satisfy their basic needs. The consequences of cultural ageism, as with any culturally 
oppressive ideology, will also include the potential for many of the victims to 
internalise the negative cultural meanings that the oppressive stereotypes convey, and, 
as a result, may even come to accept the discrimination they face as natural or just. 
Such internalisation and self-abnegation then leads to an undermining of the self- 
respect of older persons and so diminish their capacity to make autonomous choices. 
Another consequence of cultural ageism is that it may be self-reinforcing. That is, 
insofar as the discriminatory actions that are motivated by cultural stereotypes express 
negative judgements regarding their moral and social worth those actions thereby 
confirm the inferior status that many people assume older people to embody. In 
chapter 3 we see how, as a consequence of the reactive qualifications many employers 
look for when recruiting employees, such discriminatory actions reinforce negative 
cultural judgements. Thus, cultural ageism consists of both judgements of negative 
moral and social worth, but, although these are qualitatively different in theory, the 
discriminatory treatment they motivate may in practice not substantively differ for the 
victims. 
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(a) Cultural ageism motivated by judgements of negative intrinsic moral worth 
This form of ageism involves individuals holding a moral bias, a judgement that those 
who are of a certain chronological age, or who share the visual features and supposed 
characteristics of the old thereby lack intrinsic moral worth merely by possessing 
those traits. As I noted in section 1, most non-consequentialist moral theories 
acknowledge that each person embodies intrinsic moral worth, and I argued that this 
moral worth remains equal and unchanging throughout the life of a person. Thus, the 
assumption that older people no longer posses this status relates to the second 'kind of 
ageism' distinguished by Lesser, i. e. the 'attributing to members of a particular age 
group characteristics they do not in fact possess and using it as a ground for adverse 
discrimination. 149 These negative moral judgements will also tend to be categorical in 
the sense that those that hold them would think them valid in all social contexts, and 
would seek to always avoid the company of older people. 
(b) Cultural ageism motivated by negative judgements of social worth 
This second form of cultural ageism is based upon the judgements that question the 
social use of older people, or their ability to contribute to the well-being of their 
community and to other citizens within it. In contrast to the diachronic nature of the 
intrinsic worth of persons, social worth is synchronic in the sense that it may differ for 
a person at different parts of their lives, and it applies only to citizens rather than to 
persons. It applies only to citizens because to have social worth involves an individual 
being an actively participating member of a cooperative community working towards 
149 Lesser, 'Ageisin, ' Encyclopedia ofApplied Ethics, p87. 
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mutual advantage, and it is only individuals who are at the same time citizens of a 
society that are such participants. 
It is true that some older persons will embody less social worth because they are 
either unable to actively participate or do not wish to, but it is certainly not true of all. 
Moreover, old people often contribute to the economic and social well-being of both 
the society as a whole and to fellow citizens in ways that are not readily recognised. 
For this reason this second form of cultural ageism relates to Lesser's third kind of 
ageism, that of 'attributing to members of a particular age group characteristics 
possessed by only some of them, and using it as a ground for discrimination. ' 50 As 
noted above, it would, in any case, be wrong to discriminate against individuals and 
penalise those who, although perhaps embodying less social worth, nevertheless wish 
to participate. Society should instead seek ways to provide them with that capacity 
and so recognise their social worth. We should also note that, again in contrast to 
negative moral judgements, judgements of negative social worth will sometimes be 
contextual rather than categorical, and that older persons would often be thought to 
embody less social worth in some social contexts but not in others. 
(ii) Idiosyncratic ageism 
We have said that individuals would normally hold judgements regarding the negative 
moral and social worth of others because those judgements are part of a more widely 
held ideology within society. However, it is possible that some people hold negative 
moral judgements that are idiosyncratic in the sense that they are not the product of a 
'30 Ibid. 
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widely held culturally oppressive ideology, but rather of the psychological 
peculiarities of the individuals that hold them. Imagine for example that I believe that 
people with red hair are morally inferior. Although there are a few stereotypes about 
red-headed people being more hot-tempered than the average person, this is an 
insufficient basis for many people to think that they embody negative moral worth. 
Thus, such negative moral judgements about red-heads do not manifest a form of 
cultural oppression, and my holding those beliefs are an idiosyncratic form of 
intrinsically wrong discriminatory judgement. It is intrinsically wrong because it 
involves judgements of negative moral worth, but as it is not part of a culturally 
oppressive ideology, the consequences for any individuals affected will be isolated 
rather than systematic. Indeed, an intrinsically wrong idiosyncratic moral bias would 
in fact be extrinsically benign to the extent that the individual holding it does not act 
on that prejudice and harm the interests of others. Moreover, because it is not part of a 
cultural ideology it is unlikely that individuals will internalise an idiosyncratic moral 
bias. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that any negative judgements regarding the elderly 
would not be a product of cultural ageism, and even if it were so the effects of an 
idiosyncratic bias against older people would be indiscernible from cultural ageism. 
Thus, idiosyncratic ageism has been defmed in the table on page 83 as extrinsically 
benign to the extent that those holding such judgements do not act on them in such a 
way as to harm the fundamental interests of older persons. However, in practice it is 
likely that they would. 
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(iii) Egalitarian ageism 
This form of ageism owes its wrongfulness neither to negative judgements of social or 
moral worth, or to the consequences of discriminatory practices based upon such 
judgements. Rather, egalitarian ageism owes its wrongfulness to the consequences of 
a strict application of egalitarian principles such as the complete life view (CLV) and 
the fair innings argument (FIA), and for that reason it is consequentially or 
extrinsically wrong. The explicit or implicit acceptance of the complete life view 
(CLV), for example, recognises that the interests of each separate person should be 
given equal consideration over their complete lives, and this justifies providing each 
person with an equal diachronic share of benefits. However, the CLV logically 
condones what Dennis McKerlie has called 'taking places egalitarianism', which 
permits one part of one's life in which we are poor to compensate for another pad of 
our lives when we are well OE151 If the CLV is accepted as a premise of political 
morality then it will condone the restriction of benefits to the elderly (or to the young) 
if that meant greater equality over a complete life between separate individuals. Such 
concern for diachronic equality thus leads to a neglect of the fundamental synchronic 
interests of individuals, and it may be wrong for that reason. Therefore, egalitarian 
ageism relates to the first of Lesser's taxonomy of ageism, that of 'using the mere fact 
of chronological age as grounds for adverse discrimination'. 
151 Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time, ' Ethics 99 (1989): 492-502. 
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(iv) Ageism based upon reasons of efficiency 
As we have seen in chapter I discrimination against older people is often motivated 
by a concern for efficiency. This is especially the case within the distribution of health 
care where health economists seek to maximise the efficiency of the finite resources 
at their disposal in order to ensure maximal welfare for society as a whole. The 
concept and use of the QALY is an example of this. As far as the argument of this 
thesis is concerned, though, such policies would be wrong for the same reason that 
egalitarian ageism is wrong, Le. to the extent that they manifested the neglect or 
thwarting of the synchronic interests of individuals. 
(v) Positive age discrimination 
This form of age discrimination is particularly contentious for two reasons. Firstly, it 
is pulling in the opposite direction to all the other categories of discrimination within 
this taxonomy and actually implies that discriminating on the basis of age is morally 
required. Secondly, the concept of positive age discrimination is contentious because 
any negative age discrimination against the old might equally be portrayed as positive 
discrimination in favour of the young. 
Positive discrimination in the context of race and gender is motivated for two reasons; 
firstly, to bring about an equality of opportunity between black women and white 
men; and secondly, as a way of challenging negative cultural stereotypes. These goals 
are closely linked in the struggle against racism and sexism because by overcoming 
the negative cultural stereotypes the members of these groups are more likely to enjoy 
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diachronic equality of opportunity with white men in the long-term. However, within 
the context of age these two goals are detached because positive age discrimination in 
essence promotes one part of an individual's life over another part, and diachronic 
equality is itself a justification for discriminating against the old. Nevertheless, as I 
discuss in the next chapter, if we detach the two goals then positive age discrimination 
may still have a role in challenging cultural stereotypes, though this is likely to 
conflict with diachronic equality. Moreover, an appeal to positive age discrimination 
would probably only be applicable within the social context of employment 
recruitment and training, because, as I noted in chapter 1, that social context is the one 
most obviously influenced by cultural ageism. 
(vi) Egalitarian based age discrimination 
This form of age discrimination is both intrinsically benign because it involves no 
culturally oppressive moral or social judgements, and it is extrinsically benign 
because the consequences do not violate the fundamental synchronic interests of the 
old. Indeed, discriminatory treatment that is based upon reasons of efficiency should 
show equal concern for the synchronic interests of all citizens. And it should do this 
even if they involve categorising people into age groups for the purposes of 
efficiency. One example might be the free influenza jabs that are offered to the 
elderly. The reason they are freely offered is because the state wants the elderly to 
take the jabs almost as much as older individuals would want to take them. However, 
the practice shows an equal concern for the synchronic interests of all citizens, and 
not just the elderly, because by ensuring the elderly are less affected by the flu virus 
each year means there will be less of a bed shortage in hospitals during the winter. 
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The degree to which egalitarian based age discrimination is to be permitted would 
again be constrained by the moral requirement that the fundamental synchronic 
interests of the elderly (or of any other age group) are neither thwarted nor neglected 
as a consequence. The problem in practice is determining where that threshold would 
lie. 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has drawn two fundamental distinctions that allow the construction of a 
taxonomy of age discrimination. Cultural ageism is intrinsically wrong and is defiiied 
in terms of negative judgements that derive from a widespread culturally oppressive 
ideology. These judgements may concern either the social or moral worth of an older 
person. In contrast, egalitarian ageism is thought by many to be justified by normative 
reasons of equality rather than negative moral judgements, and it is therefore 
intrinsically benign. Egalitarian ageism is nevertheless extrinsically wrong to the 
extent that it has consequences that harm the synchronic interests of older persons. 
Cultural ageism is the more obviously wrong and will be discussed in the next 
chapter. Egalitarian ageism is more complex and will be discussed, along with its 
wider implications for egalitarian political theory, over chapters 4 to 6. Ageism that is 
motivated by reasons of efficiency will not be much discussed on its own because the 
reasons for which it is wrong are essentially the same as for egalitarian ageism: it 
harms the fundamental synchronic interests of older persons. The three extrinsically 
benign forms of age discrimination will also not be discussed by this thesis, though 
the question of positive age discrimination is addressed in relation to cultural ageism 
in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three: The nature and combat of cultural ageism 
Having outlined the taxonomy of age discrimination this chapter goes on to develop 
some of the ideas integral to the category of cultural ageism. Included in this is a 
discussion about the dynamics that work between the two social constructs of cultural 
stereotypes and social groups. The notion that the old form a separate social group, 
and that there are cultural stereotypes that both identify the members of this group and 
describe the nature of those members, is integral to the definition of ageism. 
Moreover, there are some obvious parallels between cultural ageism, racism and 
sexism, that are not shared between these other oppressions and egalitarian ageism, 
and these are also examined in more detail. 
By the end of the chapter I hope to have also explained why we can talk about ageism 
as an example of cultural oppression in its own right rather than merely being one 
aspect of economic or political oppression. I outline the way in which both the causes 
of cultural ageism and its effects work to both diminish the opportunities of the 
elderly to form, revise and pursue new conceptions of the good in their later years, 
and to consequently diminish the degree of self-respect that many of them can enjoy. I 
examine the inadequacies of much contemporary liberal philosophy when it comes to 
combating culturally oppressive ideologies like cultural ageism, and I will argue that 
contemporary liberal egalitarian theory ought to seek to establish a just cultural 
environment. To this end I defend a form of cultural combat, the advocacy strategy, 
that aims to challenge the cultural stereotypes that convey both negative moral and 
social judgements, and I argue that this strategy is compatible with mainstream liberal 
egalitarianism. 
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3.1 Cultural ageism as an oppressive ideology 
Drawing on the discussion in chapter 2 (section 1) we can say that cultural ageism is 
based upon false judgements concerning the moral and social worth of older citizens, 
and for that reason it is intrinsically morally wrong. Moreover, cultural ageism is 
distinctive from racism or sexism in the sense that it is a cultural oppression of a 
synchronic period of a person's life, and its effects will involve the harming of certain 
fundamental synchronic interests of those persons rather than the harming of 
diachronic interests which is the consequence of racism and sexism. These harmful 
effects would then constitute an extrinsic wrongfulness. The phenomenon is cultural 
because it involves shared social meanings regarding old age and what it is to be old. 
And it is oppressive in its effects to the extent that these meanings are negative and 
work to restrict the opportunities open to older people, and to the extent that they 
infiltrate the conscious of older persons leading to a diminished level of self-respect 
and moral agency. 
The concept of culture is rarely discussed within liberal theory except within the work 
of liberal multiculturalists, like Will Kymlicka, who argue that cultural membership 
provides a range of meaningful options for individuals to choose a valuable life 
plan. 152 Multiculturalists argue that different cultures ought to be tolerated within 
liberal theory to the extent that they contribute positively to the formation of 
conceptions of the good life, and this involves discussions regarding how one culture, 
152 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
p166. 
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that of the liberal host culture, can and should tolerate the existence of other cultures 
within it. 
An alternative view of the concept of culture is taken by thinkers like Clifford Geertz 
who, instead of seeing it as a wide and meaningful range of life options from which to 
choose, view it instead as a form of restraint on the options available to individuals. 153 
Geertz views culture as 'a set of control mechanisms - plans, recipes, rules, 
instructions (what computer engineers call 'programs') - for the governing of 
behaviour. ' 154 This more pessimistic view of the role of culture means that as 
individuals we do not come to know a good in isolation but against a background of 
values implicit in one's culture. And, because we are what Andrew Kernohan calls 
'finite creatures' with limits to our time and reflective capacity, we cannot adequately 
reflect upon all the values one acquires from one's culture: we will simply accept 
many beliefs about value without reflecting on them. 155 
From this perspective, therefore, a culture is a form of structure or a framework for 
the making of meaningful choices about how to live. Karen Warren has described this 
cultural conceptual framework as a set of basic beliefs, values, attitudes and 
assumptions which form a socially constructed lens through which we perceive 
ourselves and others. 156 The cultural lens of each individual is, in turn, affected by 
153 Clifford Geertz, 'The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man, ' in The 
Interpretation ofCultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). 
154 lbid, p44. 
1-15 Andrew Kernohan, Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
1511 Karen J. Warren, "Ibe Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism, ' Environmental Ethics 12 
(1990): 125-146. 
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such features of their lives as gender, race, class, age, affectional orientation, 
nationality, and religious background. That is to say that the lens is conditioned by 
one's social and economic position within that culture. As a result of this conditioning 
some conceptual frameworks are oppressive in the sense that they justify and maintain 
relationships of domination and subordination between different classes, races, 
genders, and even age groups. 
However, oppression comes in several forms. Personal oppression, on the one hand 
involves a relationship between two individuals in which one person oppresses the 
other, and there is an obviously responsible agent. Social oppression, on the other 
I 
hand, involves numerous members of a society being engaged in a set of actions that 
collectively oppress other members of that society over time, and there is no one 
determinate agent responsible. The social oppression itself also takes a number of 
forms including economic, political, and cultural, and it is the latter that involves the 
cultural formation of negative attitudes about the worth of others or oneself, with 
corresponding beliefs about the naturalness of social and moral inequality. 
It is a contestable issue as to which social form of oppression might be fundamental 
and whcthcr it is the cconomic, political or cultural forms that sustains the othcrs, but 
Kymlicka for one acknowledges that at least some forms of cultural oppression would 
continue to exist even within a politically and economically egalitarian society: 
Liberals tend to believe that cultural oppression cannot survive under conditions of 
civil freedom and material equality. But there may be some false and pernicious 
cultural representations that are invulnerable to social criticism. 157 
157 Will Kyrnlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1990), p257. 
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The example of 'false and pernicious representations" discussed by Kymlicka is that 
of pornographic images of women which would continue to oppress women even 
within conditions of economic equality. And it is surely plausible that if a widespread 
moral bias existed in the form of a culturally oppressive ideology then even if those 
we despise have no more or less economic power than we do we would continue to 
despise them. 
We should therefore view culture in the way Kernohan describes it, as 'the totality of 
socially transmitted beliefs, meanings, values, ideas, norms and institutions that form 
the background of our lives %158 and we should understand cultural oppression as the 
social transmission of false ethical beliefs regarding the worth of others, or attitudes 
that convey social meanings which support such false beliefs, and the harmfiil actions 
these beliefs motivate in others. As Susan Sherwin notes, these beliefs often become 
6so well established that they have been internalized by both those who suffer under 
them, and those who benefit from them; they remain invisible to many of the people 
most directly involved. ' 159 
Naturally an oppressive culture involves relations of power, but a sexist culture does 
not have power itself, rather it allows men to have power over women. Similarly, an 
ageist culture allows the young and middle-aged to have power over the old and to 
make decisions that discriminate against them. Culturally oppressive judgements 
regarding the supposed inferiority of women or the old often seem natural and even 
just, and it thus seems fair to many in society today that we should discriminate 
15g Ibid, p48. 
15' Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics andHealth Care (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1992), p 14. 
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against the old in the distribution of and access to healthcare. Thus, although cultural 
oppression is devoid of determinate agency it nevertheless makes the members of one 
group vulnerable to the power of another. 
I said at the beginning of this section that cultural oppression harmed both the self- 
respect of persons and their moral agency. It harms moral agency because it affects 
not only the outcome of people's choices but the very process of deliberative choice 
itself Culturally oppressive judgements, usually in the shape of stereotypes, are 
internalised by both victims and oppressors and they inhibit the agency of the former 
as a consequence. Cultural oppression is therefore a form of power that conditions the 
beliefs of both oppressors and victims and socializes some individuals into accepting 
a subordinate status, and almost everyone into thinking that this is natural. An obvious 
example of this is the fact that although the subjection of women in Western society 
existed for generations (perhaps forever) that fact was not recognised until recently. 
As J. S. Mill pointed out a century and a half ago the condition of subjection was 
deemed to be natural. 160 
As a consequence of its inhibiting influence upon agency cultural oppression 
diminishes the ability of persons to rationally form, revise and pursue conceptions of 
the good, an ability that is widely accepted as one of the highest attributes of 
persons. 161 Therefore, individuals who are oppressed in this way will tend to choose 
less rewarding conceptions of the good than they might otherwise had their cognitive 
160 J. S. Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869). 
"I John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p505. 
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deliberation not been infiltrated by oppressive cultural judgments regarding their 
moral and social worth. 
The damage to, or restricted development of, the conceptions of the good that are 
chosen by the culturally oppressed is closely related to the level of respect that its 
victims perceive that they hold within their community, and the level of self-respect 
that they have. Therefore, self-respect, which is fundamental to the well-being of a 
person, and which Rawls believes to be the most important of the primary social 
goods, will also be diminished by the phenomenon of cultural oppression. As Rawls 
points out 'our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of others. Unless we 
feel our endeavours are honoured it is difficult or impossible to maintain the 
conviction that our endeavours are worth advancing. ' 162 
There are therefore several harms associated with cultural oppression: it makes other 
forms of oppression seem natural; it interferes with the interest that individuals have 
in coming to know what is best for them; and it will have the tendency to diminish the 
level of self-respect that victims enjoy. Moreover, the negative moral and social 
judgements that constitute cultural oppression are ideological in the sense that they 
are a set of beliefs or values that systematically explain the position of the social 
group, and justify that group's subordinate status. 163 Ageist stereotypes make up part 
of this ideology that systematically devalues the moral and social worth of elders. It is 
systematic in the sense that immoral discrimination against the elderly takes place on 
162 IbidpI78. 
"" Jon Elster, 'Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality, ' (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), pl4l. See also Anthony Giddens, Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), 
p727; and Bill Bytheway, 4geism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p 116. 
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a societal scale through social institutions and practices as well as between 
individuals, and it systematically produces oppressive social relations between 
younger and older citizens. 
3.2 Cultural ageism and political philosophy 
Hilde Lindeman Nelson notes that there are few accounts of cultural oppression 
within political philosophy. 164 However, in the few discussions of the concept that do 
exist very little is ever said about ageism. When the term is used it often appears that 
the author uses it merely as part of a strategy to give more weight to the point they are 
making, and they add the term 'ageism' to a long list of other reasonably plausible 
and recognizable forms of oppression. 165 Tbree brief examples will elicit the point. 
Firstly, in his rejection of cultural oppression Kernohan extends John Rawls' theory 
of the moral equality of persons and the idea that natural endowments of talents are 
undeserved. He notes that the distribution of natural talents is just as 'arbitrary from a 
moral point of view' as the assertion of birthright in an aristocratic society. Kernohan 
then argues that 'other natural characteristics of persons such as skin, colour, sex, age, 
disabilities, ethnic background, and sexual orientation are similar factors for which 
people can not be held responsible'. 166 This would seem to imply that treating 
Ifilde Lindeman Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair (New York: Cornell University 
Press, 2001), p108- 
165 Kernohan, Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression, 53; Nelson, Damaged Identities, 
Narrative Repair p 16; Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp44,54,127. 
166 Kemohan, Liberalism Equality, and Cultural Oppression p52. Rawls himself briefly mentions 
racial discrimination on p 19 ofA Theory ofJustice, and race, sex and cultural background on p99. 
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someone"s highest order interests differently on the grounds of age would be arbitrary 
from a moral point of view. But we have already seen that this is not necessarily the 
case, and those that advocate age discrimination on the basis of diachronic equality 
justify treating someone's interests differently on the grounds of age precisely 
because it is not morally arbitrary to do so. It thus remains to be explained by 
Kernohan why age should be included in his list of morally arbitrary sources of 
discrimination. 
A second thinker who uncritically lists ageism amongst several other forms of 
oppression is Iris Marion Young, who examines what she calls the 'faces of 
oppression'. "' Young conceptualizes oppression in cultural terms, and describes its 
five faces as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and 
violence. The five faces function as criteria for determining whether individuals are 
oppressed rather than as a full theory of oppression, and different group oppressions 
exhibit different combinations of these forms. Her discussion of its application to the 
old is both brief and vague, though, and she merely asserts that '[o]ld people are 
oppressed by marginalization and cultural imperialism, and [that] this is also true of 
physically and mentally disabled people'. 1611 The concept of marginalization involves 
a category of people that are expelled from useful participation in social life, and 
potentially subjected to material deprivation. However, this rather vague explanation 
of marginalized groups includes the following: 
old people, and increasingly people who are not very old but get laid off from their 
jobs and cannot find new work; young people, especially Black and Latino, who 
cannot find first or second jobs; many single mothers and their children; other people 
167 Young, Justice and the Politics OfDifference, chapter 2. 
168 lbid, P64. 
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involuntary unemployed; many mentally and physically handicapped people; 
American Indians, especially those on reservations. 169 
One feels tempted to ask whether any conceivable group that is popularly associated 
with discrimination has been or could have been left out of this conception by Young. 
Young then discusses what she calls the 'scaling of bodies', and she claims that 
members of oppressed groups are locked inside their objectified bodies. The 
(normalizing gaze' of science focuses on 'the objectified bodies of women, Blacks, 
Jews, homosexuals, old people, the mad and feeble-minded', and '[flrom its 
observations emerged theories of sexual, racial, age, mental or moral superiority'. 170 
Again, one wonders what possible help such a broad, general and vague 
understanding of the ideas of marginalization and objectification can provide us with. 
What Young does is to start by developing a concept of cultural oppression and then 
assume that there is only one form of ageism, which must be culturally oppressive 
along with every other kind of discrimination. This I believe is a mistake. Rather than 
trying to make particular patterns of discrimination fit an already constructed theory 
of cultural oppression one should instead begin the process of theorizing by 
examining the particular form of discrimination itself, and then compare it with the 
dynamics of other discriminations. If we do this for ageism we find that not all 
wrongful discrimination against the old is in fact culturally oppressive. Indeed, to 
assume that every form of age discrimination is culturally oppressive is to weaken the 
position of anti-ageists, because it is possible for others to point to alternative 
motivational reasons for such discrimination. 
169 Jbid, p54. 
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A third philosopher who has briefly alluded to ageism in her work is Hilde Nelson 
who believes that the systems of beliefs that People hold are closely related to the 
social construction of their identities, and she describes as 'doxastic damage' the 
distorting and poisoning of people's self-conceptions caused by negative cultural 
beliefs. Her theory relates to the idea of a narrative ethics, and the construction of 
selves through master narratives of which cultural stereotypes are an important part. 
Nelson identifies some of the currents at work in oppressive power relations between 
social groups and defines them as; expulsive, pressive, preservative, and dismissive. 
She then gives a very brief example of how these currents relate to popular ideas 
about the old by saying that 'ageism pushes the elderly out on the margins of social 
life but doesn't, for the most part, insist on killing them'. 171 
What this very brief survey of the few inclusions of the concept of cultural ageism 
within political philosophy shows is that although the concept is not seriously 
analyzed, its actual existence as an oppressive ideology is something that is assumed. 
Very little time or effort, however, is given to either explain what is actually meant by 
6ageism' in these contexts or how it relates to other forms of oppression such as 
sexism, racism, classism, or disableism, if indeed it does at all. Ageism is a form of 
cultural oppression that these authors expect most of their readers to instantly 
recognise, even if they have only a vague understanding of what constitutes ageism, 
and even though that vague understanding is little helped by the philosophers 
themselves who include that concept within their theories. It would seem that the only 
reason that references to ageism are included within these discussions of oppression is 
to intellectually bludgeon readers into accepting the theory of oppression presented, 
170 lbid, p127. 
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rather the hope of gaining any real understanding of the concept of ageism itself or of 
any other forin of oppression on their lists. 
3.3 Cultural ageism and the elderly as a social group 
A fundamental issue that arises from any definition of ageism is the degree to which 
stereotypes and social groups play a part in the concept. Lesser's second and third 
'kinds of ageism' seem implicitly to involve some dynamic between social groups and 
stereotyping in the sense that individuals are attributed characteristics which either 
only some members of the social group have, or in fact none of them have. 172 It seems 
that every culture has had a conception of old age and what it means to be old, but the 
meanings of those concepts, whether negative or positive, have varied widely. 173 
Now, although these phenomena are closely related, so closely in the case of ageism 
in fact that one would not exist without the other, I will nevertheless examine them 
separately. The question for this section then is whether the elderly actually do exist 
as a social group sufficiently distinct from race and gender. 
Firstly, then, how do we determine whether or not the old do in fact constitute a social 
group? Gordon Streib has argued that there are plausible grounds for thinking of the 
aged as a minority social group and that its individual members are attributed a 
subordinate social status. 174 He claims that: 
Nelson, Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair, p 140. 
Harry Lesser, 'Ageism, ' Encyclopedia of, 4pplied Ethics, Volume I (Academic Press, 1998), p87. 
"" Nancy Foner, Age in Conflict. - A cross culturalperspective on inequality between old andyoung 
(New York: Columbia Press, 1984). 
"' Gordon F. Streib, 'Are the Aged a Minority GroupT in 13. Neugarten (ed-), Middle Age andAging 
(Chicago, 11: Chicago University Press, 1965). 
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In many respects the aged show characteristics of a minority group. They are subject 
to categorical discrimination, they have relatively high visibility, and, in many parts 
of our society they constitute a functioning subgroup. Stereotypes are held about the 
group, and individuals are judged thereby. Prejudice is not uncommon, especially in 
industry,.... Thus, the ingredients necessary to the development of minority group 
status are present for the aged. The characteristics commonly attributed to minority 
groups as a result of such categorization may be expected to develop among older 
persons. 175 
Streib alludes to a number of subjective and objective characteristics here that, if 
shared by most members of a social category, would mean that they constituted a 
social group, and we shall now examine them each in turn. Firstly, there is the idea 
that members of the group have a 'relatively high visibility'; that they posses certain 
identifiable characteristics that would mark them out as members of the elderly. In 
other groups like blacks, Asians, and women, the identifiable characteristics are often 
fairly obvious. But as ageing is a gradual process many people will look older than 
they are while others look younger, and it is not obvious when an individual ceases to 
be middle-aged and becomes old. It is thus not possible to determine when a person 
joins the elderly social group simply by looking at him. Nevertheless, ageing is a 
visible characteristic and people in society will generally be able to agree when 
someone looks 'old'. In any case, other groups, like Jews, are not always readily 
'visible' but that does not prevent negative cultural stereotypes to motivate very 
damaging discrimination against them. 
Secondly, the identifiable characteristic that marks someone as a member of a social 
group at the same time conveys a particular social status upon that individual, whether 
positive or negative. There is, to say the least, an absence of special marks of privilege 
"I Ibid, p157. 
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attached to aging in the 'West' which are found in other cultures. 176 Western society 
generally associates the old with obsolescence, decline, and death, and stereotypes 
abound regarding their low social status as at best an irrelevance and at worst a 
burden that is parasitic to society. These negative images of the old exist 
independently from race, gender, or class, though the conditions of older individuals 
may tend to be exacerbated by these further social categorizations. 
A third characteristic of a social group is that there will often be relations of 
dominance and submission with regard to other groups in society, and the status 
characteristic tends to lead to differentiated access to power, privileges and rights. As 
Gordon Streib argues, the idea that the elderly are under-privileged is the principle 
reason that many commentators have identified the elderly as a minority group. 177 But 
it is not true to say that civil rights are legally denied to the elderly, and, despite the 
fact that a large number of the old are poor, the proportion of the economic, political 
and social elite who are also old is quite high. Moreover, those who are needy in old 
age will often have been needy for most of their lives, which suggests a connection 
with class, and there is likely to be a high concentration of elderly poor amongst racial 
minorities. This might suggest that ageism is at best a subset of other more obvious 
forms of oppression. But there is also no institutional segregation of the old from the 
young. Fewer than 5% of the old live in care or residential homes, and although old 
individuals may live alone they are not ghettoized in the way that people marked by 
"6 John A. Vincent, Inequality and OldAge (London: UCL Press, 1995). See chapter three for a 
discussion of how being old differs between societies, and how in some societies the old enjoy great 
privilege in virtue of their age while in others old age confers an inferior status. 
177 Streib, Are theAged a Minority Group? p38. 
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class and race are. Of course, women, are not ghettoized in a physical sense either and 
yet they too are often marked out as a culturally oppressed social group. 
A fourth characteristic of social groups is that their members usually have some 
degree of group consciousness, a way of identifying fellow members and recognising 
that they have a common cause with them. While the social category of blacks has a 
shared history that may plausibly exclude other racial groups, the aged as a social 
category has no independent past or history of its own that is not linked to other age 
groups. Individuals within a birth cohort do have a shared history but that history has 
passed through the earlier age groups with that cohort. Although there has always 
been an old age group its individual members are not only just passing through it, but 
those individual members pass through it at different times. At one temporal moment 
two individuals might be in different age groups, one old (70) the other middle-aged 
(55), but at another moment, the two may both be considered old while their ages 
remain the same number of years apart, and when one is very old (85) and the other 
old (70). Thus the group's members are not permanent or exclusive in the way that 
many other social groups are, and although a person becomes a permanent member of 
the 'elderly' age group once she has attained a certain age (because she will only 
leave that age group with her death), membership is not exclusive in any way because 
almost everyone will eventually have had a turn to be old. There is, therefore, likely to 
be significantly less collective identification with one's age group than with other 
social groups where membership is exclusive and permanent, or at least chosen. 
Moreover, because of the biological weakness of the connectedness old people have 
with one another they will also often have stronger attachments to younger people 
within their family than they do with many other old people. 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is little empirical evidence to show that people 
identify with their age group in the same way that they might with their class, or 
ethnic background, or sexual orientation. Indeed, there is in fact much evidence to 
suggest that although older people acknowledge the existence of the 'old' as a social 
group they nevertheless dissociate themselves from that group in a way that members 
of other social groups do not. 178 Minichello shows that whatever their age many older 
people often deny that they are 'old', 'elderly', or 'aged', because these terms denote 
negative cultural meanings. I believe the fact that older people do not deny the 
existence of an elderly social group, but then vehemently deny their own membership 
of it despite their age, illustrates the social power of the assumed existence of certain 
groups in the collective imagination. 
This question of whether the group consciousness among the elderly is either strong 
or weak is an important aspect to the debate over generational equity, and the degree 
to which the elderly do shape public spending in ways that benefit themselves to the 
detriment of younger citizens. If there was a weak group consciousness amongst the 
elderly then this would seem to be reflected in what John Vincent et. al. have 
identified as their lack of readiness to organise as a cohesive political pressure 
178 V. Minichello, J. Browne, & H. Kendig, 'Perceptions and Consequences of Ageism, 'Ageing and 
Society 12 (2000): 253-278. This tendency has, however, been challenged by Arnold M. Rose, The 
Subculture of the Aging: A Topic for Sociological Research, ' in B. Neugarten (ed. ) MiddleAge and 
Aging. 
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group. 179 This would also suggest that the concerns that motivate commentators like 
Van Parijs to suggest ways of disenfranchising the elderly are unfounded. ' so 
A fifth characteristic that is often thought to be a precondition to the existence of a 
social group is that there be an identifiable subculture of which the members of the 
group are a part. This characteristic is obviously closely related to the previous issue 
of a collective identity because the existence of a definitive subculture that members 
recognise would strengthen collective identity. But it is also possible that although the 
old share a subculture they do not recognise the fact and so do not recognise that they 
do in fact have a collective interest around which they should unite. 
One writer that incorporates the notion of a shared subculture within her 
understanding of what constitutes a social group is Iris Young, and her definition of 
that concept is 'a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by 
cultural forms, practices or way of life'. 181 What this suggests, as Brian Barry 
forcefully points out, is that her definition 'makes the possession of a distinctive 
culture the feature that defmes somebody as a member of any social group'. 182 But 
although Young includes the 'old' as an example of a social group she says nothing 
about what an aged subculture might look like. Barry dismisses this characteristic of 
social groups altogether and claims that '[o]ld people are defmed by age, not by 
179 John A. Vincent, Guy Patterson & Karen Wale, Politics and OldAge: Older Citizens and political 
Processes in Britain (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001). 
I" Phillippe van Parijs, "Ibe Disenfi-anchisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts to Secure 
Intergenerational Justice, ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1999): 292-333. 
"1 Young, Justice and the Politics ofDifference, p43 (see also p 186). 
192 Brian Barry, Culture andEquality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p306. Emphasis added. 
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sharing some 'old people's culture'. 183 But it is not just the aged for whom Barry 
believes a subculture is irrelevant when defining them as a group, and he argues that 
membership of the disabled group is in virtue of a physical condition rather than a 
cultural trait, and while there may be a 'gay lifestyle' only some gay and lesbian 
people choose to adopt it. 
184 
Barry does acknowledge that 'there is an irresistible case for making discrimination 
based on age illegal', but believes that if this happened most of the cases brought 
would not be for indirect discrimination based on some cultural attribute distinctive to 
those over some age. 185 It should be noted that Barry is dismissive of the whole idea 
that social groups with conflicting interests actually exist within society, but if he 
believes anti-ageist legislation is required then this suggests that he also 
acknowledges that the old are identified in some way, otherwise they would not be 
discriminated against. Thus, we do not need to believe that the old share any kind of 
subculture in order to acknowledge the existence of ageism and the adverse influence 
it has on the interests of older persons. 
However, 
. 
although we may agree that a shared culture is not a necessary 
characteristic of a social group, there have nevertheless been attempts to defend the 
idea that the old do participate in a subculture. 186 Arnold Rose, for example, believes 
that a subculture can be expected to develop within any category of the population 
... Ibid, p96. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
116 Rose, 'The Subculture of the Aging: A Topic for Sociological Research., 
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when its members interact with each other more than they do with persons of other 
categories. Such insular interaction occurs under two possible sets of circumstances, 
both of which he believes pertain to most older people in Western society. The first 
circumstance is that the members have a positive affinity for one another on some 
basis, and secondly, that members are to a significant degree excluded from 
interaction with the members of other social groups. And the greater the segregation 
of older people from other age groups the greater the likelihood of a development of a 
subculture amongst them. What that subculture actually looks like is left as an open 
question by Rose for further research. However, from what we've already said in this 
section it would seem that at least one of the preconditions for the development of a 
subculture (i. e. that old people have a positive affinity for one another) is not usually 
fulfilled. And I would argue that society ought to avoid the appearance of the second 
precondition (i. e. segregation) in order to ensure an inclusive society. Older persons 
do not as a rule have a greater affinity with each other than they do with younger 
people. And, although the old may very often be excluded from a wider inter-age- 
group interaction the reasons for that are that the old face problems like the lack of 
mobility, limited resources, and widespread cultural prejudice: it is not because they 
are officially excluded from certain civil and political rights. However, it is van 
Parijs' suggestion that these very exclusions should be introduced as a way of 
overcoming what is often perceived as too great an identification of older people with 
the selfish interests of their age group. But van Parijs' proposals would in fact create 
the very precondition that Rose identifies as necessary for that greater collective 
affinity to develop. 187 
"' Rose himself implies that any subculture of the aged would be confined to the poorer, less well 
educated elderly, because the greater connectedness the individual has with the wider society through 
interaction with younger people, or through mass media, and continued employment, the less likely the 
old are to identify with their age group rather than with other social groups and social issues. 
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Indeed, because the probable consequence of such discrimination would increase the 
'visibility' and identification of older individuals we may have a strong reason for 
challenging Van Parijs' suggested disenfranchisement of the elderly. Firstly, such 
discrimination against elderly people would make them more readily identifiable 
because their chronological age would officially determine their differentiated civil 
and political rights. Secondly their status as citizens would be markedly diminished in 
that they would no longer enjoy equal civil and political rights. The readiness of 
individuals to organise as an identifiable and politically coherent pressure group has 
always been related to the realisation that their group characteristics deny them equal 
access to power, and if we disenfranchise the elderly the same trend is likely to 
happen. It is therefore possible that no measure would actually do more to bring about 
intergenerational conflict than one of Van Parij's suggested policies for avoiding it. 188 
I would argue, therefore, that the elderly are easily identifiable as such, and that their 
physical characteristics of age denote a subordinate status in modem society. 
Nevertheless, their membership as a social group is not exclusive, they have little or 
no sense of group consciousness, and they are not defined by any shared culture that 
is separate in some way from wider society. However, social groups are social 
constructs and it may in fact not be necessary for us to prove that the 'elderly' exist as 
a social group in any objective sense, provided enough people assume that they do. It 
is just this subjective criteria that leads us to the sixth and final characteristic which 
Streib identifies as a feature of social groups; 'that stereotypes are held about the 
I'll Such explicit and direct discrimination would also seem to give official legitimacy to the negative 
social stereotypes that imply the elderly are more selfish than other age groups. 
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group, and individuals are judged thereby. "89 Such stereotypes both identify the 
individual members of the group and provide norms of response to those individuals. 
Stereotypes will convey judgements concerning the moral and social worth of such 
persons and these judgements, if we accept them, will condition our responses to 
those individuals. Therefore, as I argue in section 3.5, if a large enough web of 
cultural stereotypes abound within society then the individuals they purport to identify 
and describe can for all intents and purposes be assumed to constitute a social group. 
Before doing so, however, I first want to examine why it might be self-defeating for 
anti-ageists to portray the old as constituting an identifiable social group. 
3.4 Why anti-ageists should not portray the old as a social group 
A fundamental feature of social groups is that the individuals who are thought to 
constitute them are in some way considered to be different from the rest of us, and 
that suggests a 'them' and 'us' dichotomy with some distance between the two 
groups. This distance and difference between the old and other members of society is 
precisely what cultural ageism presupposes, and the negative stereotypes that abound 
within society seek to describe the nature of that difference by conveying judgements 
of the lesser moral and social worth concerning the elderly. If, as anti-ageists, we 
were to simply champion the interests of the 'old' over the 'young' we would 
reinforce the idea that older people constituted a separate social group with interests 
that conflicted with their younger compatriots. We would be confirming the claims of 
those engaged in the 'generational equity' debate who represent this supposed conflict 
between the 'old' and the 'young' in relation to the distribution of available resources. 
189 Streib, 'Are the Aged a Minority Group?, p 157. 
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The anti-ageist concern to refute the claims of groups like Americans for Generational 
Equity (AGE) that older people are inherently selfish, and the need to challenge the 
negative assumptions about the elderly that are implicit within 'disengagement 
theory', suggests that anti-ageists should decry the idea that the old constitute a 
separate social group. 190 
However, while we should refute the idea that older people constitute a social group it 
is not obvious that a liberal anti-ageist ethic would require us to abandon all 
distinctions of the kind that are usually made, between young, middle-aged, and old, 
however unclear those boundaries are. 191 Such social categorisation does not in itself 
seem to be a moral problem, even when it involves differential treatment in public 
policy. What is important is that the categorisation is not motivated by negative 
cultural stereotypes and that the policies that use these classifications do not neglect 
the fundamental synchronic interests of the old. Indeed we can refer to the 'elderly' as 
a social category in order to direct public policy in an efficient way, insofar as it helps 
to provide statistics that would, for example, correlate the demand for certain drugs 
among older people with the supply of sufficient funds to the NHS to purchase those 
drugs. In short, the use of social categorizations does not thereby imply the existence 
of a social group, and it does not premise a 'them' and 'us' dichotomy. Society needs 
to ensure an inclusive culture rather than one that emphasizes difference, and we 
191 Anti-ageists would commonly deny 'difference' between the old and young because they wish to 
reffite anyjustification of different treatment that is likely to be to the detriment of the old. However, 
difference theorists like Young might actively seek to encourage the development of a group 
consciousness amongst the old as a way of asserting their interests in society. 
191 We can, for example, make an analogy between the process of ageing and the process of education. 
They both are never ending processes. However, although education is a process we nevertheless tend 
to categorise individuals into different groups on the basis of their level of educational development 
and achievement: ill/well educated; literate; urbane; etc. in the same way we can classify individuals as 
presently existing at different stages of chronological development. 
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should ensure that the social relations between those perceived as old and young are 
equal. 
3.5 Cultural ageism and the role of stereotypes 
It is conceivable that the negative moral and social judgements that some people hold 
about others could be idiosyncratic in the sense that the discriminator simply decides 
upon these negative judgements for themselves, but as I noted in the taxonomy, these 
are likely to be rare and not a concern for social justice. Nonnally, as David 
Wasserman notes, 'individuals do not regard groups as morally inferior on a random 
basis', but rather the 'contempt for and devaluation of the members of a group is 
informed by a social and institutional structure that consigns the [members of a] group 
to a particular 'place' and endows its members with particular attributes. ' 192 
As noted above, the ways in which we act towards people and objects within society 
are largely guided by social norms, and stereotypes represent powerful examples of 
these norms. What stereotypes do is incorporate an aspect of an assumed identity of 
certain individuals, creating a cultural image of them which then conveys stories 
about their characters. Stereotypes themselves involve at least two moral norms, 
norms of identity and norms of response. The norms of identity presuppose the 
existence of a particular social group, and describe the characteristics, behavioural 
traits, and social and moral worth of the individual members of that group. Moreover, 
such norms allow us to identify particular individuals as members of that group. The 
192 David Wasserman, 'Discrimination: Concept of, ' in Encyclopedia ofApplied Ethics, Volume I 
(Academic Press, 1998), p810. 
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norms of response then provide non-group members with a range of attitudes and 
actions in regard to those social group members which are normally deemed to be 
culturally appropriate. 
Once someone is identifiable as a member of the 'elderly' then this social fact may be 
taken as a proxy trait for other features of her personality that imply a lack of social 
worth, i. e. that she has old fashioned ideas about morality, that she is less adaptable 
and slower to learn, that she is 'out of touch' with the contemporary social world, that 
she plays no part in economic productivity, or that she uses her electoral vote solely to 
ensure that a high percentage of the national product continues to be spent on her age 
group. Cultural images of the old may also convey judgements of negative moral 
worth, and these would imply that old people do not share the same moral rights as 
younger people, and that younger persons do not have the same moral duties towards 
the old as they do towards other young people. 
Once the norms of identity of a particular stereotype have created the cultural image 
of a social group, and they have identified the defining characteristics and the worth 
of members, as well as the proxy traits that will identify particular individuals as its 
members, the norms of response then guide our attitudes and actions towards these 
individual members. It is within the norms of response that the activity of 
discrimination is justified, and 'wrongful' discrimination often takes place as a 
consequence of the existence of unreflected prejudices and moral bias based upon 
inaccurate or irrational negative stereotypes. For the elderly, if the norms of identity 
have identified members as generally embodying negative social worth because they 
are judged obsolete then it justifies discrimination against them in the rationing of 
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access to healthcare and of recruiting or training older workers. If the norms of 
identity defme the elderly as embodying negative moral worth, then the norms of 
response might permit more directly harmful attitudes and actions. 
The cultural images and mental pictures that stereotypes create concerning certain 
kinds of people can hold our imaginations captive because those same stereotypes 
normalize and naturalize our assumptions of their differential worth. In this way 
stereotypes become part of what Margaret Walker has called the 'epistemic 
firewall'. 193 The epistemic firewall confines the way we normally perceive the 
condition of others. Negative assumptions seem natural because they are so widely 
held, and the harms they cause individuals are not recognised because they have been 
normalised. Because stereotypes keep our imaginations captive in this way we do not 
always reflect upon their accuracy and legitimacy. The very nature of cultural 
oppression, therefore, is that the prejudices people hold are thought not to be 
prejudices. People are often socialized into holding the prejudices they do, and those 
prejudices are often assumed and unreflectively endorsed by persons as being 
Inatural'. Moreover, as I have argued above, in addition to categorizing people by 
their socially ascribed group membership, and determining how others should treat 
them, these norms of identity and response may come to be accepted as natural and 
just even by those discriminated against. Thus, as Grimley Evans has noted, '[a]geist 
prejudice is deeply and widely pervasive in British society', and '[i]t is treated as in 
some way 'natural', even by many older people. ' 194 
"' Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics (Rowan & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc, 1998), p173. 
194 Grimley Evans, 'Age Discrimination: 1hplications of the Ageing Process, ' in Sandra Fredman & 
Sarah Spencer (eds. ) Age as an Equality Issue (oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003), 
p2O. 
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Older individuals will perceive that they are categorized by society at large as 
members of a particular social group about which there exist derogatory stereotypes, 
and because these stereotypes seem natural they may accept and use them to structure 
their own conduct and preferences and conceptions of the good. As social beings we 
partly construct our own identities from the cultural meanings around us, and so 
internalized cultural stereotypes that identify people as embodying lesser moral or 
social worth may result in those people become self-abnegating. Once the old have 
internalized the negative stereotypes, and accepted their inferior status, they are likely 
to become less assertive and are in danger of not being able to ftilfil their synchronic 
interests in having as good a life as possible. 
Therefore, although there is significant interdependence between the concepts of 
social groups and stereotypes, I believe that at least as far as cultural ageism is 
concerned, negative stereotypes arc fundamental in the sense that they exist before 
cultural oppression can take place. Stereotypes identify the elderly as a social group, 
they determine the features that designate individuals as members of that group, and 
they determine the way those individuals will be treated. The idea that the 'elderly' 
might constitute a social group would not therefore have meaning without the prior 
existence of cultural stereotypes. Of course this is not necessarily true for all social 
groups, and the membership of those groups that are based upon religion or ethnicity 
will often be subjectively defiried by the individual members themselves. But this is 
not the case for the 'elderly'. There would be no point supposing the existence of a 
social group unless there were stories to tell about its members, and if the supposed 
members do not identify themselves as such then stereotypes will often do the job 
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instead. Thus, we can defme stereotypes as popular stories and plotlines that can be 
told about individuals who share certain characteristics, and which describe the 
nature, character, behaviour, patterns of thinking, and the social and moral worth of 
such individuals. At the same time they prescribe ways in which 'we', the rest of us, 
should react to individuals embodied within that description. And negative cultural 
stereotypes are therefore a fundamental cause of cultural ageism rather than merely a 
manifestation of it. 
We should at this point make a couple of qualifications to this critique of stereotypes. 
Firstly, stereotypes do not need to be negative. One example of a positive rather than 
negative stereotype concerning older people is what can be loosely described as 
'sagism'. It is the generalised idea that older people are wiser than younger ones 
because they have been around for longer and seen more of life. Again, though, this 
may of course be true of some older people, but by no means is it applicable to all. 
People are usually thought wise if they have had many and varied experiences from 
which they have learnt a great deal about life. But individuals may have lived a long 
life precisely because they have successfully avoided much life experience, and have 
thus avoided many of the corresponding risks. There are old fools just as there are 
wise youngsters. Moreover, this positive stereotype does not carry much weight in a 
society of rapid technological change where the wisdom of older generations is 
widely thought to be outdated and irrelevant to modem living. Nevertheless, it would 
not be morally wrong for people to act on the positive stereotype of sagism, if it does 
not form part of an oppressive ideology, and does not adversely affect the interests of 
others to any significant extent. 
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Secondly, generally speaking not all negative stereotypes need be irrational or 
wrongful. It is perhaps a stereotype that most convicted thieves are likely to steal 
again, and that they have less social worth as a result because they are less likely to 
play a supportive role in a cooperative society. Naturally, while this may be true of 
many convicted thieves it is not true of all, and there are many ex-criminals who find 
it difficult to 'go straight' in the face of adverse discrimination. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be said to be morally wrong to hold that particular stereotype because it is 
based upon the past actions of the individuals themselves. Ageist stereotypes are not 
like this. 
3.6 Why Cultural ageism is not economic or political oppression 
Understanding the negative cultural stereotypes as a cause of cultural ageism rather 
than as a manifestation explains two further features about this form of oppression. 
Firstly, it explains why we describe this oppression as cultural rather than economic 
or political, and secondly, it suggests a way of challenging cultural ageism. This 
second issue will be examined in section 3.9, but I will discuss the first issue here. 
Whether an individual is subject to cultural oppression depends upon two things. 
Firstly, whether or not she can be defmed by others as a representative of a social 
group, and secondly, whether there is an extensive web of negative stereotypes 
regarding members of that particular social group. The degree to which members of a 
particular social group are culturally oppressed would depend upon the number of 
negative stories that can be told about them. If we return to the example of red-headed 
males in chapter 2, and we imagine a social policy that required categorisation by hair 
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colour, we would have to say that it is a category about whose members there are few 
stories to tell. As we have said, the only story that can really be told about red-headed 
men is that they are sometimes thought to be relatively more hot-tempered than the 
average man, but this is hardly a sufficient cultural identity to oppress an individual 
male who happens to have red hair. While there is no obvious way of determining 
exactly how many negative stories are necessary in order to define a group as 
culturally oppressed, it must obviously involve a plurality of such stories, and there is 
just such a plurality of stories regarding the old. 
A critic of the view put forward here might say that people are primarily marginalised 
through economic forces, and that negative cultural stereotypes develop as 
explanations and justifications of that economic marginalisation. Thus, blacks are 
stereotyped as lazy and intellectually slow because they are relatively predominant 
among the poor, and members of the 'lower' social classes are stereotyped as less 
dynamic and motivated because they are poor. This view would claim that cultural 
stereotypes are merely a manifestation of the oppression rather than its essential 
cause, and any action taken to reform our culture and challenge cultural stereotypes 
could only ever tackle a symptom of the oppression rather than its root source. And 
the reason for this would be that the supposed real source of the oppression, i. e. 
economic domination, would be left unchallenged by cultural reform. The oppression 
would thus continue. 
in many situations there may well be significant overlap between the effects of 
economic domination and cultural oppression, and there is little doubt that the force of 
negative cultural stereotypes will be strongest against those individuals who are 
120 
economically marginaliscd, while those older people who remain economically active 
and who are well-off will not be subject to them to the same extent. Nevertheless, as I 
have argued above, it seems to me that in regard to older persons, ageist cultural 
stereotypes do form a cultural identity and that this is the source of a unique form of 
oppression. It is because negative stereotypes create cultural ageism that we can 
describe it as a form of cultural oppression rather than economic or political 
oppression, 
3.7 Is it appropriate to base ageism on models of sexism and racism? 
Another important question that arises from any understanding of ageism is whether it 
is appropriate to base it on the models of 'racism' and 'sexism", and again, 
diametrically opposed positions have been taken on this issue. On the one hand, as we 
have seen, Butler views ageism as analogous to those other models because he sees it 
as 'a process of systematic stereotyping and discrimination against people because 
they are old, just as racism and sexism accomplish this for skin colour and gender'. 195 
Bytheway and Johnson on the other hand try to distance ageism from other 'isms' and 
to emphasise instead its uniqueness as a form of oppression in its own right. 196 This 
section argues that what is unique about ageism is the dual dimension between its 
cultural and egalitarian forms, and that each dimension has at least one common 
feature with both racism and sexism which they do not share with one another. 
`3 Robert N. Butler, 'Ageism, ' in 77w Encyclopedia ofAging (New York: Springer Publishing 
Company), p22. 
196 Bill Bytheway &Julia Johnson, 'On Defining Ageism, ' Critical Social Policy 27 (1990): 27-39, 
p33. 
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However, we should start by examining why we cannot simply agree with Butler and 
model ageism on racism and sexism. 
Many anti-ageists like John Grimley Evans claim that '[A]geism is ... as great an 
affront to the supposed values of our society as sexism or racism' 197 Nevertheless, 
many people would not find this claim intuitively compelling because it is not 
generally thought that ageism leads to the same kind of violence against the elderly 
that perhaps racist ideas often do against ethnic minorities. Moreover, to model 
ageism on racism and sexism is to assume that racism and sexism are themselves 
largely similar in nature, but this too has been challenged. Ann Dummett argues that 
the analogy between racism and sexism breaks down as soon as we examine their 
respective consequences for the victims. 198 She claims that sexism maintains women 
in a subordinate social position to men, but that 'racism denies the right of certain 
people to be alive. " 99 Therefore, the 'difference between sexism and racism is not one 
of degree, but kind'. 200 If Dummett is right then we should understand racism as 
denying the intrinsic moral worth of members of certain racial groups while sexism 
merely questions the instrumental social worth of women. Both are forms of cultural 
oppression but there is a qualitative difference between them. And if sexism is so 
different from racism then perhaps ageism is very different from both. 
'97 John Grimley Evans, 'Age Discrimination: Implications of the Ageing Process, ' p20. 
198 Ann Dummett, 'Racism and Sexism: A False Analogy, ' in James Rachels (ed. ), Moral Problems 
(Harper Row: New York, 1979): p45. 
'99 Ibid, p39. 
200 Ibid, p4O. 
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However, I believe this is too simplistic a view of the differences between racism and 
sexism, and Dummett is wrong on two counts. Firstly, not all racism implies that 
members of a certain race have no right to life; and secondly, some sexism does deny 
that right to life. In fact, both sexism and ageism may involve the active killing of 
women or old people. In certain sexist cultures infant girls may be left to die or be 
actually killed because they incur greater long term expense and fewer returns for the 
parents than boys. The fact that they are killed is precisely because they are female 
and because prevailing cultural meanings ascribe females less worth than males. 
Similarly, while certain forms of egalitarian ageism legitimate the denial of life saving 
resources or even the termination of life, cultural ageism, as we saw in chapter one, 
will legitimate bad treatment, violence and even killing in the minds of the 
discriminator. Thus, while ageism is not wholly similar to racism and sexism, neither 
is it wholly unlike them. 
The argument that ageism is unique originates in the simple fact that we are all going 
to be old one day, while we are not all going to be black or female. T'herefore, as we 
have said above, ageism has a dimension that other forms of oppression do not posses, 
and this fact is thought by some to explain what is wrong with racism and sexism and 
what is intrinsically benign about age-discrimination. Bill Byetheway puts the point 
thus: 
The unique character of ageism in later life can be best conveyed by evoking the ideas 
of worlds in which each over the course of a full lifetime slowly and consistently 
change from white to black, or from male to female; and conversely of worlds in 
which blacks and women have statistical life expectations of no more than 15 years. It 
is in this way that social responses to the ageing process and old people differ 
radically from those of gender and women and race and ethnic groups. 201 
201 Bytheway & Johnson, 'On Defining Ageism, ' p33. 
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Thus, it may be thought intuitively plausible that in some cases it is perfectly just, or 
at least 'less unjust', to discriminate on the basis of age, especially when resources are 
limited, because the period within one's life when we are discriminated against will 
be compensated for at another period of our lives with a greater access to benefits. 
This may even make it rational for people to accept a society in which discrimination 
on the basis of age alone is prevalent, and the synchronic quality of the discrimination 
(as opposed to the diachronic quality of racism and sexism) in some way militates 
against the seriousness and harms that age discrimination causes its victims. 
However, if it is this synchronic quality that makes ageism permissible we might ask 
whether racism and sexism would not continue to be unjust even if they too were 
synchronic and that, over the course of a full lifetime, people did slowly and 
consistently change from black to white or from women to men. Would a racist and 
sexist society cease to be unjust simply because racist and sexist views only 
discriminated against individuals for a part of their lives? Some egalitarians argue that 
such synchronic inequality is wrong irrespective of whether it is compensated for later 
on, because that inequality nevertheless involves a form of domination. Dennis 
McKerlie, for example, argues that even if people take turns to experience wealth and 
poverty, and so are as well off as each other over their complete lives, this does not 
detract from the wrongfulness of the inequality that exists between each of them at 
each temporal moment. 202 What we need in order to challenge this assumption is an 
appeal to the idea that social relations between persons should remain equal 
throughout their lives. If inequality is wrong, and it continues to exist through time, 
then the wrongfulness continues as well irrespective of the fact that first one and then 
Dennis McKerlie, 'Equality Between Age-Groups. ' 
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another person has a turn to be well Thus, while there are aspects of the 
concept of ageism that are unique its effects may be no less unjust. 
We therefore have some parallels between racism, sexism and ageism, and some 
important differences. However, I believe we can construct a model that helps make 
sense of these various similarities and differences, and to do this we can draw on the 
analysis of Lawrence Thomas. 204 Thomas argues that there are two significant 
differences between racism and sexism, and this analysis in turn helps us to 
understand the differences between the two forms of ageism-that I have identified. 
Thomas argues that: (a) sexism, unlike racism, readily lends itself to a morally 
unobjectionable description; and (b) the positive self-conception of men has been 
more centrally tied to their being sexists than has been the positive self-conception of 
whites to their being racists. And, as a consequence of these two features, sexist 
attitudes are that much more difficult to dislodge. 205 
The reason Thomas suggests that sexism is often thought to be unobjectionable is that 
there is a crucial difference concerning the relationship between discriminators and 
those discriminated against. Sexism might be described as unobjectionable to the 
extent that it does not involve malignant intent, and because it is based upon the 
203 To illustrate this point McKerlie describes a marriage in which circumstances dictate that first the 
husband and then the wife take turns in being dominant and subordinate. This is far from a perfect 
marriage despite the fact that over its entire duration they each have an equal amount of dominance. Of 
course, in this sense an ageist society might havejust as much inequality within it as a racist or sexist 
one, the only difference being that in a sexist/racist society two groups, men and women and blacks and 
whites, hold unequal positions for their entire lives, while in an ageist society the citizens took turns as 
in McKerlie's marriage example. 
204 Lawrence lbomas, 'Sexism and Racism: Some Conceptual Differences, ' Ethics 90 (January 1980): 
239-250. 
205 Ibid, p240. 
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traditional role of the man as benefactor and protector; that the man has a duty to 
protect and provide for his womenfolk. The relationship between racists and blacks 
does not give rise to any analogous role of beneficence, and Thomas argues, it is 
therefore very difficult to view racism in an unobjectionable light. Thus, sexism might 
be unobjectionable in this rather limited way, but ageism would seem to even more 
readily lend itself to a morally unobjectionable description. The problem for anti- 
ageists, as it is for anti-sexists, is that people must accept reasons for rejecting certain 
assumptions as unjust. And, as we have seen, the biggest problem for those that 
challenge egalitarian ageism, i. e. ageism defended on grounds of diachronic equality, 
is to explain why the idea of taking turns is wrong, and how it can be morally 
objectionable to discriminate against older people if all people are treated the same 
over a complete life and all end up with the same level of benefits over their complete 
lives. Egalitarian ageism thus lends itself to a morally unobjectionable description, 
though, as we have seen, this can be challenged as we have seen by appealing to the 
idea that social relations between persons should remain equal throughout their lives. 
The source of Thomas' second claim is an argument concerning the self-conception of 
sexists and racists. Thomas argues that the positive self-conception of men has been 
more centrally tied to their being sexist than has been the case for the self-conception 
of racists being racists. The traditionally-minded male, perceiving it to be his duty to 
provide for and to protect his wife, would be incapable of enjoying self-esteem if he 
was unable to perform this duty. Blacks, on the other hand, are not thought to play 
any role in the self-conception of whites. Indeed, while the self-identity of a man 
predicates the existence of women, the identity of a white Englishman does not 
predicate the existence of blacks or Chinese. Thus, being sexist may be an integral 
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part of a man's identity, while being racist is unlikely to be integral to a white man's 
identity. Thomas claims that racist attitudes are consequently more readily eradicated 
than sexist ones. 
In light of this insight the question for us here is whether ageists conceive of old 
people in a way that is closer to that of sexists or racists, i. e. is being ageist an integral 
part of a younger person's self-conception. Once again the difference between cultural 
and egalitarian ageism is fundamental, and I would argue that the latter does not 
construe old age in this way but that the former does. Indeed, we can see how some of 
the assumptions that constitute the cultural ageist ideology are arguably linked to the 
self-conception of younger people by examining the work of Iris Young 206 and Julia 
Kristeva . 
20' As we said earlier, Young argues that the members of oppressed groups 
are locked into 'objectified bodies' that are perceived by society as ugly, and, rather 
than being viewed by others as individuals, older people are perceived only as old 
bodies. These bodies are objectified both by the 'normalizing gaze' of modem science 
which medicalizes old age, and by the ideal of respectability which requires the 
conforming of the body to norms that repress sexuality, bodily functions and 
emotional expression. 208 Although ageist prejudice may not always be consciously 
verbalised it nevertheless continues to exist in the behaviour, images and attitudes of 
persons, and it often reveals itself within 'contexts of interaction - in the gestures, 
speech, tone of voice, movement and reaction to others'. 209 
206 iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 
207 Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay in Abjection (New York: Coltunbia University 
Press, 1982). 
2011 Young, Justice andthe Politics ofDifference, p135. 
209 Ibid, p 123. See also Arthur Brittan & Mary Maynard, Sexism, Racism and Oppression (Oxford: 
Blackwell Press, 1984): 6- 13. 
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Kristeva's concept of abjection, which again is expressed in reactions of disgust, 
provides a way of understanding the interactive behaviour between members of an 
oppressed group and what Young calls the 'dominant culture', or in this case between 
old and younger individuals. Younger individuals often find the bodies of the old ugly 
and loathsome because they are associated in Western culture with decline, decay and 
death. In confronting old people one confronts what one will eventually become, and 
this engenders fear. The youthful subject may consequently develop a 'border 
anxiety' about her identity. She is faced with the knowledge that her identity will 
undergo a change that is culturally associated with decay and this often leads to a 
displacement of that fear in to a loathing of the older bodies of others. Such fear and 
loathing may motivate violence against old persons because younger people wish to 
maintain a distance between their own current identity and that of their future, older 
self Old age is perceived as a disease, and the old as 'not fully human', and they are 
perceived in this way as a defensive device to maintain that distance. The 
development of a 'them' and 'us' relationship between those who perceive themselves 
as young and those whom they perceive to be old assists persons to maintain a 
distance between their current and future selves. Thus, cultural ageism, like sexism 
and unlike racism, may indeed be centrally tied to the self conception of younger 
people. The challenge for anti-ageists, as for anti-sexists, is the fact that people are 
disinclined to alter their behaviour if they have reason to believe that in doing so they 
would jeopardise their self-conception. 
There are, therefore, some features that ageism shares with both racism and sexisrn, 
and some features that it shares with one and not the other, and some features it shares 
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with neither of them. What is significant about this analysis is that, because there are 
two very different categories of ageism, there is at least one feature that egalitarian 
ageism shares with sexism and does not share with cultural ageism, and there is at 
least one feature that cultural ageism shares with racism and does not share with 
egalitarian ageism. In short, the question as to whether we should model ageism per 
se on the models of racism and sexism is far more complex than most ageists and anti- 
ageists have often supposed. The various similarities and differences between cultural 
and egalitarian ageism on the one hand, and racism and sexism on the other are 
summarised below. Those features that are common to two discriminatory forms ke 
indicated by their sharing a particular digit. 
Cultural Sexism Racism Egalitarian 
ageism ageism 
2121 
3344 
Key 
I -Me phenomenon readily lends itself to a morally unobjectionable description 
2- The phenomenon is unmistakably morally objectionable 
3- The phenomenon might be centrally tied to the self-conceptions of men/whites/younger persons 
4- The phenomenon is not tied to the self-conceptions of men/whites/younger persons 
This analysis shows that ageism as a single concept might be at least as difficult as 
racism and sexism to dislodge. The reasons for this are that egalitarian ageism shares 
with sexism the notion that it can be readily described in morally unobjectionable 
terms, while at the same time cultural ageism shares with sexism the notion that the 
attitudes they involve are centrally tied to the self co'nceptions of those who hold 
them. No progress can therefore be made in challenging ageism without first 
acknowledging the complexity of the concept. 
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3.8 The culpability of cultural ageism 
As I noted in section 3.1, unlike personal oppression, which involves one agent 
oppressing another, social oppression involves numerous agents oppressing numerous 
victims, often unconsciously and not necessarily with malice. There is thus no one 
agent responsible for the existence of culturally oppressive ideologies. For cultural 
ageism this oppression is motivated by a widespread acceptance of negative 
stereotypes regarding the moral and social worth of older persons. Although the 
stereotypes themselves are factually wrong, and individuals are wrong when they 
accept them, no-one is individually culpable for their existence or morally culpable 
unless they act on them in a way that harms the interests of others. I am wrong to 
believe that old people have less intrinsic worth, even if I refrain from acting on those 
beliefs, because there is no rational reason to suppose a person's age detracts from her 
moral equality any more so than if she were Jewish. But, because Kernohan is right 
that humans are finite beings with limits to their reflective capacity, and because 
stereotypes become part of an 'epistemic firewall' as Walker suggests, it is a moot 
point as to the level of responsibility any of us has for contributing to culturally 
oppressive relations. 
One practice worth discussing here, as an example of the contentious nature of 
culpability, is the issue of reaction qualifications (RQs). Alan Wertheimer defines 
1R, Qs as 'those abilities or characteristics which contribute to job effectiveness by 
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causing or serving as the basis of the appropriate reactions in recipients. Technical 
qualifications refer to all other qualifications. 210 Thus, in addition to the technical 
qualifications that employers look for in job seekers they also look for reactive 
qualifications, which is to say, how prospective employees will be perceived by both 
the public and other employees especially where interpersonal skills will be 
necessary. These reactive qualifications readily utilise cultural stereotypes and 
employers may not employ older workers if they believe the public might perceive 
those employees as 'passed it' or 'over the hill'. 
It is tempting to conclude that the morality of individual employers who consider RQs 
when making recruitment decisions follows straightforwardly from the morality of the 
negative moral and social judgements on which the reactions are based. Indeed, by 
not employing someone whom an employer expects customers to have a negative 
reaction to she also indirectly reinforces those negative judgements. This would be so 
even if her decision were motivated purely by instrumental rationality, i. e. that she 
will do more business with the prejudiced persons in the community if they do not 
have to come face to face with people they despise. Nevertheless, Larry Alexander's 
tentative conclusion is that the morality of one's treatment of RQs is not primarily a 
function of the intrinsic morality or immorality of the reactionS. 2 11 And the extent to 
which those that participate in cultural oppression are culpable is a function of their 
own reflective abilities. 
2 '0 Alan Wertheimer, 'Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, ' Ethics 94 (1983): 99-112, plOO. 
"' Larry Alexander, 'What Makes Wrongfid Discrimination Wrongful? Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, ' University oftennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992): 149-219, p 176. 
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Thus, no-one is individually culpable for the existence of culturally oppressive 
stereotypes, and it is uncertain what level of responsibility individuals have for 
accepting them as true and being motivated by them to act in ways that harm the 
fundamental synchronic interests of the old. What society has a responsibility for, 
however, is the combat of cultural ageism, along with the false negative stereotypes 
that both create and sustain it. 
3.9 Challenging cultural ageism 
We said in section 3.2 that, because negative stereotypes were the primary feature of 
cultural ageism, it is these that must be effectively challenged if cultural ageism is to 
be eradicated. The question for us here in this section, therefore, is how we are to go 
about challenging the stereotypes that exist in our culture. The first subsection 
examines the issue of positive discrimination while the second and third develop the 
concepts of cultural combat and the advocacy strategy, and in my discussion of the 
latter I largely follow the thinking of Andrew Kemohan. 
(j) Positive age discrimination 
The issue of positive discrimination is one that is usually associated with employment 
practices, and while in the context of race and gender the practice remains a 
contentious issue for political morality the complexity of the issues that surround 
positive ageism make it more contentious still. The reason for this is that if we take 
turns in being discriminated against at different points in our lives then individuals 
will be treated equally over the course of their complete lives. Moreover, any negative 
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age discrimination against the old might equally be portrayed as positive 
discrimination in favour of the young and/or the'middle-aged. This is evident if we 
think of the four social contexts discussed in chapter 1. For example, discrimination 
against the old in healthcare may be seen as a form of positive discrimination in 
favour of the young, which aims to ensure equal opportunities for all to reach a fair 
innings of life. In the context of income support the airn may be to restrict benefits to 
the old in pursuit of generational equity between them and the young, and as far as the 
distribution of voting rights is concerned policy might need to positively discriminate 
in favour of youth (by weighting electoral strength towards them) in order to ensure 
its political influence is not overwhelmed by the interests of age. Only in the field of 
employment practices does age discrimination not readily suggest positive 
discrimination in favour of the young, and we may speculate that this is because the 
discrimination in that context is more often motivated by culturally oppressive ageism 
as opposed to ideas about diachronic equality of benefits or opportunity. 
An examination of the concept of positive discrimination points to further differences 
between ageism on the one hand and racism and sexism on the other. If we examine 
the issues of race and gender within employment, we see that the case for positive 
discrimination begins with the acknowledgement that women and blacks are 
statistically less well paid than white men, and are proportionately fewer among 
higher status jobs. These empirically verifiable statistics represent the widespread 
culturally oppressive prejudice against blacks and women within society. This 
prejudice, in turn, may be based on either conscious or unconscious moral bias, and 
from negative judgements of either moral or social worth. Thus, the airn of favourable 
discrimination for black women and against white men is to correct the inequality that 
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has traditionally existed between the complete lives of these separate individuals and 
to narrow the gap between their respective employment opportunities. 
However, there are two separate issues involved with this goal where normally there 
is only assumed to be one. And the distinction we can make between them explains 
why analysis of positive age discrimination is so contentious. Firstly, then, there is the 
issue of moral bias that exists within society against both blacks and women, and the 
corresponding normative goal that this be eradicated. Secondly, there is the issue of a 
lack of equality of opportunity between the lives of black women and white men and 
the corresponding normative ideal that this should be corrected. It may be 
unproblematic for these two issues to be conflated within positive discrimination for 
race and gender because the issue of moral bias is generally accepted to be the source 
of the issue of a lack of equality of opportunity. 
Issues 
1. (Cause) Racism and sexism are a 
manifestation of a widespread 
moral bias that exists against 
blacks and women. 
2. (Effect) Racism and sexism manifest 
themselves as a lack of diachronic 
equality of opportunity. 
Normative ideals 
That this moral bias be 
eradicated. 
That blacks and women 
en oy equal opportunitites j 
with white men over their 
complete lives. 
The two issues thus represent a cause and effect. If we can achieve the former 
normative ideal then the second ideal would seem to be readily obtainable. However, 
the divided nature of ageism presented in this thesis, between cultural and egalitarian 
sources, means that the cause and effect associated with racism and sexism can be 
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separated within the issue of ageism. Both moral bias and a desire for diachronic 
equality can be causes of wrongful age discrimination. Tbus the relationship of issues 
and normative ideals would look somewhat different for ageism. 
Issues 
i 
1. (Cause) Cultural ageism is a manifestation 
of a widespread moral bias that 
exists against old people. 
Normative ideals 
That this moral bias be 
eradicated. 
2. (Cause) Egalitarian ageism manifests itself That the fundamental 
as a consequence of the normative view synchronic; interests of 
that there should be diachronic persons be protected. 
equality between separate complete 
lives. 
There are two arguments for positive discrimination: a forward-thinking view 
concerning beneficial consequences and a backward-looking view concerning 
compensation of past wrongs. Both views are motivated by a principle of equal 
concern for the interests of persons. The backward-looking defence views positive 
discrimination as a convenient means of compensating people who have been 
systematically denied equal opportunities in the past. Of course the problem for this 
view is that the actual people who are favoured are not necessarily those individuals 
who have been discriminated against in the past, and those who are positively 
discriminated against now may not be those who have benefited from traditional 
prejudice in the past. The problem is further complicated for the question of age 
because those who would benefit from current positive age discrimination have not 
been old before. Nevertheless, the traditional discrimination against blacks in 
particular often means that they have not had an equal opportunity to acquire the same 
qualifications as whites, perhaps as a result of less well-educated parents and second 
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rate schooling. Thus, Boxill argues that by applying positive discrimination in favour 
of blacks within recruitment practices for jobs and university places (by using quotas 
for example) we might compensate them for being denied those equal chances, and as 
a result competition in the job market would be fairer. 212 
The forward-looking, consequentialist view of positive discrimination aims to make 
opportunities more equal by breaking the hold of cultural stereotypes. L. W. Sumner 
defends this view, and although he acknowledges that positive discrimination in 
favour of blacks and women will violate the right to equality of opportunity for white 
men he nevertheless claims this is necessary for the sake of eradicating long-term 
injustice. '13 Positive discrimination is therefore the lesser of two evils, and Sumner 
argues that there is an important difference between the impact of the two forms of 
positive and negative discrimination. When 'women are discriminated against the 
message they receive, whether overtly or covertly, is that they are inferior to men', 214 
while a program of positive discrimination 'is premised not on a myth of male 
inferiority, but on the necessity of giving women a competitive advantage so that they 
can achieve real equality [of opportunity] -). 215 'Mus, as Boxill and Sumner claim, the 
principle of equality of opportunity must be framed so as to serve the principle of 
equal concern for the like interests of all. 
212 Bernard R. Boxill, 'Equality, discriminatim and preferential treatment, ' in Peter Singer (ed. ) A 
Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Blackwells, 1997): 333-342, p336. 
213 L. W. Sumner, 'Positive Sexism, ' in E. P. Paul et al (eds. ), Equal Opportunity (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1987). 
214 lbid, p215. 
215 Ibid, p216. Here again we see within Sumner's defence of positive discrimination a conflation of the 
two issues of cultural oppression and equality of opportunity. 
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However, we might rephrase this claim to make it applicable to the assessment of the 
justness of age discrimination, and say that the principle of diachronic equality of 
opportunity must be constrained by an equal concern for the fundamental synchronic; 
interests of each individual. By constraining diachronic equality in this way we can 
ensure that those temporal interests a person has in having their basic needs met, of 
maintaining autonomy over their lives, and of enjoying the social bases of self- 
respect, will prevent ageism harming those fundamental interests (whether that be 
understood as traditional negative discrimination against the old or as positive 
discrimination in favour of the young). Thus, rather than simply appealing to 
distributive equality, the only equality that anti-ageists should appeal to is a broader 
social ideal that seeks to create and sustain equal social relations between all citizens. 
The appeal of this social egalitarian ideal will be further examined in chapters 4 and 7 
within the discussion of democratic equality. 
However, by making the distinction between the two separate issues involved with 
positive discrimination in ageism, as opposed to racism/sexism, we might still make 
sense of an appeal to positive age-discrimination in the social context of employment. 
The normative goal within this context would be to combat cultural ageism and 
challenge the cultural stereotypes that portray the elderly as redundant. The reason 
this goal is pursued for race and gender is that by making blacks and women more 
fivisible' in high status, high paying jobs we are able to first counter the stereotypes 
that suggest these groups are unable to perform well in such jobs, and secondly, to 
provide role models to motivate younger blacks and women to aspire to such 
positions themselves. However, making old people more visible in this way would 
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seem absurd to many people as there is already a high proportion of older people in 
high status, highly paid jobs. 
Nevertheless, it is not these highly paid jobs that are the real issue for cultural ageism. 
Rather, it is the fact that many middle aged and older workers fmd it difficult to be 
recruited or trained once they have been retrenched from their previous employment. 
We can return to the example of the retired steel worker used in chapter 2 (section 2) 
to illustrate this point. Bob, as we called him, was prevented from doing a job that he 
had a proven ability to do, and which would have given him gainful employment, on 
the basis of a negative cultural stereotype. However, as we have seen, such cultural 
oppression is incompatible with the requirements of the economy in general. If the 
government is trying to encourage employers to recruit older workers in order to 
maintain an efficient economy in the face of demographic change, then greater 
visibility of older workers being recruited in to new jobs may seem a contingently 
sensible policy. And positive discrimination would arguably further this aim. 
However, age discrimination within employment might also be defended from a 
principled anti-ageist position, rather than one of mere contingency, if the aim is to 
equalise social relations between citizens rather than to pursue diachronic equality of 
opportunity. The former principle would give added weight to the requirement that we 
should eradicate ageist cultural stereotypes in a way that the latter principle is unable 
to do. The reason for this is that diachronic equality is not harmed if the old are 
discriminated against in employment and recruitment. Thus, while the issue of 
positive age discrimination is a complex one, it might be permissible both from an 
anti-ageist perspective as well as from the perspective of a principle of social equality. 
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(U) Cultural combat and the advocacy strategy 
I have argued that cultural ageism is morally wrong to the extent that it conditions the 
views people hold conceming the moral and social worth of older people in a false 
and negative way. It is also extrinsically wrong to the extent that it harms the 
fundamental synchronic interests of older people and that it results in the 
internalization of negative views by older people of themselves, which thereby 
engenders a form of self-abnegation within them. What justice requires, therefore, is 
that we actively challenge prejudice and stereotypes with the aim of creating and 
maintaining a culturally just environment, which is to say an environment free from 
practices that acculturate false derogatory beliefs about the worth of individuals. 
Kernohan argues that liberals often think that state neutrality or state perfectionism 
are the only two possible strategies for combating the inegalitarian aspects of culture, 
and that we can only either adopt a liberal laissez faire strategy to cultural attitudes 
and practices or a state censorship strategy that is inherently illiberal. Egalitarian 
liberals like Rawls and Dworkin are pluralists regarding the conceptions of the good 
that people hold, and believe that political authority should be neutral between 
- competing conceptions of what makes life worth living. Advocates of the laissez faire 
strategy would argue that under conditions of equal basic liberties and material 
equality the inegalitarian oppressive aspects of culture would disappear in a 
marketplace of cultural ideas. The principle of state neutrality requires that no-one 
should be excluded from influencing the shared cultural environment, and that sexist, 
racist and ageist views should be discredited in open debate between rational 
individuals. But because these liberals tend to see the only alternative to the laissez 
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faire strategy as that of censorship they do not think we can interfere directly with 
culturally oppressive attitudes and prejudices to any great extent. 
As we have said, the role of culture as far as most liberals are concemed is merely as 
a network of ideas that represent a range of options from which individuals can 
choose a rational plan of life, and a way of providing meaning and significance to 
those available options. There is an assumption, therefore, that individuals can use 
their deliberative powers to arrive at their beliefs about value, which is to suppose that 
we are able to choose the beliefs that we hold. But the fact that people may become 
socialized in to believing something that is against their highest order interests in 
living as good a life as possible means that it is not always the case that we can decide 
what to believe. This issue of the degree to which a person is 'situated' within her 
culture, and so inextricably linked to it, drawing her values and modes of thinking 
from it, has been the cause of a thorny debate between liberals and communitarians 
over the last couple of decades. In contrast to the liberal multiculturalists' view 
Kemohan argues that a 'culture is less like a range of options offered for people's 
choice and more like a mechanism for controlling them', 216 which is a view that has 
also been acknowledged by Dworkin. 217 Liberals will say that it is possible for people 
to avoid adopting the prevailing social norms, but while this might be possible for 
some people the question seems to turn on how universal that capability is. 
The problem is that our culture provides us with both the range of explicit ends that 
we may choose from as well as the background beliefs on which we judge those 
" Kemohan, Liberalism Equality, and Cultural Oppression, p23. 
217 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter qfPriwiple (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p237. 
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explicit ends. These background beliefs seem so natural that we do not readily 
question them, and we only really examine them when they are called in to question 
by social movements like those of anti-racism, anti-sexism, and anti-ageism. It is 
therefore not always possible (if at all) to choose to believe something, because to 
believe something is to believe it is true, and not merely because we choose to believe 
it. As Bernard Williams argues, it is not possible to believe at will otherwise a person 
could come to acquire a belief whether or not it were true, and what is more she 
would know that she could acquire it whether or not it was true. 218 Thus, Kernoham 
argues that; 
we are finite creatures, and the amount of critical reflection we can carry out puts 
boundaries on our reflection. Many, if not most, of the beliefs that enter into our 
deliberations have simply been uncritically adopted from our culture. Our culture not 
only suggests beliefs to us for consideration but also provides the background beliefs 
on which our deliberation dependS. 219 
Kernohan therefore believes that we should reject the liberal 'voluntarist' view of 
culture; that it merely proposes a selection of options from which we can choose. 
Moreover, Kernohan argues that the truly pernicious aspect of this model is 'its 
complicity in hiding the power that culture exercises over us'. 220 This is because it 
wrongly implies that the process of belief formation and enculturation is in the control 
of the individual herself who can then take full responsibility for it. In fact what 
people do is to deliberate and reflect on their beliefs about ethics and the way they 
should lead their lives on the basis of two things: firstly, their background beliefs; and 
secondly the evidence laid before them. 
"' Bernard Williams, 'Deciding to Believe, ' in Problems ofthe SeýV(Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973), p 148. 
"" Kernohan, Liberalism, Equality, and Cultural Oppression, p2 1. 
220 lbid, p24. 
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However, the only alternative to the laissez faire strategy that most liberals view as a 
possible challenge to the cultural attitudes we find obnoxious is that of censorship. 
One advocate of the censorship strategy is Catherine Mackinnon who calls for 
censorship against pornography on the basis that it is a form of cultural oppression. 221 
Mackinnon argues that although the laissez-faire strategy might be an adequate theory 
if practiced within a non-hierarchical society, it is in fact ineffectual in a society 
where a gender inequality already exists. Mackinnon's censorship strategy would 
coercively regulate the expressive activities of individuals that contribute to an 
oppressive cultural enviromnent, and Ronald Dworkin is right when he suggests that 
coercing an individual to follow a certain conception of the good does not make her 
believe in the truth of that conception, nor does it make her life go better by following 
it. 222 The reason that coercion does not make one's life go better is that a person can 
not be forced to endorse that conception of the good, indeed it is more likely to turn 
someone against it. 
Nevertheless, we do not have to think that these two strategies are the only options. A 
third strategy, and one that Kernohan claims is a better interpretation of egalitarian 
liberalism than unqualified state neutrality, is what he calls the advocacy strategy. The 
advocacy state, unlike the neutral state, can challenge inegalitarian cultural practices 
and beliefs actively and publicly, and engage in cultural reform, but would not 
interfere coercively with personal expression and would leave the final evaluation of 
ideas to individuals themselves. We noted above that there were two aspects to the 
221 Catherine Mackinnon, Only Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
222 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: Me Theory and Practice ofEquality (Harvard University Press, 
2000), chapter I 
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deliberation of people when they reflect on their values; their background beliefs and 
the evidence before them. The second feature ensures that understanding culture as a 
pervasive and controlling power does not rule out the possibility of cultural reform, 
and cultural change can take place as we become more aware of evidence that tells us 
something about the lives of others. The more we are able to identify with members of 
other groups in society as human beings similar to us, and the more we can view the 
world from their perspective, the more we can relate to their interests. It is this ability 
to identify with others that has allowed the successful challenging of other cultural 
oppressions like racism and sexism, through the challenging of cultural stereotypes. 
And, as we saw in chapter One, anti-discriminatory legislation has been able to give 
culture a significant move in the right direction. 
Thus, the advocacy strategy would not coercively intervene against any particular 
expressive acts because it recognises that the chain of causality between act and harm 
is vague and purely speculative. Therefore, as we said before, I am wrong if I accept 
culturally oppressive moral and social judgements about people, but I am only 
morally culpable if I act on those judgements to the detriment of the interests of 
others. However, even if empirical sociological data could show that members of 
certain groups think their own projects are less valuable, or that their self-respect was 
lower, it would nevertheless be very difficult to trace a connection between these false 
beliefs and the particular expressive acts or socially prejudiced attitudes of others. An 
advocacy strategy therefore seeks to persuade rather than coerce individuals through 
the economic, educational and ideological power of the state, so it would for example 
provide active fmancial support for associations and groups striving to combat 
inegalitarian cultural prejudices. 
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One group that seeks to combat a form of cultural oppression is Age Concern. The 
'Millenium Debate of the Age', which was coordinated by Age Concern, published a 
report that criticised many of the principle bases on which it is often thought 
permissible to discriminate against older people. 223 Among its recommendations are 
the following: firstly, the state should introduce citizenship classes in schools which 
have, as part of their curriculum, the positive aim of demystifying ageing and old age; 
secondly, the state should support programmes specifically aimed at fostering 
meaningful contact between members of different generations; thirdly, the state 
should be guided by the principle of age-neutrality which denies that it is legitimate to 
discriminate against a person on the basis of age in any policy area. 224 
By adopting these policies the liberal state would be adopting an advocacy strategy 
towards the challenge of cultural ageism. And if the government was serious about the 
third suggested policy then it would have good reason to extend the coverage of legal 
protection of older people beyond the employment sector to the distribution of goods 
and services. In this way it would emulate the comprehensive single equality 
legislation of the Irish Republic. It might also go further and extend the current anti- 
discriminatory legislation to embrace a positive duty, arguably found within the 
Northern Ireland Act of 1998, to promote equality of opportunity for older people 
rather than simply a negative duty to not discriminate against them. 
223 Age Concem England, The Millenium Papers: Values andAllijudes in an geing Socie y( 
Age Concem England, 1999). 
At London, 
224 ibid, P45. 
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(W) Is the advocacy strategy compatible with mainstream liberal theories? 
Kernohan claims that the theories of several contemporary liberal philosophers would 
be fully compatible with the advocacy strategy he defends, and I will outline this 
compatibility with reference to Ronald Dworkin, perhaps the leading liberal 
egalitarian thinker today. However, one important point to note is that Kernohan's 
theory of cultural oppression only incorporates judgements of moral inferiority, while 
I have argued that the phenomenon actually includes judgements of social inferiority 
as well. For this reason, while Dworkin's philosophy might well incorporate the 
advocacy strategy as far as unequal moral status is concerned (that the state should not 
ban but should argue against such a view) it is less certain that it would advocate such 
a strategy where inaccurate judgements of negative social worth are concerned. On 
the other hand, there seems no obvious reason why it should not if, as I have argued, 
inaccurate stereotypes that convey judgements of negative social worth constitute a 
feature of the same culturally oppressive ideology as that of negative moral 
judgements. If people are inaccurately classified as being of less instrumental worth to 
society than others, merely on the basis of their chronological age, and are 
discriminated against on that basis, then it seems to me to be morally wrong for 
essentially the same reasons as negative moral judgements. 
How, then, is the advocacy strategy compatible with mainstream political philosophy? 
Cultural oppression involves acculturating individuals into false beliefs about value, 
their own and that of other people. For this reason phenomena like cultural ageism 
represent an unjust restriction on the liberty of the citizens of a community, and it can 
therefore be thought of as a form of coercion. Historically liberalism has sought to 
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liberate individuals from the coercive power of the church and state and more 
recently, with the advent of liberal egalitarianism, from the coercive power of 
economic forces within capitalism. However, as the following quote from John Stuart 
Mill reveals, these are not the only sources of coercive power that we must challenge. 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates 
instead of right, or any mandates at all in things which it ought not to meddle, it 
practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, 
since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of 
escape, penetrating more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself 
Protection, therefore against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough. 225 
How do we ensure that we are not oppressed by culture? What should we identify as 
our interests? And what is necessary for us to be free from this form of oppression? 
Ronald Dworkin tackles this problem and defends what he calls the 'endorsement 
constrainf). 226 Dworkin argues that the value of someone's life comes from her life 
being a skilftil response to the challenges facing her, rather than from the impact her 
life has on the world. Thus, as Will Kymlicka puts it, 'my life only goes better when I 
, 227 am living it from the inside, according to my beliefs about value . On this 
constitutive view someone's endorsement of a component of the good life is a 
necessary condition for that component to increase the good in her life, and therefore, 
6no component may even so much as contribute to the value of a person's life without 
his endorsement' . 
228 This argument harks back to a principle that has its origins in 
John Locke's A Leiter Concerning Toleration, and the insight that forcing a person to 
225 john Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in John Gray and G. W. Smith (eds. ), JS Mill - 'On Liberty'in Focus 
(London: Routledge, 199 1), p26. 
" Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: 7he 7heory and Practice ofEquality (London, England: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), Chapter 6. 
227 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p2O34. 
229 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, p248. 
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worship, to go to church and to pray to a God they do not believe in can not make 
their life go better. If a person does not endorse theism as a constitutive feature of 
what makes life worth living then it is self-defeating to coerce her to worship. 
The 'endorsement' constraint therefore requires that a person consciously endorses 
the beliefs, values, goals and preferences they have in order for them to count as valid 
constituents in a good life. However, someone who has been culturally oppressed, and 
who has internalized. negative social and moral judgements regarding her own worth 
and that of others, may nevertheless endorse those judgements. The fact that cultural 
stereotypes often appear natural and normal encourages us to accept them without 
reflection. In response to this problem Dworkin realises that '[w]e must distinguish 
acceptable from unacceptable circumstances of endorsement', and though this is a 
difficult distinction, any person's endorsement would not be genuine if it involved a 
'change that lessened his ability to consider the critical merits of the change in a 
critical way'. 229 Therefore, it is morally important that we have the capacity to 
consider the cultural merits of different options in a reflective way. 
Kernohan asks a rhetorical question: 'Why is critical reflection so importantT His 
answer is that it is important because we have an interest in having true beliefs about 
the good, and critical reflection is important because it allows us to get our beliefs 
right. But what if some agent beneficially brainwashed us and induced true beliefs 
about what is valuable in our lives? Would our ability to critically reflect on values 
and beliefs continue to be so necessary? If our interest is only to have true beliefs then 
beneficial brainwashing would seem to be acceptable. Nevertheless, most liberals 
229 fbid, p218. 
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would argue that we have an interest not only in having true beliefs about the good 
but also in corning to have knowledge of the good, and to have arrived at that 
knowledge for ourselves. Critical reflection is important because it allows us to come 
to know our own good where to know something is to have a justified belief in its 
truth. To know something means that it should cohere with the other judgements we 
have and be justified by them. We can therefore summarize Kemohan's argument in 
the following six points. 
I have an interest in knowing my own good, in believing and endorsing my ends. 
2. Therefore, I also have an interest in having ends that are justified by my other 
beliefs in a coherent way. 
3. Therefore, my ends must be revisable in the sense that they should respond to the 
reasons that justify them. 
4. If one has an end that is Rxed and resistant to change even when the reasons for 
which it was justified have changed (and so logically require that end to change), then 
that end would not be the product of reasons but of causes. 
5. Therefore, benevolent brainwashing, which inserts true ends into a person's 
conception of the good still harms the person's interest in knowing her good. The 
consequences would be that even though her induced ends may now be true they are 
not justified on the basis of the other beliefs she has. 
6. Therefore, critical reflection must aim not simply at true beliefs, but at justified true 
beliefs. 
Therefore, not only is it morally important that we have true beliefs, but we must also 
know them to be true. Thus, Kernohan argues that in order to protect our interest in 
having the best life possible what we need is not just the endorsement constraint but 
also a 'knowledge constraint'. 230 The latter not only implies the former but ensures 
that the process by which we come to that endorsement is autonomous. It is my 
"' Kemohan, Liberalism Equality, and Cultural Oppression, p33. 
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argument that this applies to not only questions of moral worth but of social worth as 
well. 
Let us apply this thinking to the issue of cultural ageism. Imagine an older person has 
internalized culturally oppressive judgements concerning her negative social worth. 
To the extent that she unreflectively accepts a diachronic view concerning the 
meaning and value of life she will also endorse the popular belief that, now that her 
career and most of her long-term life plans have been completed, any substantive 
meaning that her life has is in the past. This view has infiltrated her consciousness and 
in that sense it is now coercing her to not recognise her true interests. Those true 
interests are to develop new meaning and value within the temporal stage of life in 
which she now fmds herself. She has a synchronic interest in living as good a life as 
possible, and this is prevented by the internalized cultural belief that old age has no 
meaning, and moreover that it is normal and natural that it should have no meaning. 
Moreover, believing this cultural assessment of the value of her synchronic interests 
means that she will not expect and require society to ensure her the means to fulfil her 
real interests. 
Now, even if she was to somehow be beneficially brainwashed in to recognising her 
true synchronic interests that belief would not be justified by her other beliefs 
concerning the meaning and value of old age. If she continued to believe that only the 
diachronic interests of persons are of fundamental importance then for her to also hold 
the belief (that had been induced in her) that she has synchronic interests in 
developing new meaning would not be coherent. She therefore not only has an interest 
in knowing her real synchronic interests, but she also has an interest in being able to 
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come to know those interests through an autonomous process. And, what justice 
requires in order for her to facilitate that autonomous process is the challenging of the 
cultural stereotypes which suggest that older people's lives are of less value. 
3.10 Concluding remarks 
We have said that in general cultural oppression is intrinsically morally wrong 
because it involves false judgements concerning the moral and social worth of certain 
persons, and it is extrinsically wrong because it diminishes the autonomy and self- 
respect of its victims as well as seeming to justify and legitimise other harms that 
prevent the satisfaction of their basic needs. Negative assumptions of worth are 
internalised by older individuals which engenders a lack of self-respect and a degree 
of self-abnegation, and this in turn diminishes the autonomy those individuals have in 
developing and pursuing a conception of the good. This chapter has both outlined the 
nature of cultural ageism and examined ways in which we might challenge it, and 
how we challenge it is dependent upon its nature. 
Cultural oppression per se is a complex phenomenon, and one of the flaws with much 
of its analysis within political philosophy is that many thinkers have analysed the 
general concept rather than focussing upon the particular forms it takes within the 
context of sex, race, and age. My argument has been that we cannot adopt a 'one size 
fits all' analysis of cultural oppression, and that cultural ageism is not necessarily the 
same as other forms of this phenomenon. One such variable feature of cultural 
oppression is the degree to which the individuals affected by it identify with the social 
group discriminated against. I have argued that although older persons themselves 
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acknowledge the existence of a social group labelled 'the elderly', around which exist 
a number of negative meanings and valuations, they also seek to disassociate 
themselves from that group. Thus, older people do not defffie themselves as members 
of this social group but are objectively defmed as such by others in their society. And 
because there is little or no self-identification of individuals with the 'old' as a social 
group we can say that, in contrast to other possible ethnic or religious social groups, 
the elderly is one that only really exists within the popular imagination and is created 
through a network of cultural stereotypes. Cultural ageism is thus unquestionably 
cultural in origin, regardless of any other political or economic consequences it might 
have. 
The chapter has analysed the comparison often made between sexism, racism, and 
ageism, and found that the complexity of the concept of ageism means that each of its 
two distinct cultural and egalitarian forms have similarities with both racism and 
sexism that the two forms themselves do not share with each other. And, while 
cultural ageism shares with racism the fact that it is unmistakably morally 
objectionable, it may nevertheless be difficult to dislodge because it also shares with 
sexism the idea that the prejudice that supports it is centrally tied to the self- 
conception of those that discriminate. Ageist cultural stereotypes thus serve to 
reinforce the idea that the old represent a threat to the self-conception of younger 
persons. Therefore, to successfully challenge cultural ageism we need to challenge 
and combat the cultural stereotypes that sustain the existence of that social group in 
the popular imagination, rather than to simply seek economic redress. As we have 
seen cultural oppression in general may continue to exist within a materially 
egalitarian society, and this is particularly the case for cultural ageism. 
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Having analysed the nature of the phenomenon, the chapter then examined ways of 
challenging it. I have argued that the issue of positive discrimination as a form of 
challenge to ageism is complicated by the fact that the two issues of equal opportunity 
and of moral prejudice are separable within the context of ageism while they are not 
within racism and sexism. While positive discrimination is aimed at equalising the life 
opportunities of blacks and women as a consequence of challenging the prevailing 
negative cultural images many people have of them, this is not the case with ageism. 
For example, we might successfully challenge negative ageist stereotypes and yet 
continue to pursue policies that harm the synchronic interests of the old as egalitarian 
ageism does, or we might successfully equalise the benefits and opportunities that 
exist between people and yet continue to hold a moral bias against older persons. For 
this reason I have argued that positive discrimination is only relevant as a challenge to 
cultural ageism, and that it will probably be most effective as a way of challenging 
cultural ageism within the context of employment practices. 
The discussion of the limitations of positive discrimination introduces the social ideal 
of equality. This ideal charges us to seek to create and sustain equal social relations 
between citizens rather than attempt to address the consequences of cultural ageism 
through egalitarian distributive policies. Indeed, as we will see in the following 
%chapters, the pursuit of distributive equality may actually justify wrongfiil age 
discrimination. Positive age discrimination in the context of employment will ffirther 
the social egalitarian ideal as well as serving to challenge the moral bias on which 
racism and sexism are similarly based. 
152 
The goal of social equality requires us to combat negative cultural assumptions, to 
show them to be false, and to strive to create and maintain a culturally just 
environment, and I have outlined three possible strategies for pursuing such cultural 
combat; that of censorship, laissez faire, and advocacy. While we must reject 
censorship as illiberal, the laissez faire policy of most liberals is arguably somewhat 
ineffective because, as we have said, individuals are 'finite beings' who are unable to 
critically reflect on all or even most of the cultural assumptions that their social 
conditioning provides them with. The advocacy strategy therefore seeks to overcome 
this lack of reflective ability by actively persuading people of the fallacy of cultural 
stereotypes through the economic, educational and ideological power of the liberal 
state. Only by challenging the ideology of cultural ageism and creating a culturally 
just social environment can we hope to allow individuals to autonomously come to 
recognise their own fundamental synchronic interests. The ideal of social equality is 
thus fundamental to the challenge of cultural ageism because it challenges its very 
cause. Distributional equality in this sense is largely irrelevant and at best would 
correct the symptoms. The next chapter begins with an analysis of these two 
egalitarian goals and goes on to argue that the social ideal is also the only one relevant 
to the challenge of egalitarian ageism as well. 
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Chapter Four. Ageism, equality and the CLV 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the phenomenon of what I have called 
regalitarian ageism', and its implicit justification within much contemporary 
egalitarian political philosophy. Many of those who advocate theories of equal 
distribution will implicitly assume the complete life view (CLV) because diachronic 
equality is their aim. Distributive equality is inherently comparative and the CLV 
claims that in questions of distribution we should compare the shares people enjoy 
over their complete lives rather than how well off they are at any particular time. My 
argument is that this principle implicitly justifies age discrimination and that this 
discrimination is morally wrong to the extent that it neglects the fundamental 
synchronic interests of the old. I argue that an alternative conception of social 
equality, or democratic equality (DE), not only prevents the need for such 
discrimination but would actually challenge it. And, for that reason, any anti-ageist 
principle ought to be embedded within such a theory. Democratic equality expounds a 
normative ideal of equal human relations, and therefore, the discrimination that would 
be implicitly justified by theories embodying the CLV would be deemed immoral by 
DE because such discrimination would necessarily involve relations of social 
inequality. 
The chapter begins by addressing some of the fundamental questions facing 
egalitarians, and it argues that if we answer those questions in certain ways we are led 
to the justification of age discrimination. In this way I outline the phenomenon of 
egalitarian ageism and in particular how it is related to the currently dominant 
philosophical position sometimes referred to as luck egalitarianism. 
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4.1 Social equality or distributive equality? 
The first and most fundamental question for egalitarians is whether society should 
pursue either social or distributive equality. David Miller distinguishes between these 
'two different kinds of valuable equality', one of which he claims is connected with 
justice, the other standing independently of it. 23 ' Equality of the first kind is 
distributive in nature and specifies that benefits of a certain kind should be distributed 
equally, because this is what justice requires. Equality of the second kind does not 
directly specify any particular distribution of benefits, but instead identifies a 'social 
ideal' of 'a society in which people regard and treat one another as equals. 232 Such a 
society would not be marked by status divisions such that one can place different 
people in hierarchically ranked categories, and Miller calls this second kind of 
equality equality of status or simply social equality. One might argue that as 
egalitarians we should pursue both conceptions simultaneously, perhaps because one 
is just another expression of the other, but one of the main claims of this chapter is 
that these conceptions can in fact conflict at least when it comes to the treatment of 
older persons. 
It is equality of the first kind that has been the focus of much contemporary liberal 
political philosophy over the last three decades since the publication of John Rawls' A 
Yheory of Justice. 233 This focus represents a debate concerning various formulations 
of the concept of social justice, and one particularly dominant generic form of such 
231 David Miller, 'Equality and Justice, ' in Andrew Mason (ed. ) Ideals ofEqualfty (oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1998): 21-36, p23. 
232 Ibid. 
233 john RaWIS"4 Theory OfJuslice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 
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distributive liberal egalitarianism is that which has been dubbed by Elizabeth 
Anderson as 'luck egalitarianism' (LE). 234 They are luck egalitarians because they 
argue for the equal distribution of benefits of one kind or another as a way of 
expressing 'fairness'. Justice involves the political community treating all persons 
with equal respect and concern, and it is thought fair within the circumstances of 
justice (i. e. the conditions of relative scarcity) that individuals have an equal share of 
a particular distruband, and that individuals can thereafter dispose of that equal share 
as they see fit. In this way individuals are assured autonomy from both other citizens 
and the state, and have an equal opportunity to pursue their particular conception of 
the good. 
However, they are luck egalitarians because they also make a moral distinction 
between brute luck on the one hand, which relates to our unchosen circumstances, and 
option luck on the other which relates to personal choice. Although there are different 
versions of luck egalitarianism, including 'equality of resources', 235 , equal access to 
advantage'. 236 6 equal opportunity for welfare', 237 1; equality of fortune',, 238 and 
others, 239 the fundamental principle underlying each variant is a common conception 
of fairness. That conception requires that society should compensate individuals for 
234 Elizabeth Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' Ethics 109 (1999): 287-33 7. 
235 Ronald Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources,, Philosophy and Public 
, 4ffairs 10 (1981): 283-345. 
236 G. A. Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, ' Ethics 99 (1989): 906-44. 
237 Richard Arneson, 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, ' Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 
77-93. 
239 Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 199 1). 
239 John E. Roemer, 7heories ofDistributive Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1995). 
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disadvantages for which they are not responsible, but requires them to bear the full 
costs of the adverse consequences of their choices 
A normative principle that each person has access to an equal initial share of benefits 
not only ensures equality of opportunity but it also requires that individuals are held 
personally responsible for the success of their lives, which is to say that they can be 
expected to carry the full cost of their individual choices. It seems legitimate to do this 
because each individual has had an equal opportunity to make their life a success. 
Moreover, to ensure that the outcomes of people's lives properly reflect their choices 
society would need to prevent the problem of free-riding. Free-riding involves 
individuals who are either lazy or who have squandered or unwisely invested their 
initial shares then claiming the benefits that others have created through their own 
industry and prudence. To allow free-riding is thus unfair because it reduces the 
shares (and so liberty) of others who have been responsible, but it also provides no 
incentive for people to be personally responsible for their behaviour if they know they 
will always be bailed out if necessary. 
It can be argued that the principle of personal responsibility is valuable because it 
ensures that people can enjoy the lives that they choose. What gives individual choice 
value is that one can benefit from the good fortune that accrues from hard work, 
prudence or successful gambles, and redistribution of this would deny the harder 
working, prudent, and risk embracing amongst us of their particular conceptions of 
the good. Moreover, most contemporary liberals conceive themselves to be in some 
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part followers of Immanuel Kant, and it was one of his premises that to not hold 
individuals responsible for their free choices is to not respect them as moral agentS. 240 
As G. A. Cohen points out, by giving a central role to the ideas of personal 
responsibility and choice in this way egalitarians can sidestep one of the most 
compelling criticisms of the anti-egalitarian right, i. e. the criticism that egalitarians 
wish to equalize the outcomes of persons irrespective of how much effort or personal 
responsibility they display. 241 The moral distinction between different forms of luck 
would enable us to develop a distributive scheme that is both ambition-sensitive and 
endowment-insensitive, and so the egalitarian project would be to equalize 
opportunities rather than outcome. Such a theory would therefore be compatible with 
quite wide disparities between wealth outcomes for individuals. We can generalise the 
fundamental idea underlying LE theory in what we can refer to as the LE maxim: 
Justice requires that, as far as possible, a person should be compensated for 
disadvantages that derive from the features of her circumstances for which she is not 
responsible (brute luck), but that she should not be compensated at all for 
disadvantages that derive from her free choices (option luck). 
Understood in this way LE has two immediate premises, 
1. LE places significant weight on the cut between individual choice and unchosen 
circumstance. 
2. LE treats equality as an essentially distributive ideal. 
The fact that the choice/circumstance conception of fairness is taken as fundamental 
means that the LE position must be an essentially distributive ideal. These premises 
240 Immanuel Kant, Foundations ofthe Metaphysics OfMorals, Translated by Peter Heath. Edited by 
Peter Heath & 113. Schneewind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1). 
241 Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,, p933. 
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also mean that LE ý is committed to diachronic equality, and that provided that this 
requirement is respected then any amount of synchronic inequality would be tolerable. 
If people were compensated for disadvantages that were the consequence of a choice 
they made then some people would end up with more than an equal share over their 
complete life, which would mean any inequalities would no longer reflect the free 
choices of individuals. 
This luck egalitarianism remains the dominant position within contemporary political 
philosophy, but, as Samuel Scheffler points out, a 'project of critical examination' of 
that philosophical position has been initiated by Anderson and others. 242 This project 
firstly questions the LE assumption that egalitarians should focus so extensively on 
the distribution of divisible goods because it argues that there is something else more 
fundamental to egalitarianism than simple distribution, i. e. the social relationships 
between citizens. The fact that distribution is not the only important, or even the most 
important element, of egalitarianism is recognised by Cohen when he acknowledges 
that it seems quite unclear that a state which forthrightly refuses to pursue a norm of 
strict distributive equality ipso facto shows failure to treat its subjects with equal 
respect and concern'. 243 
Secondly, the critique of LE questions both the philosophical and moral plausibility of 
the distinction between choice and circumstance. As Anderson points out with her 
... Samuel Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism? ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 31(2003): 5-39, p7. The 
other papers that critique luck egalitarianism include; Jonathan Wolff, 'Fairness, Respect, and the 
Egalitarian Ethos, ' Philosophy andPublic Affairs 27 (1998): 97-122; Seana Valentine Shifffin, 
, paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 
(2000): 205-50; Timothy Hinton, 'Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and RespectT 
philosophy and Public Affairs 30 (2001): 72-87. 
243 G. A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come Youre SO Rich? (Cambridge: Harvard Univer sity 
Press, 2000), p165. 
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example of the deaf community, there are unchosen features of a person's 
circumstances that disadvantage them but for which they do not seek compensation. 
On the other hand, even if people are responsible for the disadvantageous 
circumstances they find themselves in, perhaps if they fail to insure themselves 
against an accident they later suffer, we would not normally accept that it was morally 
required to deprive them of the urgent medical. intervention of which they are now in 
need. Finally the critical project claims that LE is not in the spirit of Rawlsian 
liberalism despite the widely held assumption that it is, and I will examine this claim 
more fully in chapter 6.244 We can surnmarise this list of ob ections; to LE thus; j 
Objection 1: Distribution is not the only, or even most, important feature of 
egalitarianism. 
Objection 2: The LE distinction between choice and circumstance is not always 
morally plausible. 
Objection 3: The LE conception of fairness is not a refmed version of Rawls' 
, difference principle'. 
But there are ftirther objections that can be made. An alternative conception of social 
equality has been defended by Anderson and Andrew Levine as 'democratic equality', 
and by Timothy Hinton as 'equality of status'. 
245 Democratic egalitarianism (DE), as I 
shall also refer to this position, involves a normative egalitarian ideal of human 
relations and is primarily concerned to equalise the social relations that exist between 
citizens. I will henceforth use the terms DE and social equality interchangeably, 
although I acknowledge that the former may not be the only possible version of the 
244 Will Kymlick, for example, claims that Dworkin's concern for the choice-circumstance distinction, 
and therefore his defence of LE, is an extension of Rawls' theory ofjustice. He argues tha4 although 
one of Rawls' central intuitions ... concerns the distinction between choice and circumstance', his 
theory in fact Wls to fully do justice to that intuition and it is therefore up to Dworkin and others to 
articulate it fulV'. Will Kyrnlicka, Contemporwy Political Philosophy. - An Introduction (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), p70. 
241 Andrew Levine, Rethinking Liberal Equality: From a "Utopian " Point of View (Ithaca & London: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Hinton, 'Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and RespectT. 
160 
latter. DE seeks to achieve this social ideal by challenging all forms of domination, 
exploitation and oppression, and, in direct contrast to luck egalitarianism, does not 
seek to eliminate or ameliorate the effects of brute luck on people's lives. 246 DE is 
described as 'democratic' because it regards two people as equal, not when they 
simply hold equivalent resources, but when each accepts the obligation to justify their 
actions by principles acceptable to the other. 
Miller believes that the ideal of social equality is more deeply embedded in the 
contemporary moral conscious, 247 and, as T. M. Scanlon notes, 'the ideal of a society 
in which people all regard one another as equals - has played a more important role in 
radical egalitarian thinking than the idea of distributive justice which dominates much 
discussion in our time. 9248 Indeed, both Anderson and Scheffler claim that luck 
egalitarianism is not what egalitarian political movements have historically sought to 
achieve. Rather they have pursued the social and political ideal of equal social 
relations between citizens, which 'repudiates distinctions of moral worth based on 
birth and social identity' . 
249 This is as true for anti-feminists and anti-racists as it is for 
those who challenge inequalities that disadvantage homosexuals, the handicapped, 
and the aged. DEs also seek to claim the authority of the Rawlsian tradition, and 
Anderson, Scheffler and Hinton all express the view that the alternative conception of 
social equality they advocate is closer to the interpretation of equality within John 
246 Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' p288; Hinton, 'Must Egalitarians Choose Between 
Fairness and RespectT p73. 
247 Miller, 'Equality and Justice, ' p32. 
248 T. M. Scanlon, 'The Diversity of Objections to Inequality, ' in Matthew Clayton & Andrew Willimns 
(eds. ) The Ideal ofEqualily (Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): pp4l-60. 
" Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' p312. I would include the repudiation of distinctions of 
social worth. 
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Rawls' 'difference principle' than the principles of luck egalitarianism. I examine this 
claim more fully in chapter 6. 
The most prominent luck egalitarian philosopher is Ronald Dworkin (though he 
strenuously rejects that characterisation) and for that reason I focus my criticisms 
either at the generic LE principles in general or to Dworkin in particular. Dworkin, as 
an LE philosopher, argues that his egalitarianism aims to achieve the same social 
equalities as those advocated by DE, and that the concern for an egalitarian 
distribution is an extension of that concern for a broader ideal that includes social 
equality. 250 As Miller points out, the two conceptions of equality do not necessarily 
conflict despite the fact that they draw upon different political traditions. 251 one 
reason that Scheffler and Anderson critique Dworkin more than any other LE theorist 
is precisely because he seeks 'to anchor his egalitarian distributive principles in a 
more general ideal of equality. 252 Unless a theory of distributive equality is anchored 
within a broader conception of social equality the former will not necessarily be 
incompatible with an autocracy, and therefore, on its own the generic theory of LE is 
not incompatible with hierarchy and discrimination. It would be quite possible to 
equalise benefits between the complete lives of separate individuals without 
challenging existing prejudices, and indeed may even create new forms of 
250 It should be noted that Dworkin himself strenuously rejects his characterisation as a luck egalitarian. 
See Ronald Dworkin, 'Equality, Luck and flierarchy, ' Philosophy and PublicAffairs 31(2003): 190- 
198. However, Scheffler in his reply to Dworkin reasserts that characterisation. See Samuel Scheffler, 
'Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Dworkin, ' Philosophy and PublicAffairs 31 (2003): 
199-206. 
251 Miller argues that the distributive form of egalitarianism draws upon the liberal tradition, while 
social egalitarianism derives from socialism and the social democratic tradition. See David Miller, 
'Equality and Market Socialism, ' in P. K. Bordhan &I Roemer (eds. ) Market Socialism: 7he Current 
Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
252 Scheffler, 'Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns, ' p203. 
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discrimination such as ageism as a way of ensuring that diachronic equality be 
maintained. Thus we have a fourth objection to LE. 
Objection 4: By itself LE is not incompatible with a social hierarchy that involves 
discrimination. 
It is therefore a DE claim that there are situations in which the respective prescriptions 
of LE and DE are mutually incompatible. One other such situation is where the 
interpretation of 'fairness' and 'respect' appear to conflict. While LEs focus on their 
understanding of fairness, summed up in the LE maxim, Hinton and Jonathan 
Wolff253 have argued that there are in fact two values which are equally central to 
egalitarian social justice, and that in addition to 'fairness' we should also give 
consideration to the value of 'respect'. Hinton argues that these two values sometimes 
conflict within LE because luck egalitarians understand 'fairness' as the compensation 
for the effects of brute luck, and they think of the equalisation of brute luck in purely 
distributive terms. LEs endow this understanding of fairness a lexical priority over all 
other values, including that of respect, with the result that the attempt by LEs to 
ensure fairness in the Real world would often involve making a sacrifice of respect. 
For example, Anderson claims that implementing the LE maxim would involve 
making moralising judgements regarding the level of personal responsibility people 
have displayed in their lives. These judgements would be necessary in order to 
properly separate the two forms of brute and option luck, given the obvious 
'53 Timothy ffinton, 'Must Egalitarians Choose Between Fairness and Respect? '; Jonathan Wolfý 
'Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos'. It is of course possible for someone to have self-respect 
without respect-standing if they perhaps had such disdain for the opinion of others. 
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difficulties involved with the separation of choice and circumstance. 254 The need for 
such moralising about other people's behaviour is a consequence of the lexical 
priority of the LE interpretation of fairness which overrides any concern for showing 
respect to the unfortunate whether they are partly responsible for their plight or not. 
Wolff argues that the neglect of the value of respect inherent within LE would also 
manifest itself in the 'shameful revelations' of personal inadequacy that individuals 
would need to make in order to qualify for compensation for brute bad luck. 
255 
As we have noted, Rawls views issues of respect and self-respect as being at the very 
core of a theory of justice, and one of the central primary social goods to which he 
believes all citizens should have access are the 'social bases of self-respect'. These 
should include a person's sense of his own value both intrinsically and to society? 56 
Generally speaking, therefore, for an individual to enjoy self-respect they will usually 
need to have the respect of others or, as Wolff calls it, 'respect-standing'. 
257 
Moreover, self-respect and the normative ideal of DE are closely related because, as 
Robin Dillon argues, '[w]hether individuals respect themselves or not is very much a I 
function of their social relationships and of the structure and functioning of the 
institutions among which they live; when these relationships and institutions are 
unjust, discriminatory or oppressive, self-respect can be diminished, distorted or 
254 Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' p3 10. 
"' Wolf& ppI 13-118. Wolff argues that if someone remained unemployed during a period of very low 
unemployment then they would have to prove that they were too inadequate to be employed Mi order to 
qualify for compensation. However, LEs might argue that in an ideallyjust world such revelations 
would not be seen as shameful. The fact that someone had personal inadequacies such as that they were 
unemployable because they were stupid would be seen purely as a matter of luck. 
256 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197 1, revised edition, 1999): 
pp386-7,404. 
237 W01M 'Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos'. It is of course possible for someone to have 
self-respect in the absence of respect-standing if one had disdain for the opinion of others. 
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destroyed. '258 Thus, we have a fifth criticism of LE, which, together with the 
objections detailed above, can be summariscd as follows; 
Objection 1: Distribution is not the only, or even the most, important feature of 
egalitarianism; 
Objection 2: The LE distinction between choice and circumstance is not always 
morally plausible; 
Objection 3: The LE conception of fairness is not a refined version of Rawl's 
'difference principle'; 
Objection 4: By itself, LE is not incompatible with a social hierarchy that involves 
discrimination; 
Objection 5: The LE conception of fairness may conflict with ideas about the value of 
respect. 
In response to these criticisms of distributive LE, the social ideal of DE would 
tentatively defend the following premises; 
Premise 1: Social relations between citizens are the most important feature of 
egalitarianism; 
Premise 2: Social hierarchy and wrongful discrimination should be challenged 
directly as a way of achieving equal social relations; 
Premise 3: Social equality seeks to balance fairness with respect. 
I will return to these objections to LE and the normative goals of DE in section 4.6. It 
is my claim there that the significant differences between the two theories can be 
reduced to a difference of opinion over the value of the CLV. %ile LE is committed 
to the CLV, DE rejects it. 
258 Robin S. Dillon, 'Introduction, ' in Dignity, Character and SeV-ResPect (New York: Routledge, 
1995), p36. 
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4.2 DE, luck and egalitarian ageism 
As noted above, it is my claim that the principles of DE and LE conflict in the way 
they would each treat the old. It will be my claim that the implications of LE 
principles would tend to justify age discrimination as an unfortunate consequence of 
ensuring the equality across the complete lives of separate individuals (or diachronic 
equality). This then is what I have called 'egalitarian ageism'. The definition and 
taxonomy of ageism outlined in chapter 2 argued that such age discrimination was not 
intrinsically wrong when it did not convey judgements of negative moral or social 
worth, but that it might be extrinsically wrong if it neglected or violated the 
fundamental synchronic interests of persons. This is precisely what the normative goal 
of diachronic equality would condone, and when it does it is extrinsically morally 
wrong and may be called ageist or ageism. 
The alternative ideal of democratic social equality is aimed at ensuring that citizens 
hold equal social and political standing within society and enjoy equal social 
relations. As Scheffier notes, on this view the 'question that is of particular interest to 
political philosophy is the question of what a society of equals is like and, in 
particular, what sort of social, political, and economic institutions are appropriate to 
such a society. 259 If institutions deny certain goods to individuals on the basis of age 
and they do this in order to implement equal benefits over the course of a complete 
life, then they are likely to bring about a lack of self-respect amongst those of a 
certain age as a consequence. Those individuals will be enjoying fewer of the benefits 
that others in their society currently do on the basis that they have already consumed 
259 Ibid. 
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their fair share. But the justice of this implication can be challenged by the idea 
outlined earlier that people have irreducible synchronic self-interests, or synchronic 
needs, which should be protected. In such a case LE may be shown to not ensure the 
continued existence of the social bases of self-respect. 
I argue, therefore, that from the perspective of the social egalitarian ideal of DE it 
would obviously be morally wrong to neglect or violate the fundamental interests and 
needs of anyone, whatever their age, and DE would therefore not countenance the 
inequality of social relations between citizens that such age-discrimination would 
often create. Therefore, I believe the best defence of an anti-ageist ethic is for it to be 
embedded within a democratic social egalitarianism rather than to seek to defend it 
within the currently dominant philosophical position of luck egalitarianism. 
However, appealing to social equality does not negate the need to determine a just 
form of economic distribution. And while the ideal of social equality does not by 
itself prescribe any particular material distribution it certainly has distributive 
implications. Certain patterns in the distribution of goods will be more instrumental 
than others in securing the equal social relationships between citizens that democratic 
equality prizes. But, as Dworkin argues, it is not enough to say that once the 
('constitutioml essentials' are satisfied then procedural fairness justifies whatever 
distribution the play of ordinary politics produces. 260 We need to be clear what kinds 
of distribution DE would justify, and the rest of this chapter and the next outline more 
fully how some distributive principles justify ageism while others do not. We should 
finally note in this section that just as there are several versions of LE so too are there 
260 Dworkin, 'Equality, Luck and Hierarchy, ' p 198. 
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likely to be several versions of DE, and there may arguably be several distributive 
principles that are compatible with the core DE goal of equalising social relations 
between citizens. 
We should note that although few writers have so far defended a version of DE there 
is no doubt that there may be serious objections to the theory as a whole that need to 
be addressed. Some such criticisms have been raised against Anderson's article in 
particular. 261 Nevertheless, my aim in this thesis has been to outline a philosophical 
position which would best defend an anti-ageist ethic, and this I believe to be DE. The 
fact, therefore, that there might be sound criticisms of that general position is not 
directly relevant to my aim. However, in chapter 71 do respond to the criticisms of 
DE that relate to its treatment of older people. 
4.3 Initial questions for distributive egalitarians 
This section examines some of the fundamental questions that contemporary theories 
of liberal egalitarianism normally address. In the* following two sections I will 
examine how the way in which these questions are addressed affects the justification 
of egalitarian ageism. 
11 For example, see Richard L Arneson, 'Luck egalitarianism and Prioritarianism" Ethics 110 (2000): 
339-349; Ronald Dworkin, 'Sovereign Ortue Revisited, ' Ethics 113 (2002): 106-144, csp 113-118. See 
also the papers of David Sobel and Thomas Christiano to be found at 
. 
browns. edu/dcpartments/philosophy/bears. Among the criticism arc, firstly, that Anderson 
conflates the psychological and technical economic senses of envy (see Anderson, 'What is the Point of 
Equality? ' p287). Secondly, Anderson wrongly claims Dworkin's 'equality of resources' lacks respect 
for some persons because it bases aid on public declarations that they suffer 'personal inferiority'. But 
distributive cgalitarians would argue that within an ideal society such attitudes would not be the basis 
of compensatioriL Rather, it would simply be acknowledged as unfair that some people should have 
fewer personal resources than others. Thirdly, Anderson says that equality of resources insults, or at 
least is disrespectful towards, people by making 'judgements of moral desert and responsibility' about 
theni. She claims this forces them as a condition of receiving compensation to obey other people's 
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(i) Equality, priority, or sufficiency? 
The first question for those who are concerned with distributive equality is whether 
such a theory should be strictly egalitarian between persons, whether it should be 
prioritarian and so only require us to give priority to the worst off citizens or group in 
society (thus not valuing equality itself as an intrinsic good), or whether it merely 
requires us to ensure the existence of a social minimum below which no-one should 
fall. Many contemporary liberals describe themselves as egalitarians but few of them 
would claim that equality is more important than other things like providing 
incentives for the talented to be more productive, and in a seminal article Derek Parfit 
outlined the differences and respective implications between such theorieS. 262 Those 
that believe that equality is intrinsically valuable are subject to the well-known 
, levelling-down' objection, which is to say, critics claim that such strict egalitarians 
would forgo increases in the well-being or benefits of everyone if it meant a move to a 
less equal society. 263 
The priority view, however, aims at prioritising the interests of the worst ofý but also 
accepts the legitimacy of the idea that some inequalities are pareto superior, i. e. that 
they are better for some and worse for no one. Moreover, by allowing some level of 
inequality to incentivise the more talented to be productive a theory can aim to 
improve the situation of everyone in society by increasing the overall product of the 
judgements about the uses they should have put their resources to rather than what theyjudge 
themselves. However, many would argue that such judgements are necessary to prevent free-riding. 
262 Derek Parfit, 'Equality or Priority?, in M. Clayton & A. Williams (eds. ), 7he ideal OfEquality 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 81-125. 
263 For a discussion and defence of the'levelling-down' objection see Larry Temkin, 'Equality, 
Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection, ' in Clayton & Andrews (eds. ) The Ideal ofEquality, 
ppl26-162. 
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economy as a whole. It is for this reason that John Rawls can be described as a 
prioritarian rather than a strict egalitarian. His 'difference principle' allows inequality, 
but only insofar as it benefits the expectations of the least advantaged in society. 264 
Rawls thus gives priority to the least advantaged in a society while at the same time 
allowing incentives for the more talented, and so justifies some inequality. 265 There 
are, however, also some differences between Rawls and other alleged prioritarians, 
and Thomas Nagel claims that although the worst off have the greater moral urgency 
society should not give exclusive concern to them. 266 Instead, so Nagel believes, we 
should balance the competing weights with the moral weight we give to increasing 
benefits for others in society. 
In the words of Derek Parfit the chief difference between strict equality and priority is 
that '[Strict] Egalitarians are concerned with relativities: with how each person's level 
compares with the level of other people. On the Priority View, we are concerned only 
with people's absolute levels'. 267 Prioritarianism is therefore non-comparative in the 
sense that it is unconcerned with how well off others are provided the worst off are 
given any available aid. Thus, 'what is bad is not that these people are worse of than 
others. it is rather that they are worse off than they might have been. 268 
"I John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice Revised Edition (Oxford: OUP, 1999). 
265 The need for these incentives, and so the inequality, has been challenged by G. A. Cohen, who 
argues that to be consistent with his theory Rawls should include an egalitarian ethos that would negate 
the desire of citizens from wishing to benefit from the inequality that incentives would bring. See 
Cohen, 'Incentives, Inquality, and Community, ' in Stephen Darwell (ed. ), Equal Freedom: Selected 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995). 
266 Tbomas Nagel, 'Equality, ' in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
pp106-128. 
267 parfjý 'Equality and Priority, ' p23. Naturally prioritarianisin is comparative in the sense that we 
must compare the well-being of citizens in order to determine who the members of the worst off group 
are. 
263 lbid, p22. 
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There is of course a third and much less demanding goaL the idea of a social 
minimum (SM), which some so-called egalitarians would claim is both more 
attainable and so morally more defensible. 269 A social minimum, or the doctrine of 
sufficiency, determines a level of well-being necessary for a decent and tolerable life, 
and beneath which no member of society should be allowed to fall., Harry Frankfurt 
argues for this goal by claiming that 'what is important from a moral point of view is 
not that everyone should have the same, but that everyone should have enough i, . 
270 
Indeed, Jeremy Waldron argues that a principle of sufficiency is the most that people 
within the Rawlsian Original Position behind the Veil of Ignorance would agree on, 
and that therefore, although Rawls himself dismisses the idea of the sufficiency 
minimuM, 271 Rawls' theory may in fact justify that rather than the difference 
principle. 272 
Of course, the problem with a sufficiency minimum is that it denies that there is 
anything morally wrong with the inequalities that exist between persons above that 
minimum. This doctrine would in fact condone very wide, even unlimited, disparities 
between the rich and poor, and this is undoubtedly the important intuitive objection 
against it. However, such unlimited inequality might not ensue if we were to 
understand sufficiency in Rawlsian terms. Integral to Rawls' theory is the idea that 
269 See Alexander Rosenberg, 'Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just Society, ' in Ellen 
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., & Jefrrey Paul (eds. ) The Just Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995): 54-71. 
270 Harry Frankfurt, 'Equality as a Moral Ideal, ' in The Importance of What We Care, 4bout 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988): 134-57, p 134. 
271 p 
, awlS"4 7, heory ofjUstice * p124. 
272 Jeremy Waldron, 'John Rawls and Social Minimum, ' in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981- 
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 250-270. 
171 
rational, self-interestcd agents, choosing principles of justice from behind a veil of 
ignorance, would have to agree upon principles to which they could consistently 
commit themselves even if they found themselves on the bottom rung of society once 
the veil was lifted. These are the strains of commitment, and as a thought experiment 
they ensure that the principles chosen have moral plausibility. It might therefore be 
rational for individuals to choose a social minimum, rather than the difference 
principle, but to ensure also that there is some limit to the permissible inequality 
above that minimum. In this way the sufficiency minimum might meet the strains of 
commitment. 
We can summarise the three distributive principles outlined in this section thus; 
Principle of [strict] equality: it is in itself bad if some people are worse off than 
others. 
273 
Principle ofprioritarianism: that benefiting people matters more the worse off people 
are. 
274 
Principle ofsufficiency: that no-one should fall below a certain minimum threshold. 
fli) Equality of What? 
The second question a distributive theory of equality must address is exactly what it is 
that we should be distributing, and this debate has been outlined in another seminal 
article, this tune by Amartya Sen, as 'Equality of What?, 275 The three most common 
273 Parfit, 'Equality and Priority, ' p4. 
274 lbid, p19. 
275 Arnartya Sen, 'Equality of Whaff in Equal Freedom. - Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 
edited by Stephen Darwall (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995): 307-330. 
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answers to this question are that we should equalize welfare, resources or capabilities 
(the latter being Sen's own preferred metric). Welfare is probably the least plausible 
because of the practical problems involved with measuring how happy, or how much 
welfare, each individual in a society is experiencing, and the problem of how we 
quantitatively and qualitatively compare our happiness with that of others. Indeed 
these are the same problems of interpersonal comparison that utilitarians face when 
defending utility as the intrinsic and normative good. 
The other well-known problems with equality of welfare as a metric are those of 
expensive, cheap and malformed tastes. That is to say that if we aim to equalise 
welfare, then the distribution of resources will be held hostage to people who have 
tastes and preferences that are costly to satisfy, or to those who are for some reason 
inefficient at converting resources into welfare. The elderly, of course, are often 
inefficient at converting resources into welfare due to infmnity (though not 
necessarily more so than handicapped young people), and it might be thought justified 
as a result to divert more resources towards older individuals for this reason. 
However, if a person has inexpensive tastes, either as a consequence of genetic or 
socially determined reasons, but is nevertheless able to reach a relatively high level of 
welfare without much investment, then the equality of welfare metric denies that they 
should have as many resources as those with expensive tastes. This implication might 
in itself be thought wrong. However, one socially determined reason as to why an 
individual might have inexpensive tastes is that those tastes are malformed. Imagine, 
for example, an elderly person who has internalised a culturally oppressive stereotype 
regarding people her age, and imagine that this leaves her with a certain self- 
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abnegation. In such a situation the equality of welfare metric would not challenge the 
reasons for her cheap tastes, and may in fact require her to forfeit some of her pension 
in order to finance the interest in paragliding that a more ambitious younger person 
has. Thus, equality of welfare is problematic to the extent that it would arguably 
ignore the existence of cultural ageism without further refinement. And, in order for it 
to not ignore cultural ageism, equality of welfare would have to involve some 
overarching principle that determined which kinds of welfare were wrong and which 
permissible. 276 
The equality of resources metric does not suffer from the same problem of 
measurement as welfare, because the quantity of money or goods that each person has 
a share of is easily quantified. Both Ronald Dworkin. 277 and Eric Rakowski278 measure 
the benefits that individuals are owed in terms of 'impersonal' resources such as 
goods and money, and make a distinction between these and the 'personal' resources 
of individuals which include their intelligence, skills and abilities. Dworkin's theory, 
which we look at in more detail below, compensates individuals for any lack in their 
personal resources with a redistribution of impersonal resources. 279 John Rawls is also 
sometimes characterised as a resource egalitarian, and the benefits to which citizens 
are to have 'fair' shares of within his theory are defiried as 'primary social goods'. 280 
276 Another common criticism of the welfare metric is that the process of determining the various levels 
of welfare enjoyed by different people would involve significant impositions upon their privacy. 
277 Ronald Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources, ' in Sovereign Virtue: 7he Theory and Practice ofEquality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200): 65-120. 
278 Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199 1). 
2" For a criticism of Dworkin's theory see Colin M. Macleod, Liberalism, Justice and the Market 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Phillippe Van Parijs, Real Freedom For Alk What (ifanything) can 
justijý capitalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), section 3A. 
280 John Rawls, A 7heory ofJustice. 
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Primary goods are those things that every rational individual is presumed to want 
whatever else she wants, and they include 'rights and liberties' that must be strictly 
equal, and 'income and wealth' and 'power and opportunities' that are to be 
distributed according to the 'difference principle'. Both resources and primary goods 
contrast with the welfare metric in that they would not inherently ignore cultural 
ageism because, as we saw in chapter 3, they are compatible with the advocacy 
strategy. 
A third egalitarian metric is that of the capability approach, and this is concerned with 
evaluating a distribution in terms of a person's actual ability to achieve various 
valuable functionings. Functionings are understood as the various things a person can 
do or be, and which are constitutive of living. While some functionings can be quite 
basic, such as being adequately nourished and being in good health, others, like the 
achieving of self-respect or the avoidance of social exclusion, are more complex. 
Capability sets represent the alternative combinations of functionings that it is 
possible for a person to achieve, and which embody a particular conception of the 
good. 281 
Sen argues that the capabilities metric has the advantage over resources and primary 
goods in that it concentrates on freedom itself rather than on the means to achieve 
freedom. Primary goods and resources are general purpose means that are useful for 
the pursuit of different ideas about the good that individuals might have, but each 
individual must then convert those resources, or means to freedom, into actual 
freedom. However, people are able to convert resources into freedom at different 
291 Amartya Sen, Inequality Re-ccamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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rates, and because the conversion rates of different people will differ significantly, an 
equality of resources or primary goods might go hand in hand with serious 
inequalities in the actual freedoms enjoyed. These variations in conversion rates can 
arise either from social issues or simple physical differences between people, and one 
example of the latter given by Sen is that of the differences in metabolic rates caused 
by age and gender. A social issue that would also undoubtedly affect the conversion 
rates of some individuals are the consequences of cultural oppression, and particularly 
the diminishing of self-respect that ensues from internalising the negative meanings 
conveyed by culturally oppressive stereotypes. There would be good reason, 
therefore, for any theory incorporating the capability metric to challenge those 
culturally oppressive stereotypes. 
The capability approach differs from equality of welfare because it makes room for a 
variety of human acts and psychological states as important in themselves irrespective 
of the welfare they provide, while at the same time it can mean providing some people 
with more resources than others to bring them up to the same capability. 282 It may also 
have an affinity with Rawls' primary goods metric. Although Rawls has often been 
thought of as a resource egalitarian, he has claimed that 'as Sen argues, any such 
index [of primary social goods] will consider basic capabilities, and its aim will be to 
restore citizens to their proper role as normal members of society'. 283 Thus, Rawls' 
metric may be understood as a hybrid of capabilities and resources, and that his list of 
primary goods should be supplemented with an account of those capabilities essential 
to be a normally cooperating member of the community. 
... Contrary to this explanation of the capability metric, Dworkin claims that it ultimately collapses 
either in to equality of welfare or resources. See Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, chapter 7. 
Rawls, Political Liberalism, p 186. 
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Naturally, the capabilities approach is not immune to criticism, and one important 
criticism is that it judges the well-being of persons independently of the attitudes they 
themselves have with regard to their capabilities. This points to the fact that while 
both welfare and resource metrics have an important subjective component, the 
capabilities metric is essentially an 'objective list' theory. Welfarism is directly 
concerned with the happiness or preference satisfaction of individuals and requires the 
state to equalise this as much as possible. The resource metric is subjective in the 
sense that it provides individuals with the opportunity to purchase whatever goods 
they desire within a free market. The capabilities metric, in contrast, selects an 
objective list of those functionings to be provided by the community irrespective of 
whether they satisfy the preferences of citizens. Consequently, it might be claimed 
that such an objective list would violate liberal neutrality between competing 
conceptions of the good: that the metric was biased in favour of such conceptions that 
the list supported but failed to respect those ideas about the good life that it did not. 
'Mus, the capability metric may even be characterised as perfectionist. 
However, Elizabeth Anderson responds to this criticism by claiming that it 
misunderstands the distinction between what people want and what the political 
community is obligated to provide them with. 284 The state, which is the power of 
citizens as a collective body, ought to secure for citizens a certain list of goods, not 
because they are the ones that are the most important for human happiness or 
nourishing, but because they are the goods that the members of society can agree to 
collectively provide given the fact of pluralism. As Rawls has shown, there may be a 
"" Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality?, p329. 
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plurality of reasonable though opposing comprehensive conceptions of the good life 
that are held by individuals within society, but if it is a stable and just society there 
will also be an overlapping consensus among those otherwise incommensurable 
doctrines. 285 It is this consensus that allows us to identify those goods that all 
reasonable people can recognise as important and as having a legitimate basis on 
which individuals can make moral claims upon one another. 
Tbus, an objective list of socially provided capabilities is not necessarily based upon 
any perfectionist assumptions or by any particular conception of the good. In any 
case, individuals are not required to use the benefits that society provides and are 
entitled to satisfy their preferences by other means. All that the capability view denies 
is that it is the responsibility of the state to either provide citizens with happiness 
directly, in the way that welfarists and utilitarians claim, or with the direct means of 
satisfying their subjective preferences as do resource egalitarians. In practical terms 
the capability metric can be seen as providing citizens with a guaranteed access to a 
list of goods that ensures a sufficiency minimum of certain freedoms. However, as 
with the SM principle outlined above, the capabilities metric is silent once the 
relevant capability threshold has been reached, and says nothing about the justice or 
otherwise of inequalities that continue to exist above that threshold. 
295 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), chapter V. 
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(Iff) The unit of egalitarian concern: Synchronic or diachronic? 
The third question that a distributive egalitarian should ask of a political theory is 
what Larry Temkin has referred to as 'the unit of egalitarian concern'. 286 Dennis 
McKerlie defines what has been called the complete life view (CLV) as the normative 
principle 'that different people's share of resources, or welfare, should be equal when 
we consider the amounts of those things that they receive over the complete course of 
their lives. 287 While this particular definition may only be applicable to strict 
equality, Temkin recognises that the view can be applicable to either equality or 
priority and defines it thus: 
The CLV- an egalitarian should be concerned about A's being worse off than B to the 
extent, and only to the extent, that A's life, taken as a complete whole, is worse off 
than B's, taken as a complete Whole. 288 
The usual assumption is that justice is concerned with complete lives rather than 
merely with parts of them, and some liberal thinkers, such as Thomas Nagel, are 
explicit in claiming that 'the subject of an egalitarian principle is not the distribution 
of particular rewards to individuals at some time, but the prospective quality of their 
lives as a whole, from birth to death'. 289 We should note that the use of the word 
6prospective' implies that Nagel's commitment to diachronic equality would support 
the restricting of goods to older people if it seemed that those older persons had 
"" Larry S. Temkin, Inequality (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapter 8. Ibis 
third question has rarely been addressed while the two questions between equality and priority and 
between metrics have been discussed exhaustively. 
287 Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time, ' Ethics 99, (1989): 492-502, p476. 
211 Temkin, Inequality, p233. 
219 Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 199 1), p69. 
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already had their fair share (or more) over their complete lives than the young and 
middle-aged could expect to enjoy in theirs. 
The CLV is integral to mainstream liberal egalitarianism, and Mckerlie has claimed 
that the two most prominent contemporary liberal thinkers, John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin, both explicitly embrace it. 290 However, while Dworkin's use of the CLV is 
quite explicit, as we shall see below, the reference that McKerlie uses to suggest that 
Rawls embraces the CLV is rather less so? 91 Indeed, I would argue that this reference 
merely suggests that Rawls unreflectively assumes the CLV rather than that he 
actively and exclusively supports it. And rather than rejecting any concern for 
synchronic well-being, as McKerlie suggests, I argue in chapter 6 that in fact Rawls, 
theory of justice can be read to involve a significant concern for the temporal or 
synchronic benefits that people enjoy. 
Although rarely discussed within political philosophy the issue of whether we should 
adopt a synchronic or diachronic unit of egalitarian concern seems fundamental to 
distributive justice. The fact is that it directly determines which individuals have 
claims ofjustice against the community. It is a question that Parfit briefly addresses in 
his discussion of priority and strict equality, and he gives three possible answers to the 
question of to whom we should give priority: 
'" Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time, ' p476. 
"I The references Mckcrlie gives as evidence for Rawls' commitment to the CLV are in A Theory of 
Justice, pp78 and 178 (these pages refer to pp67-68 and p 155 respectively in the Revised edition). 
Rawls assumes that the membership of the worst off group in society remains constant. That 
individuals are members of it from birth to death. However, I point out in chapter 6 that this is not 
necessarily so, and that even from what Rawls himself says it would seem more plausible that an 
individual could be a member of the worst off group at one point in their lives and not a member at 
another point. In short, membership of economic groups is synchronic. 
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(1) those who are worse off in their lives as a whole, 
(2) those who are worse of at a time, 
(3) those who have needs that are morally more urgent. 292 
Parfit notes that there is often a divergence between (1) and (2), but a convergence 
between (2) and (3). Thus, someone who is now wnong the worst off may have been 
quite well off in the past, but if someone is worse off at a time then her needs are 
likely to be morally more urgent. However, despite his insight, Parfit assumes for the 
purposes of his article that 'there is no difference between those who would be worse 
off at a time, and those who would be worse off in their lives as a whole. 293 
Nevertheless, iý as I have argued, each individual has fundamental synchronic 
interests that have independent moral weight, then the distinctions that Parfit makes 
are very important. We must decide whether the moral urgency of those synchronic 
interests provide individuals with claims for impersonal resources that outweigh the 
moral importance of their complete life diachronic share. 
The CLV does not take this view, but rather it values diachronic equality over and 
above the importance of temporal needs. As noted in section 2.2, few liberal 
egalitarians view 'needs' as a plausible principle on which to distribute goods, and it 
is generally assumed that if people have needs then they should satisfy them 
themselves in the same way as they. would their desires. That is, through the 
Parfit, 'Equality or Priority, ' section VIII, pp20-22. 
293 lbid, p 103. 
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investment and consumption of their equal diachronic shares. Nevertheless, if the 
CLV can be shown to justify material deprivation for individuals at a time which is 
significantly detrhnental to the interests of the old (i. e. that their basic synchronic 
needs will go umnet), then there are grounds to call this deprivation wrongful. The 
CLV is a normative principle of social justice that implicitly justifies temporal or 
synchronic inequality between persons in pursuit of greater equality over the complete 
lives of separate persons. This in turn justifies discriminating against the old, as far as 
distribution is concerned, if by so doing we are able to achieve greater equality 
between the complete lives of different people. The question, therefore, is whether 
egalitarians should adopt the diachronic CLV, and so equalise or prioritise benefits 
over complete lives, or whether they should be concemed rather to equalise or 
prioritise benefits between separate persons within the synchronic temporal segments 
of their lives. 
Mckerlie defends the claim that we should give priority concern for the synchronic 
circumstances of the worst off group of individuals at a time in what he calls the 
'time-specific priority view', or what I term the synchronic priority view (SPV). And 
he argues that the application of priority to life stages is arguably more intuitive than 
applying it to lifetimes. We can now define at least four alternative distributive views. 
1. The diachronic egalitarian view. that we should minimize the sum total of 
inequality between the complete lives of separate individuals. 
2. The diachronic prioritarian view: that it matters more to benefit people the worse 
of they are over their complete lives. 
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3. The synchronic egalitarian view: that we should minimize the sum total of 
inequality between individuals at-a-time. 
4. The synchronic prioritarian view: that it matters more to benefit people the worse 
off they are at-a-time. 
Having outlined the synchronic; and diachronic versions of strict equality and priority, 
both of which are further discussed in chapter 5, we should now turn to the principle 
of SM and deterniine whether that too might be applied either in synchronic or 
diachronic terms. My claim is that it can only plausibly be thought of synchronically 
because its underlying premise is that people should always have (enough'. As we 
have already noted, one might be well-off at one synchronic point in one's life and 
destitute the next, and those who suffer even periodic destitution do so because they 
do not have enough at that temporal stage of their lives. In terms of Parfit's insight, 
the needs of such people now have moral urgency. The SM view must therefore be 
applied synchronically if it is to honour the premise that gives it intuitive force. And 
because the SM would not be concerned. with how well off someone has been in the 
past it will necessarily violate the CLV that each of us should have an equal 
diachronic share. 
Thus, integral to the idea of a SM is that distribution is understood in synchronic 
terms, and the view would not therefore permit the more vulnerable citizens to be 
entirely destitute. Being synchronic the SM would have to take in to account the 
different needs that people have at different points in their lives, and as Clark Wolf 
argues, it would therefore 'ensure that the fundamental needs of the elderly do not go 
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unmet'. 294 However, even the SM would not rule out age discrimination altogether 
because more resources might still be made available to provide for the needs of the 
young over and above the minimum guarantee provided to the old. 
Thus, there are various synchronic alternatives to the CLV, but although these views 
have some intuitive plausibility, there are nevertheless fundamental theoretical 
problems involved with thinking that the unit of egalitarian concern is purely 
synchronic. Perhaps the most important of these involves the independent moral 
principle that individuals should take personal responsibility for the success of their 
lives. indeed, a fundamental justification for assuming the CLV is that it would 
require individuals to distribute their equal share of benefits prudently and so take 
personal responsibility for their own well-being in later life. The purely synchronic 
application of an equality of resources or welfare might be morally implausible 
because we would be denying the importance of the personal responsibility each of us 
has for the success of his life. If each of us was guaranteed an equal share of benefits 
at each temporal stage of our lives, then there would be no incentive for any of us to 
be prudent in our life gambles. Thus, any endorsement of synchronic equality would 
obviously violate the principles of LE outlined in section 4.1. However, there are also 
practical implications for the economy of an exclusive concern for the synchronic 
view, because if people are continuously compensated for imprudence, i. e. for not 
saving or investing resources or not working hard, then the economy would likely 
become increasingly less productive. 
"' Clark Wollý 'Healthcare access, population ageing, and intergenerational justice, ' in A Harry Lesser 
(ed. ),. 4geing, 4utonomy and Resources (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 212-24 1, p233. 
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There is another more practical problem for the synchronic: view in that it would need 
to define exactly what duration a 'synchronic temporal period' should be. For the 
purposes of public policy we might categorise individuals by age, and the age ranges 
of these categories could be whatever is most efficient from an administrative 
perspective. We have said in the previous chapter that it is not helpful for anti-ageists 
to think of the old as a social group, and that they do not constitute such a group in 
any objective sense. Nevertheless, social categorization is a necessary feature of 
delivering public policies in a modem society and is not in itself wrong. 
4.4 Egalitarian metrics and the fundamental needs of the old 
How do the various egalitarian distributive principles and metrics affect the potential 
for egalitarian ageism? As far as the metrics of both welfare and resources are 
concerned, egalitarian ageism is likely to be justified if they are applied in a way that 
is exclusively diachronic because that would countenance the neglect of the 
synchronic interests of older people. Alternatively, if we were to take a synchronic 
view then either welfare or resources would be equalised at each temporal moment, 
and that would mean that irrespective of the claims individuals had already made on 
the community in the past they would never be able to exhaust their claims before or 
after they reached old age. As noted, though, this might arguably cause problems for 
the principle of personal responsibility. 
The synchronic view also presents particular problems for the welfare metric with 
regard to the process of aging. The fact that there is some degree of mental and 
physical decline involved with ageing means that the well-being of people is likely to 
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naturally diminish as people get older. Thus greater resources would be necessary for 
older people to achieve the same level of welfare as younger people. The changing 
conversion ratio of resources to welfare as we age also means that the equality of 
welfare metric would need to find a way of simultaneously comparing the inter- 
personal welfare between people who are young, middle-aged and old. However, this 
measuring process is further complicated because the relative decline that each older 
individual experiences will be at a different rate. Therefore, although the same level 
of goods might equalise ihe welfare of two older persons, person A and person B, at 
one temporal moment, this situation is not constant. If person A's physical and mental 
condition declines faster than that of person B over the next couple of years, then it 
will be necessary to transfer more resources to A than to B at a second temporal 
moment to continue to equalise their welfare. I believe, therefore, that the welfare 
metric is implausible in a practical sense and particularly so when looked at from a 
synchronic perspective. For these reasons I will focus upon the possibilities of the 
resource and capability metrics over the rest of this thesis. 295 
We have seen that resources can be distributed either synchronically or 
diachronically, but if an egalitarian theory only entitled a person to a certain quantity 
of a particular resource they need over their complete lives then once that equal 
diachronic share had been exhausted the individual would no longer be entitled to any 
more. If the resource in question was health care, and the individual had already had 
his complete life share, then further health care in the form of emergency treatment 
293 Although G. A- Cohen's preferred egalitarian metric 'equality of access to advantage' appeals in part 
to welfarism he is nevertheless conscious that finding out people's relative levels of advantage may be 
intolerably intrusive. Cohen views this as an issue of freedom- Ilius, Cohen believes that the 
independent value of freedom should limit the degree to which welfarist policies should be 
implemented. See G. A. Cohen, 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,, pq 10. 
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following a road accident might be denied on the basis of fairness. Understood in this 
way, diachronic shares of resources do not take account of the principle of urgency or 
of synchronic need. And it is therefore these fundamental needs that an exclusive 
concern for the CLV endangers if what it seeks to do is merely distribute resources or 
welfare as equally as possible over a complete life. 
In contrast to the other distributive principles and metrics, however, there is a 
commonality between the capabilities metric and the doctrine of sufficiency in that 
they share an appeal to the concept of urgency, or of synchronic need. I have already 
claimed that any plausible sufficiency doctrine is concerned with how well off people 
are at a time and so does not work on a diachronic basis, and a similar dimension of 
synchronic concern would also seem to be inherent within the capability metric. 
Therefore, if we are concerned about the synchronic needs of particular age groups we 
could do worse than appeal to these principles. Once adopted, though, the capability 
metric must determine the particular synchronic functionings that society is to 
guarantee citizens. We might start, however, by suggesting that those functionings 
should include the fundamental synchronic interests of individuals to having one's 
basic needs met, to autonomy, and to enjoying the social bases of self-respect. Indeed, 
Sen is in any case committed to these very functionings. He uses the term 'basic 
capabilities' to refer to the satisfaction of certain elementary and crucially important 
functionings up to certain levels, e. g. the ability to be well-nourished and well- 
sheltered, the capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature mortality. 
The central place given to the functioning of autonomy within Sen's metric is 
illustrated by his aim to focus upon the actual extent of freedom for individuals to 
choose ways of living as opposed to merely providing them with the means to 
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freedom as equality of resources arguably does. And self-respect is viewed by Sen as 
a more complex capability along with that of being able to appear in public without 
shame, or in avoiding social exclusion. 
4.5 The CLV and Political philosophy 
The purpose of this section is to examine the influence of the CLV within mainstream 
liberal political philosophy, and particularly with regard to the principles of LE. It is 
my claim that LE is committed to the CLV while DE rejects it, and it is this 
disagreement concerning the CLV that explains the wider normative differences 
between the two theories outlined in the first section of this chapter. 
As noted, the fundamental principle underlying all forms of the generic LE principle 
is a distinction between option and brute luck. The principle requires that individuals 
should be compensated for disadvantages for which they are not responsible, but that 
they should bear the full costs of the adverse consequences of their choices. This 
principle, in turn, incorporates the two premises that the choice-circumstance cut is 
one that is plausible, and that justice is an essentially distributive ideal. Moreover, the 
two principles are mutually supportive. 
LE embraces an exclusive concern for the CLV because only by doing so can it give 
full expression to these two premises. Firstly, the CLV of equality, or diachronic 
equality, is viewed by luck egalitarians as the fairest form of distribution, and 
secondly, the CLV guarantees the cut between choice and circumstance. Indeed, the 
principle of diachronic equality between complete lives requires that people take 
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personal responsibility for the choices they make, and to pay for the true cost of their 
lives. LE does not permit the redistribution of resources from the prudent to the 
imprudent, or from the industrious to the lazy, because such free-riding would violate 
the fairness of diachronic equality. In any case, if personal choice and effort are the 
only just reasons for any inequalities of benefits, as LE claims, then compensation for 
bad option luck is unwarranted. Therefore, if person A has expensive tastes he must 
also be productive in order to finance them, and in doing so his choices would cost no 
more to society than person B who has cheap tastes and works very little. 
By allowing people to benefit fully from good option luck also ensures the existence 
of incentives for entrepreneurs to take risks, for people to work hard, and for the 
talented to be more productive. Incentives are important in that they work to increase 
the national pot and so benefit everyone. Moreover, by not redistributing the product 
of individual choices the CLV guarantees individuals the lives they prefer. 296 Thus, as 
Dworkin claims, 'I show respect for others when I do not appropriate resources that 
are properly theirs - when I do not exceed my fair share at their expense. 297 
Therefore, the form of distribution that LE would necessarily be committed to would 
be either diachronic: equality or diachronic priority, and because so much weight is 
placed upon individual choice, which is subjective, the egalitarian metric adopted 
would be either welfare or resources, or perhaps a combination of the two. 
296 One criticism of this is that there may be many cases in which gambles are undertaken reluctantly, 
not because people wish to undertake risk for the sake of risk itself but because those risks are a 
necessary feature of that choice. 
297 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, P280. 
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Because Ronald Dworkin is criticised. more often than any other alleged luck 
egalitarian we should briefly outline his theory here and its commitment to the CLV. 
Whether equality exists between persons on Dworkin's account is determined by what 
he calls the 'envy test', and this involves the application of a complicated combination 
of hypothetical insurance markets and auctions in order to determine exactly how 
such equality could be implemented in as fair a way as possible. 298 
The envy test for equality of resources is not simply a question of giving each person 
the same amount of goods, but the requirement that each person be satisfied with the 
level of goods and resources they end up with. At the same time, each person should 
take responsibility for how her tastes will be satisfied. A hypothetical auction divides 
all divisible goods into separate lots and bundles, and each individual can then bid for 
those goods with an equal initial purchasing power. Because everyone has equal 
purchasing power the particular bundles of goods they end up with will reflect their 
level of desire for those goods, so the outcome of the auction is one that satisfies the 
envy test because no-one would prefer anyone else's bundle. 
This is not the full theory because in order to be fair Dworkin wishes to ensure that 
principles of justice are also endowment-insensitive. After all, one is not responsible 
for the abundance or lack of natural endowments one has: rather it is a matter of brute 
luck. For a distribution to be endowment-insensitive requires society to compensate 
each individual for shortfalls in their personal resources with a greater level of 
impersonal resources. To do this Dworkin posits a hypothetical insurance market in 
which he asks us to think about how much we would ensure against being born with 
298 Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources. ' 
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handicaps and other natural disadvantages on the assumption that all are equally likely 
to suffer from that bad brute luck. The distributive pattern justified by this ideal world 
hypothetical thought experiment would then be replicated in the real world of practice 
by appropriately arranging taxation and public expenditure policies. 
It is the hypothetical insurance market that gives rise to Dworkin's conclusions about 
the just distribution of healthcare, and I examine this application of his theory and its 
implications for egalitarian ageism in chapter 6. But, it is important to note here that 
Dworkin explicitly assumes the CLV and insists that 'we must apply the envy test 
diachronically'. 299 He believes that we should do this in order that no-one should envy 
the occupation and bundle of resources at the disposal of anyone else over time, even 
though it is possible that someone may envy another's bundle at a particular time. 300 
As Dworkin argues, 
[I]f we look for envy at particular points in time, then each envies Adrian's resources 
at the end of the year, and the division is therefore not equal. But if we look at envy 
differently, as a matter of resources over an entire life, and we include a person's 
occupation as part of the bundle of goods, then no one envies Adrian's bundle, and 
301 the distribution cannot be said to be unequal on that account. 
Some people will wish to work hard and accumulate their resources, while others will 
wish to enjoy more leisure and consequently fewer resources. For this reason it seems 
fair to suggest that in order for someone to legitimately envy the bundle of resources 
of another she would also have to envy the level of hard work that the other person 
had done in order to accumulate those resources. Thus, while person A might envy 
person B's bundle of goods a year after an initial equal distribution, she could not 
299 Ibid, p306. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid, p304. 
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envy person B's complete life and all the work he has had to do in order to 
accumulate his fmal complete life share. 
Thus, Dworkin's theory is committed to the CLV as a way of ensuring that 
individuals are entirely responsible for the success or otherwise of their lives and do 
not expect others to bear the costs of their choices. But this commitment to the CLV 
means that equality of resources, or any other form of LE, can be defined as a 
'starting-gate' theory, i. e. a theory which provides individuals with equal starting 
points and then permits them to sink or swim as fortune and their own choices 
dictate. 302 This is so despite the fact that Dworkin himself criticises such theories and 
distances equality of resources from such a characterisation. Dworkin considers that a 
starting-gate theory merely 'holds that justice requires equal initial resources but then 
303 holds that justice requires laissez. faire thereafter'. Dworkin notes the difference 
between his own theory and his conception of starting-gate theories in that his 
'endowment-insensitive' theory requires compensating those with bad brute luck for 
their disadvantage, and rather than this involving a one-off payment as part of that 
initial starting point, his metric provides compensatory payments over the course of 
people's lives. 
Nevertheless, because 'equality of resources' also involves an explicit commitment to 
the CLV it also requires that an equal distributive share (having taken handicaps and 
302 This is a criticism levelled at LE by Anderson, 'What is the Point of EqualityT, p308. See also Marc 
Fleurbaey, 'Equality of Resources Revisited, ' Ethics 113 (2002): 82-105; Richard L Arneson, Review 
of Sovereign Virtue by Ronald Dworkin, Ethics 112 (2002): 367-71. For Dworkin's response to this 
claim see his'Sovereign Virtue Revisited, ' Ethics 113 (2002): 106-143, especially ppl. 13-8. 
303 Dworkin, 'Equality of Resources', p309. 
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lack of native talents into consideration) of purchasing power between separate 
persons must necessarily be finite. If each share were not fmite then there would be no 
need to take such care to distribute resources equally. I would argue, therefore, that 
Dworkin's is a starting-gate theory, though differently defined from his own 
conception. And this seems to be borne out by Dworkin himself who argues that if 
two people were blinded within his ideal society, then in principle, and in accordance 
with the LE maxim, the one who has not purchased insurance does without any state 
assistance other than what charity might provide. 304 
However, such a starting gate theory presents another problem, which Dworkin sets 
aside despite acknowledging it as 'of great theoretical interest and of central practical 
importance when we come to ask what the requirement of an equal start would mean 
4 
for the real world. 005 This question involves examining whether and how equality of 
resources should accommodate the possibilities of people radically changing their 
minds about the way they wish to live their lives, and whether an individual could be 
entitled to a fresh stock of resources when he regrets his former life and wants a fresh 
start. The particular case Dworkin cites is that of 'a profligate who has wasted his 
initial endowment and now finds himself with less than he needs to provide even for 
the basic needs in later life'. 
306 1 would agree with Dworkin that the question he raises 
is of central importance, and I would argue that its consideration draws one to the 
further question of whether or not we should have a concern for the synchronic well- 
304 lbid, p295. Nevertheless, despite this principle the practical implementation of equality of resources 
would adopt an averaging assumption, and assumptions would be made as to whether people would 
rationally insure themselves. 
Consequently, the sick and disabled would be covered for those illnesses 
and disabilities that the average person would 
insure against even ifthe affected individuals are 
themselves risk-embracing and would not have insured themselves. 
305 Ibid. 
'" lbid, p334. 
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being of persons at each temporal moment, rather than a diachronic one only. My 
response, and that of DE, is that we should. 
4.6 DE and the anti-ageist chaHenge to the CLV 
Whether the CLV is either explicit or implicit within a distributive theory it will have 
implications, especially for the elderly, that are intuitively implausible. The goal of 
diachronic priority or equality would justify the restriction of benefits to the old to 
such a degree that their basic interests and needs would go unmet. The CLV can 
logically justify extreme wealth among the young while there is at the same time 
severe destitution amongst the elderly. Indeed, if the current old, even though now 
destitute, have had very wealthy lives relative to those that are currently young, and if 
they are likely to have already enjoyed more benefits in their long lives than the 
current young and middle aged are likely to enjoy in their lives, then the CLV would 
actually require the destitute old to transfer some of their remaining resources to the 
wealthy young. 
These implications are particularly significant in light of the generational equity 
debate discussed in chapter one (section 1.3. ii). It is claimed by some that those who 
are currently old are now enjoying more than their fair share of benefits and may seek 
to justify moves to restrict the benefits available to that age group from the principle 
of fairness. The old are seen to be better off not just than previous generations of the 
old, and not just better off than the younger age-groups of today, but that they are also 
better off than the next generation of the old can hope to be. If such is the case, then 
the CLV as a principle is not currently being respected. Moreover, if the CLV is 
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morally sound then society ought to restrict the benefits enjoyed by the current old. 
The strict egalitarian version of the CLV principle would in fact go further than the 
advocates of generational equity and actually require this restriction of benefits from 
the old even if those benefits could not be redistributed to the young. The reason for 
this is simply that greater complete life equality would be achieved by that restriction. 
The anti-ageist principle would challenge the CLV because it requires that the old 
always have sufficient benefits to enable them to enjoy a reasonably decent old age 
irrespective of their complete life shares. As we have seen in chapter 2, each 
individual has both synchronic and diachronic; interests that are not reducible to one 
another. This means that we cannot give sufficient concern to a person's synchronic 
interests merely by securing individuals a 'fair' lifetime share of benefits sufficient for 
their diachronic interests. And because each person has the same synchronic interests 
that demand equal treatment, irrespective of their age, society has a strong reason to 
limit discrimination on the basis of age alone. 307 
Now we might ask how this theory of moral psychology challenges the CLV of 
distribution. Surely a pattern of material distribution may be just irrespective of its net 
effects on synchronic well-being? However, if this theory of moral psychology is 
sound then it gives us a reason to suppose that a distributive scheme would be 
incomplete, and so inadequately just, if it gave exclusive concern to the CLV at the 
expense of the synchronic interests of persons. Rather it gives us a reason to develop a 
distributive scheme that gave concern to the quality of both the diachronic and 
307 This is apro tanto claim against age discrimination. To the extent that we have a reason to attend to 
the synchronic interests of persons society cannot legitimately discriminate purely on the basis of age. 
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synchronic aspects of individual well-being. Moreover, this moral psychology has 
implications for Rawlsian type contractualism, which is to say theories that involve 
the idea that just principles of distribution are those that would be chosen by 
representative individuals behind a veil of ignorance. If such prudent agents 
deliberated while aware of the divided nature of their self-interest, and also realised 
that they would have to abide by the strains of commitment once those principles were 
put in to effect, then it would not be absurd to suggest that they would give some 
concern to the quality of their synchronic interests rather than to give exclusive 
concern to the just distribution across their complete lives. Moreover, it would not be 
absurd for an individual to distribute resources within his own life in such a way that 
would prioritise one temporal period when he was likely to be worst off, and that it 
would be prudent to do this even if it was at the expense of the total level of benefits 
he would en oy over his complete life. Thus, what we need is a distribution that does 
not give exclusive concern to the CLV. 
In support of this conclusion we can examine two examples that Mckerlie gives when 
it would seem morally more plausible to be concerned about the synchronic interests 
of the old irrespective of the complete life shares of benefits that people enjoy. In the 
first example, Mckerlie believes we would prefer to help an old person who is very 
badly off rather than someone younger and better off, irrespective of their complete 
life shares, even if it is clear that the actual benefit for the older person's well-being 
would be smaller than the benefit to that of the younger person. This would represent 
the pure application of the principle that we should give synchronic priority to the 
worst off individual or group. If one person is presently fairly well off it would seem 
odd that we should prefer to give him a larger benefit than to give a poorer person a 
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smaller benefit? The reason it would seem odd must partly be explained by the idea 
that we can identify with the synchronic interests of the older person who is now in 
greater need. Moreover, it might seem prudent for rational deliberators behind a veil 
of ignorance to ensure that our principles ofjustice would assist those in greatest need 
at any temporal moment irrespective of complete life shares. 
In a second example, Mckerlie argues that we would prefer to help an old person who 
is very badly off rather than a younger person who is badly off, yet not as badly off, 
even though the older person had already consumed more resources than the younger 
person is likely to do in his life. When we are dealing with morally urgent claims of 
justice it does seem plausible that we would not be primarily concerned with the total 
level of benefits someone has or is likely to enjoy over their complete lives. As noted 
above. Parfit argued that it is likely that those whose needs are morally more urgent 
are also those who are worse off within any temporal moment, which is to say those 
who are synchronically worse off. McKerlie's examples thus provide intuitive 
plausibility to the idea that a distribution should not be exclusively diachronic, and 
this is obviously at odds with a CLV. 
This anti-ageist rejection of the CLV is wholly compatible with the position of DE. 
My claim is that DE also rejects the CLV, and this claim is evident when we look 
again at what motivates democratic egalitarians and their criticisms of LE. We noted 
five objections to the LE position in section 4.1, and four of them are relevant to a 
critique of the CLV . 
308 Firstly, democratic egalitarians reject the idea that a fair 
"' The third objection to LE, that the LE conception of fairness is not a refined version of Rawls' 
'difference principle', examined in chapter 6.3(V). 
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distribution is the only (or even the most) important value within egalitarianism. A 
fundamental premise of DE is rather that the social relations that exist between 
citizens are the most important feature, and that the distributive pattern an egalitarian 
theory adopts is justified to the extent that it creates and maintains such equal 
relations. If an equal distribution is not fundamental for DE then neither is the CLV, 
but because the CLV will actually tend to create unequal social relations DE in fact 
rejects it. 
The second DE criticism of LE is that the distinction between choice and 
circumstance is not always morally plausible. Indeed, DEs are motivated by the idea 
that we should sometimes give assistance even to those who have been partly 
responsible for their desperate position. Those with needs that are morally more 
urgent at each temporal moment will have a claim on the rest of society to provide 
them with the means to fulfil their fundamental interests. This DE commitment to 
synchronic well-being would necessarily violate the CLV. 
Another DE criticism is that LE is not incompatible with a social hierarchy or the 
continued existence of moral prejudice. This is to say that we could equalise benefits 
between the complete lives of separate persons without challenging these two 
phenomena. But it is a fundamental goal of DE and its ideal of achieving equal social 
relations that social hierarchies and prejudice be challenged, and, at best, the CLV is 
superfluous to this normative goal. Finally, DE objects that the lexical priority that LE 
gives to its conception of fairness (embodied in the LE maxim) conflicts with ideas 
about the value of respect, and it is a normative goal of DE to balance these two 
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values. As noted, LE subordinates respect in pursuit of diachronic fairness, itself 
grounded on the CLV, and this is another reason for rejecting the CLV. 
What this analysis shows is that DE and the anti-ageist principle are entirely 
compatible, and we can conclude that anti-ageists should adopt DE as a general 
philosophical position from which to consistently challenge all forms of wrongful age 
discrimination. 
4.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has argued that any exclusive concern to ensure diachronic equality of 
material distribution between persons will lead to a justification of age discrimination 
in old age. The chapter has also claimed that such an exclusive concem for diachronic 
equality is prevalent within much contemporary egalitarian theory, particularly that of 
LE. In contrast I have noted the emergence of DE, and have outlined how the concern 
this concept has that social relations between citizens be equal would actively 
challenge the ageism accepted by LE. From the normative ideal that individuals 
should have equal social relations it would be morally wrong to discriminate solely on 
the basis of age, because such discrimination would inevitably involve relations of 
inequality between citizens. 
By drawing on the three premises of DE set out at the end of section 4.1 we see that 
DE would present three arguments against age discrimination. Firstly, if the 
synchronic needs of the elderly are neglected while the needs of others are not then 
the resulting situation would involve relations of social inequality, and, as we have 
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seen, social equality is a concept often thought to be theoretically prior to distributive 
equality. Secondly, as Hinton and Wolff have argued, LE principles of fairness often 
disregard the moral importance of protecting the self-respect of citizens, and 
discrimination on the basis of age alone can be expected to be detrimental to the self- 
respect of the elderly. DE, on the other hand, would seek to balance both values. 
Thirdly, by neglecting the basic needs of older citizens we would reinforce the 
cultural ageist assumption that the value of the lives of old people is inferior to that of 
younger people. The social ideal of DE would therefore recognise that the age 
discrimination justified by the distributive ideal of LE as extrinsically morally wrong. 
Within this chapter I have also noted that while social equality does not in itself 
determine a specific distributive system it does have distributive implications, and in 
chapter 71 outline the system that Anderson's DE view envisages. Anderson's view 
incorporates the capabilities metric and, therefore, one of my central claims is that DE 
would defend the anti-ageist ethic because it does not embrace an exclusive concern 
for the diachronic CLV- However, before we can examine the possibility of an 
economic distribution that does not focus exclusively on diachronic equality we first 
need to examine the alternatives and this is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Ageism and the unit of egalitarian concern 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine various understandings of the unit of 
egalitarian concem found within contemporary political theories, from the CLV to the 
'fair innings argument' (FIA), to the quality life year (QALY), and finally to 
synchronic alternatives. Analysis of these units suggest that an exclusive concem for 
any of them will have implausible consequences, and the only morally plausible view 
is a hybrid unit which combines both a concern for the complete life share of benefits 
a person has as well as a synchronic concern for the well-being they experience at a 
time. The problem for political philosophy is that such a hybrid unit of concern can 
not be easily formulated within distributive justice. Nevertheless, it will be my 
argument in chapter 7 that the intuition that lies behind this hybrid view, that concern 
should be given to both diachronic and synchronic, can be better expressed within 
democratic equality and the principle that we should equalise social relations rather 
than distribution. 
5.1 A 'fair innings" or a complete life? 
Both the consequences of the CLV and the 'fair innings argument, (FIA) are 
examples of egalitarian ageism, because although they do not involve culturally 
oppressive stereotypes, (and so are not intrinsically wrong) they nevertheless justify 
discriminating against the old in ways that may neglect or thwart their synchronic 
interests. The question in this section is whether the 'fair innings' argument (FIA), 
briefly outlined in chapter 1 (1.3.1), and the CLV are one and the same principle or 
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not. 
309 This comparison between the two views tells us more about the implications of 
each as well as the ways in which their respective implications are either similar or 
different. The comparison will also make apparent some of the ambiguity as to 
exactly what it is that the FIA justifies. 
In its simplest form the FIA provides a reason for preferring to help one person rather 
than another when both need the same treatment in order to survive, but where 
scarcity dictates that only one can be saved. The intuition behind the FIA is that it is 
better to have lived a longer than a shorter lifetime, and so where two people are 
significantly different in age we should choose to assist the younger person before the 
older. Thus, a definition of the FIA would be the following; 
The FIA - that people who had achieved old age or who were closely approaching it 
would not have their lives further prolonged when this could only be achieved at the 
cost of the lives of those who were not nearing old age. 310 
We can compare this definition of the FIA with the definition of the CLV I have been 
using; 
The CL V- that different people's share of resources, or welfare, should be equal 
when we consider the total amounts of these things that they receive over the 
complete course of their lives. 311 
it is immediately apparent that there are some strong similarities between the two 
views, and it would seem reasonable to suggest that we could in fact support both 
309 1 will leave aside until chapter 6 the fact that the CLV is in practice normally combined with a 
prudential analogy before it is able to determine the just distribution of public goods such as healthcare. 
"'John Harris, The Value of Life. - An Introduction to Medical Ethics (London& New York: 
Routledge, 1985), pp93-94. 
311 Dennis McKerl ie, 'Equality and Time, ' Ethics 99 (1989): 492-502, p476. 
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principles. Ronald Dworkin, for example, as we have seen above, is committed to the 
CLV, but he also implicitly endorses the justice of the FIA when he outlines his 
'fi-ustration thesis': the 'instinctive assumption' of which is that it is a greater tragedy 
when a young person dies than when an old one dies. 312 
Both views are concerned about the distribution of some good, and both would seem 
to be strongly normatively egalitarian. They both hold that if there is something to be 
distributed then ideally it should be distributed fairly, which is usually taken to mean 
as equally as possible. The CLV, of course, concerns the distribution of either 
resources or welfare, and these goods can be understood as the means to an end, the 
end being to live as good a complete life as possible. They are means rather than ends 
because it is not these means that is thought to be of intrinsic importance. The FIA, on 
the other hand, may be interpreted in either one of two ways. It may be a view about 
the distribution of the means to ensure a 'fair' duration of life, in which case it would 
be a view concerning the means to an end in a similar way to the CLV. The only 
difference in this case perhaps would be that the means would be specifically limited 
to health-care and medical resources. Understood in this way, the FIA only becomes 
relevant in circumstances of scarcity where only one of two persons can be saved with 
the limited resources available. 313 
On the other hand, however, the FIA may be interpreted as being concerned about the 
end itsel& and so be concerned to ensure that each person has a fair or an equal share 
312 Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument AboutAbortion and Euthanasia (London: 
HarperCollinsPublishers, 1993), p88. 
313 The CLV is also relevant only in conditions of scarcity, but that is a feature of social justice 
generally. 
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of life itself A certain lifespan would be determined as 'fair', say 75 years, and 
resources would be distributed in such a way as to ensure that everyone reached that 
age. It is in this way that I believe Oliver Leaman interprets the FIA. 
There are interesting consequences to [this interpretation ofl the 'fair innings 
argument'. One is that it involves an extreme form of egalitarianism. The fact that 
someone lives longer than someone else is regarded as patently unfair, and it is just to 
seek to equalize as far as possible the life spans of different individuals. 
314 
As Leaman recognises, this more extreme version of the FIA has somewhat 
implausible implications. If the FIA is a normative principle that each of us should 
have equal life spans, then just as it is 'unfair' that some people die young, so too 
would it be unfair that some people live longer than their fair share. And something 
should be done to correct this unfairness, perhaps through a policy of enforced 
euthanasia for all those who have lived beyond the socially determined 'fair' 
innings. 315 
The first interpretation of the FIA identified here, that which identifies it with a view 
about means rather than ends, does not suffer from this morally implausible 
implication and it would remain silent concerning the actual life spans that different 
people achieved above the fair innings. It is silent on this because the view does not 
concern itself directly with distributing the ends, only of means. Once the health care 
and medical resources had been directed to ensure everyone had an equal opportunity 
314 oliVer JeaMan, -justifying Ageism', in A- Ibny Lesser (ed. ), Ageing, Autonomy and Resources, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p 182. 
315 it might be possible to make a further distinction here between a telic and a deontic version of the 
extreme FIA view concerning ends. The telic view is the one that Leaman seems to assume, that the 
FIA actually requires us to prevent, or redistribute life beyond the fair innings. The deontic view, on 
the other hand, would claim that life beyond the fair innings would be unjust only if we brought it 
about. A natural inequality of length of life on this latter view would not be unjust, and while it is 
similar to the FIA concerning means, it does not concern itself with welfare or resources to do this. 
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to reach the fair innings the actual innings people enjoyed is left unchallenged. In this 
respect the means interpretation of the FIA is similar to the CLV of resources rather 
than the CLV of welfare. Once the resources have been equally distributed the actual 
levels of welfare that individuals enjoy is independent, even though resource 
egalitarians will usually accept that welfare is the intrinsic end for which the 
distribution of the means is the motivation. 
To complicate the issue further, the distinction between whether the FIA distributes 
means or ends is not the only distinction that can be made. Just as with the CLV, the 
FIA, as the unit of egalitarian concern, may be interpreted in terms of a distributive 
principle of strict equality, priority or sufficiency. As indicated above, Leaman 
interprets the FIA to involve 'an extreme form of egalitarianism' which implies that 
its underlying normative principle is that we should each have the same length of life. 
Arguably, an ideal world in which everyone had the same length of life would be 
fairer than one in which everyone lived to the fair innings but some lived much 
longer. Such an ideal world of equal life-spans would also be administratively more 
efficient because we would then be able to allocate exactly the right amount of 
resources for each life. However, this ideal is not morally plausible because most 
people would not find it desirable to know exactly how long they had to live. 
Arguably what gives life much of its meaning and enjoyment is the very uncertainty 
of its duration, and if we each knew we had an equal life span then as we neared the 
end of the innings we would become increasingly worried and distracted from the 
important things in life. Moreover, such a strict egalitarian view of the FIA would be 
subject to the objection that it was committed to 'levelling down' the goods being 
distributed. If inequality is intrinsically bad and the goods being distributed was life 
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itselý then Leaman would be right in thinking that the FIA would inherently require 
an older person being obliged to give up her remaining years simply because she was 
older. 316 Therefore, if the underlying normative principle of the strict egalitarian 
version of the FIA is the ideal that our lives should be of equal length, then the view is 
not plausible. 
However, Leaman's interpretation is not a necessary one inherent to the FIA, and an 
alternative interpretation might be the prioritarian fair innings view. This view would 
state that where there were two people who needed the same resource to survive, and 
one person was already approaching 'old age' and the other was not, that we should 
distribute medical resources in such a way as to prioritise the plight of the younger 
person. But by itself the prioritarian version is also implausible because it merely 
suggests prioritising the younger person and we would then find ourselves supporting 
the idea that it is better to save a 30 year old than the 40year old. Harris finds such a 
choice invidious because neither person has had their fair inningS. 317 What is also 
required, then, is some decision about exactly what length of life is 'fair,, which can 
of course only be arbitrary. Tbus, we might more plausibly think of the FIA as a 
combination of a prioritarian and a sufficiency view: the view that people should, as 
far as possible, be guaranteed a minimum length of life, and that society should 
prioritise those who have so far not enjoyed that sufficiency at the expense of those 
who have. 318 This combined view of the FIA would not be subject to the more 
316 Leaman, 'Justifying Ageism, ' p 184. 
317 Harris, The Value of Life, p93. 
"I We should note that this description of the FIA is only appropriate in pair wise situations where we 
are deciding to treat either a 75 year old or a younger person; i. e. that we aim to assist everyone under 
the fair innings, and not simply the greatest number. The idea that we should minimise the number who 
fall below the fair innings is implausible. For instance, if 75 was defined as the fair innings then 
suppose we have ten 73 year-olds who need an operation to get to 75. With those resources we could 
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obvious criticisms outlined above, though it may still be found flawed for other 
reasons. 
We can therefore think of the most plausible interpretation of the FIA as being a view 
that is concerned about means (resources) rather than the ends (life itself), and a view 
that is guided by a principle of priority constrained by a sufficiency minimum (a 
threshold length of life that is deemed fair). However, although both this formulation 
of the FIA and the CLV might be views about the distribution of resources, and both 
views would condone the restricting of at least some resources from the old in 
preference for the young, the two views will nevertheless have different implications 
for that distribution. The reason for this difference is that while personal responsibility 
is a principle that is both presupposed and encouraged by the CLV, it is a principle 
that is completely ignored by the unrefmed FIA (I examine and reject the possibility 
of a refined version of the FIA that includes a concern for responsibility in the next 
section). The CLV requires us to distribute resources fairly so that each person has a 
relatively equal share over the course of their complete lives, and this means that the 
more prudent they are with those resources the longer they will last. 
The FIA distributes resources in such a way as to ensure that people have as fair an 
innings as possible, but this commonly raises two criticisms. Firstly, in criticism of 
the FIA it has often been argued that some of the elderly who have perhaps lived hard 
lives when they were young may have had much less of the enjoyable part of their 
lives than some younger people, and could claim in a real sense that they have not yet 
ensure that five 20 year-olds get a fair innings. On the minimisation of unfair innings we would treat 
the ten, but most people might find this policy wrong. 
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'had their life' or their fair share'. 3 19 The second criticism is that from the perspective 
of the FIA it is irrelevant how irresponsible a younger person n-iight have been as 
regards to their health status or how prudent an older person has been. The younger 
person may have smoked and drank heavily, had a poor diet and taken no exercise 
while the older person has lived healthily, but the FIA will nevertheless penalise the 
prudent older person. A comparison with the CLV, illustrated in the diagram below 
expresses these two criticisms of the FIA. 
We can use the diagram first to imagine two persons, A and B living simultaneously 
at T4 and both in need of a medical resource to prolong their lives, but which, due to 
circumstances of scarcity, only one can have. In this instance the numbers indicate the 
quantity of resources that each person has spent or has had spent on them at each 
temporal period. Person A is only half the age of B but although he is only now 
coming towards the end of his youth he has used a great deal more resources in his 
short life than B has in her long life. Person B may nevertheless have another couple 
of decades of life if she is given the medical resource they both need for survival. 
TI T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
(C) 100 (Y) 150 
B (C) 50 (Y) 50 (M) 50 (0)50 
(C) Childhood 
(Y)Youth 
(M) Middle-age 
(0) Old age 
(VO) Very old 
319 ]H[affy Lesser, 'Ageism, ' in Encyclopedia OfApplied Ethics, Volume I (Academic Press, 1998), p93. 
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As far as the FIA is concerned the person who has either achieved or is approaching 
old age should not have her life further prolonged when this could only be achieved at 
the cost of those who are not nearing old age. Thus, on the view of the FIA, person A 
would be saved and B would be sacrificed, even though his complete life share of 
resources will be far greater, simply because he is not yet nearing old age. On the 
CLV, however, the shares of resources that people enjoy over the course of their lives 
should be equal. And, as person B has enjoyed significantly less than A, any further 
resources should be channelled towards B rather than A. 320 Me CLV takes in to 
consideration the past resources that each person has enjoyed while the FIA only 
counts life time. From the CLV the case might be further strengthened in favour of B 
if we were to project the resources that each person is likely to enjoy in the next 
temporal segment, which is to say in T5. The possibility that A might consume any 
more resources means that the complete life inequality between the two people would 
be widened fiulher, and this would be unacceptable. 
The second criticism of the FIA, that it penalises individual responsibility, might also 
be shown by this diagram if we take the numbers for both A and B at each temporal 
stage as the level of unhealthy living they have each subjected their bodies to. If we 
imagine that the higher the number the more unhealthy the lifestyle (the more 
cigarettes they have smoked, alcohol they have drunk, saturated fat they have eaten, 
and the less exercise taken) then again we can see that person A has been far less 
responsible than B, but again this is irrelevant from the perspective of the FIA. Any 
available resources will be directed towards the irresponsible person A to keep him 
320 This is assuming that life itself is not counted as a resource within the CLV, which arguably it ought 
to be. Nevertheless, neither Temkin or Mckerlie, or those who have appealed to the CLV, have done 
SO. 
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alive as long as possible to ensure he reaches a fair innings, and the fact that B has 
taken care of her health throughout her life counts for nothing. 
A third common criticism of the FIA is that the old have in fact earned a right to be 
treated before the young because they will have paid more in national insurance 
contributions over their lives, and have thus contributed toward both their own old age 
and those who were members of the old age group before them. Again the FIA is 
unconcerned by this previous investment. However, the issue would be addressed by 
the CLV, but only when combined with a prudential analogy (PA) to determine what 
justice requires society to spend on the well-being of its citizens at the various stages 
of their lives. Without a PA, the CLV by itself would merely indicate that if someone, 
like Person B in the above example, distributed their resources in a prudent way over 
the temporal stages of their lives, then until they had used up those resources, they 
would always be entitled to further claims irrespective of their age. The view does not 
concern itself with the option luck of individuals, which is to say the investment 
decisions and the level of economic productivity that those individuals engage in. If 
someone starts out with an equal complete life of resources and then invests them 
carefully, adding to that investment from the income they create through their 
working life, then they will be able to buy significantly more benefits in old age than 
if they had been profligate. 
The prudential analogy is an analogy made between how one rational individual, in 
possession of the general facts of her society's level of wealth, the average life 
expectancy, and the relevant facts of tendency to disease and accidents, would invest 
of her equal share of complete life resources to pay for insurance against the 
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eventuality that they should suffer such disease or accident. It is therefore to this 
extension of the CLV that we must turn to seek an alternative answer to that of the 
FIA with respect to the third criticism identified above. This I do in chapter 6 where I 
examine the prudential analogies of Ronald Dworkin and Norman Daniels. 
However, if the FIA was to be used on a societal rather than an individual scale to 
determine which life-extending treatments should be made available to which 
citizens, then the public policies that it prescribed would not be that much different 
from a combination of the CLV and the prudential analogy (PA). The reason for this 
is that as soon as the CLV is combined with the PA and used on a societal scale, it 
changes its prescriptions for individuals, while the FIA does not. The FIA would 
support age discrimination in the provision of life-extending treatments both on an 
individual level and a collective level, because those people denied treatments will 
have been deemed to have already had a good innings. The CLV in combination with 
a PA would also support age discrimination in the provision of life-extending 
treatments on the basis that in aggregate terms, society will already have spent the 
equivalent complete life resources that an individual would have been provided with, 
and the level of resources that a rational individual would have insured themselves 
against. In public policy terms, therefore, the practical implications of the FIA on the 
one hand and the combined CLV and prudential analogy on the other would be quite 
similar. 
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5.2 The Iresponsibifity-constrained FIAI as a 'tiebreakerl 
Rather than using the FIA as a policy by itself, it might instead be qualified and be 
used only in cases where a decision must be made between two people where both are 
equal in every way in respect of their deservingness. As Kappel and Sandoe argue, 
this is the claim 'that other things being equal it is fair to use age as a direct criterion 
in the distribution of vital health care resources'. 321 Within this idea of equal 
deservingness we could include the level of personal responsibility shown by 
individuals for their own health. If they were equally deserving then responsibility 
would not be an issue, because if equally deserving they would have been equally 
responsible. Alternatively, where two people, one older than the other, have been 
equally responsible for their health (always supposing such a test could be made), the 
younger one would be saved. Therefore, in the last example, the FIA would simply 
not apply because the two persons in question are not equally responsible. The 
younger person has been very irresponsible and the refmed responsibility-constrained 
FIA would consequently be redundant. 
But let us imagine that two people have been equally responsible for their health over 
the whole duration of their lives, but that one person is significantly younger than the 
other. Further, let us also assume the prioritarian version of the FIA constrained by a 
sufficiency minimum set at 75, and let us assume ftirther that person A is now 75 
years old. We must now determine which of the two should receive the treatment at 
"' K. Kappel & P. Sandoe, 'Saving the Young before the Old -A Reply to John Harris, ' Bibethics 8 
(1994): 84-92 (italics added). 
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T5 that would permit A to live another 15 years and B another 30 years (imagine each 
time segment represents a 15 year time period). 
TI T2 T3 T4 T5 
Person A 10 10 10 10 10 
Person B-- 10 10 10 
T6 
If we imagine that the figures represent the level of personal responsibility shown by 
an individual, then on the face of it both individuals have shown an equal level of 
responsibility within each temporal segment of their lives. In this instance the tie- 
breaker version of the FIA would suggest that person B should be saved before person 
A because she is equally responsible but younger. However, it could be argued that in 
fact we should view the older person as the more responsible because he has been 
responsible for a significantly longer period of time. Moreover, the younger person 
might receive the necessary treatment at T5 and then immediately become dissolute. 
if so then by the time she reached the same age as the disfavoured older person she 
could certainly not be said to have been as equally responsible for her health as person 
A. We can see the force of this argument in the table below. 
TI T2 T3 T4 TS T6 
A 10 10 10 10 
B - - 10 10 5 5 
At T6 person B has been markedly less responsible than person A was at T4, and in 
the event that we could turn back the clock it would seem better had we provided the 
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latter with the life saving treatment on the basis that over his complete life he would 
have been more responsible that person B. It may be, therefore, that if to be equally 
deserving involved being equally responsible, then we could only decide between two 
people if they were of equal age, and so had been as equally deserving / responsible 
for as long. Of course in such a case the FIA would be redundant anyway because 
both would have enjoyed an equal innings. We can say, therefore, that the 
responsibility constrained tie-breaking FIA is flawed. 
5.3 Daniel Callahan and the FIA 
One notable advocate of the FIA is Daniel Callahan, whose book Setting LimitS322 
outlined a defence of age discrimination in healthcare based upon the premise that the 
old should willingly give up access to life-extending medical treatments so that the 
young might have the greatest opportunity of becoming old. He argues that 'There is 
nothing unfair about using age as a [discriminatory] category if the purpose of doing 
so is to achieve equity between generations. 323 
However, on the first reading it may be difficult to deterniine whether Callahan is 
appealing to a CLV or the FIA. For example, he appears to be defending the CLV 
when he argues that beyond a certain point in their lives elderly people 'will have 
already had their fair share of resources', 324 and will not be entitled to any more 
resources on grounds of fairness. On the other hand, he appears to defend the FIA 
X Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an, 49eing Societ (Sýnon & Schuster, 1987). 
lbid, p140. 
324 Ibid. 
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when he proposes that '[a]fter a person has lived out a natural life span, medical care 
should no longer be orientated to resisting death', and that it would henceforth 'be 
limited to the relief of suffering'. 325 As we have seen in the last section, though, these 
two claims may conflict, and a 'fair share of resources' may not be exhausted by the 
time a 'person has lived out a natural life span'. Nevertheless, on balance the FIA has 
more relevance to Callahan's arguments which means that in effect it would not 
matter what level of medical resources someone had used before reaching the end of 
their natural life span as long as they did not use any after that point. 
Callahan defmes a natural span as 'one in which life's possibilities have on the whole 
been achieved, and after which death may be understood as a sad but nonetheless 
acceptable event'. 326 He then uses the concept of a 'tolerable death' to denote a point 
at which one's life possibilities had on the whole been accomplished; one's moral 
obligations to those whom one had responsibilities had been largely discharged; and 
one's death will not seem to others as an 'offence to sense and sensibility'. 327 
The primary reason for Callahan's adoption of a version of the FIA is to ensure 
intergenerational justice, because the resources saved from denying life-extending 
treatment to the old could then be redirected to saving the young. Nevertheless, quite 
apart from the philosophical doubts one might have about the FIA itself, the 
justification he uses might be misplaced for practical reasons. The question must be 
325 lbid, 171-173. 
326 lbid, p66. 
327 Ibid. It should be noted that Daniels does set certain necessary pre-conditions that must obtain 
before such age discrimination would bejustified; that there be universal access to healthcare (absent in 
the US); that home care and long-term care be strengthened for the elderly, and that a period of 20 to 
30 years would need to pass in which people's attitudes could be changed to accept this. 
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whether sufficient resources can be saved under this regime, and evidence suggests it 
would not. For example, Levensky has shown that the amount that society actually 
spends on technologically advanced medical treatment for the old is a relatively small 
percentage of the total. 328 And as Grimley Evans argues, JI]f patterns of practice and 
costs remain as at present the main fmancial impact of ageing in the UK will fall on 
the long-term care sector rather than on acute secondary or primary care. 329 
This would suggest that simply denying life-extending medical treatment to the old 
would not be sufficient to make a significant enough saving for it to be justified as 
Callahan suggests. Unless the FIA was enforced more ruthlessly, and the old denied 
long-term care as well as every other form of medical treatment, there seems little 
practical point in its adoption. Indeed, to pursue the FIA in such an instance where the 
practical benefits are shown to be negligible would seem to be unnecessarily and 
arbitrarily harsh, even uncivilised. This significantly undermines Callahan's primary 
justification of the FIA within his theory. 
5.4 Utilitarianism and the QALY 
The concept of the quality adjusted life year (QALY) has had much appeal for more 
than two decades now, but, unlike the other methods of resource allocation examined 
in this thesis, it has less to do with fairness than with efficiency. Nevertheless, like the 
FIA and the CLV, the QALY has often been described as inherently ageist, and we 
32" N. G. Levensky, 'Age as a criterion for rationing health care', New EnglandJournal qfMedicine 322 
(1990): 1813-15. 
329 1 Grimley Evans, 'A correct compassion: The medical response to nageing i Y. e ei 
Oration of 1997', Journal 0a 
sOc et Th Harv an 
f 'he RoYal College of Physicians ofLondon 31 (1997): 674-84, p675. 
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would therefore not be thorough in our analysis of defences of ageism without a 
comparison of the QALY with the CLV and FIA. 
The QALY methodology determines the value of treatment by considering three 
things: the cost of a treatment; the resulting quality of life; and the number of years 
gained by the use of that treatment. The approach therefore takes account of both the 
quality and quantity of life that might be produced by a particular medical treatment 
as well as its cost, and it is based on the implicit assumptions that there is a rational 
way of trading one off against the others. Each given treatment is assigned a value 
corresponding to the number of quality life years such a patient can look forward to 
with the treatment rninus the number of QALYs the patient would have if left 
untreated. One then calculates what each QALY gained by these means actually 
costs. 330 Alan Williams, one of the originators of the approach, writes that '[t]he 
general idea is that a beneficial healthcare activity is one that generates a positive 
amount of QALYs, and that an efficient healthcare activity is one where the cost of 
QALY is low, and a low priority activity is one where cost per QALY is high. 031 
QALYs may either be used at a macro level to determine which treatments should be 
offered within a healthcare system (i. e. those that produce most QALYs), or else, 
perhaps more perniciously, at a micro level as a way of selecting the suitable patients 
to undergo certain treatments (i. e. those most likely to benefit in terms of QALYs 
produced). In chapter one I noted that doctors in the healthcare system, as well as the 
330Arguably QALYs do not need to have exact numerical values ascribed to each treatment because 
ordinal conclusions can be made along the lines of what outcomes people would intuitively calculate as 
better than others. 
33 ' Alan Williams, 'The Value of QALYs, ' Health and Social Service Journal (18 July 1985), p3. 
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ordinary layman, often in fact make these sorts of comparative judgements between 
patients and treatments, and what the QALY approach arguably does is to simply 
make the decision process more explicit and democratic. 
One of the supposed moral attributes of the approach is that it can be said to be 
impartial in its application. Williams suggests that QALYs involve the idea that 'one 
year of healthy life is of equal value no matter who gets it', and that each person's 
benefit is given equal weight. 332 The principle that what matters is life itself 
irrespective of who experiences it indicates an important structural aspect of the 
approach, which is very similar to utilitarianism. Alan Cribb claims that the approach 
represents 'a new arithmetic of happiness or felicific calculus in a way that enables us 
to spend the healthcare budget in a way that maximises welfare'. 333 However, 
although the QALY has similarities to the felicific calculus it is not a purely utilitarian 
metric. Rather, the QALY is a welfarist metric, where the welfarist aim is 'that we 
should so act as to maximise aggregate benefit'. 
334 Classical utilitarianism is a 
particular form of welfarism characterised by the equation of benefit with happiness, 
which is an equation the QALY is not committed to. Rather, the benefit is equated 
with the number and quality of years to be lived. 
Now there are a number of criticisms that have been levelled at the QALY approach, 
many of which challenge the implicit assumptions underlying the acceptance of the 
QALY concept. Firstly, the QALY is similar to the utilitarian method in as much as 
332 lbid, p5 (emphasis added). 
333 Alan Cribb, 'The felicific calculus strikes back, ' in A Harry Lesser (ed. ), Ageing, A utononly and 
Resources (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999). 
334 Arnartya Sen, 'Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 'Jow-nal ofthilosophy 70 (1979). 
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what counts as important is a common denominator between people, and all benefits 
of welfare are thought to be measurable in this common value. For both utilitarianism 
and the QALY approach it is not individual persons that are the focus of egalitarian 
concern, rather it is units of utility or quality time respectively. This leads to the 
morally dubious position that there is no moral difference between whether 30 people 
are provided with one QALY each, or that one person is provided with thirty QALYs. 
As far as the approach is concerned each individual is entitled to equal consideration: 
that their QALY index counts for the same as everyone else's. However, individuals 
do not have any prior entitlement to anything more substantive than that, and in this 
way it is different from the CLV and the FIA, both of which accept that individuals 
are entitled to an equal share of something, either of life itself, or of welfare or 
resources sufficient for a complete life. 
Moreover, critics of both utilitarianism and QALYs claim that it is impossible that 
any and every benefit enjoyed by different people in different circumstances with 
different values, outlooks and conceptions of the good, can be measured in the same 
units. In fact, even for resource allocation within healthcare there may be qualitatively 
different kinds of benefits that cannot be meaningfiilly compared in terms of amounts 
or intensities of some other generalised benefits. As Cribb argues, because any state 
of affairs will be differently valued by different people their values are 
incommensurable, and this makes comparative evaluation of the outcomes 
impossible. 335 
335 Cribb, 'The felicific calculus strikes back, ' p 189-190. 
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Even when we try to make the valuations ourselves about the quality of our own lives 
under possible future circumstances there is no way to be sure we are right. Michael 
Lockwood for instance argues that faced with the sort of comparison that the QALY 
approach requires, 'most people ... would say this sort of thing: "Well, a year of 
normal life would certainly, for me, be worth at least eighteen months of life 
paralysed from the waist down, but wouldn't be worth 3 years under those 
ConditionS". 016 But how would Lockwood or anyone else know how much each 
individual actually synchronically values their lives until they themselves are in the 
actual position to experience it under those conditions? Indeed, becoming paralysed 
may be a life-changing experience that alters one's perception of what is meaningful 
in life, and in any case people very often learn to adjust their lives to compensate for 
the loss of such a capacity and continue to live as full lives as before. Thus, 
Lockwood's assumption would manifest a 'tyranny of the fit and healthy', particularly 
of the younger self over one's own later, less healthy self And to assume the former 
should determine the value of the latter is also to invite the influence of negative 
cultural stereotypes. 
The second criticism of the QALY approach is that third parties must make these 
decisions about the quality of life that one enjoys under certain circumstances, to put 
numerical values on that quality, and to trade these values off one against the another. 
The problem is that not only are those values incommensurable, but that third parties 
are likely to measure such values from their own subjective standpoint. Tbus the 
"" Michael Lockwood, 'Quality of Life and Resource Allocation,, in J. M. Bell & S. Mendus (eds. ), 
Philosophy andMedical Wel(are (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p4o. 
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QALY involves a third party, or proxy, deciding the potential quality of your future 
life. 
The third criticism is that this subýective analysis by third parties is likely to lead to 
age discrimination. If we want to maximise QALYs given a fixed set of costs, which 
of course not all those who use QALYs wish to do, then the young will in general be 
favoured over the old. This is not because of some moral bias against older people, 
but because there is an objective average difference in life expectancies between the 
young and old. Although the impartiality Of QALYs is thought to be a significant 
moral advantage by its advocates, it is this very impartiality that often manifests in 
discriminatory policies in practice. QALYs are not intrinsically ageist because they do 
not seek to discriminate against the old, and in some circumstances they might in fact 
work in favour of the old and against the interests of the young. 337 Nevetheless, 
because what matters to the approach is the number of quality life years that 
individuals enjoy after their treatment, the method will implicitly work against those 
with less life expectancy. Thus, Harris argues that although QALYs are impartial in 
abstract terms, they are nevertheless de facto ageist: 
It is true that QALYs dictate that we prefer not simply those who have more life 
expectancy but rather those who have more life expectancy to be gained from 
treatment. But wherever treatment helps postpone death ... it will, other things being 
equal, be the case that younger people have more life expectancy to gain from 
treatment than do older people. 338 
337 An example would be a choice between a procedure that treated a condition affecting mainly older 
people at a low cost per QALY over one that treated a condition affecting mainly younger people at a 
high cost per QALY. 
331 Harris, p79-80. In contrast to Harris' concerns, Lockwood argues that while QALYs are not actually 
ageist that in fact they should be. The very fact that they are not ageist seems to him to be an objection 
to unconstrained QALY maximisation, and he claims that it 'fails to be ageist when it should be, rather 
than being ageist when it should not' (Lockwood, p54). Because Lockwood finds the FIA compelling 
he believes that QALY maximisation should be constrained by that principle rather than one that is 
anti-ageist, and that we should always ensure that the QALY approach favours the young over the old. 
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Nevertheless, Harry Moody also points out that a vague quality of life standard could 
easily become a covert form of discrimination where 'quality of life' surreptitiously 
becomes tantamount to 'worth of life' . 
339 Therefore, as Jones and Higgs argue, the 
supposedly objective methods of economic evaluations of ascribing a numerical value 
to a life can often in fact contain hidden value judgements, 340 and it has been argued 
that age based rationing based on such cost-benefit analysis does in practice involve 
an implicit and covert form of age-discrimination. 341 There are of course various ways 
in which we might measure the quality of someone's life, but what commentators like 
John Vincent claim is that exclusive concern is too often given to the quantitative 
assumption that the number of life years left to live is what is paramount, and that the 
converse assumption, that the more years lived the more valuable are the successive 
years, is not made. 342 
The fourth, and related, criticism of QALYs is, as John Broome claims, that 'they do 
not properly take account ofjustice or fairness in the distribution of good . 
043 One 
view of utilitarianism is that it attaches no value to fairness, while another is that it is 
itself an account of fairness, indicating that to maximise good is itself what is fair. 344 
Broome adopts the former view and claims that justice is not the proper domain of 
-139 Harry Moody, Ethics in an Ageing Society (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992): 
p25. 
340 1. R Jones & P. F. D. Higgs, 'Health economists and health care provision for the elderly: implicit 
assumptions and unstated conclusions, ' in K. Morgan (ed. ), Gerontology., Responding to an Ageing 
Society (London: Jessica Kingsley, 1992), p 120. 
341 Jerry Avorn, 'Benefit and Cost Analysis in Geriatric Care: Turning Age Discrimination in to Health 
policy,, New Englandiournal ofMedicine 310 (1984): 1294-130 1. 
342 John A Vincent, Politics, Power and OldAge (B uckingham: Oxford University Press), p6 1. 
343 John BrooMe. 'Good, Fairness and QALYs, ' in Bell & Mendus (eds. ) Philosophy andMedical 
Wel(are, p57. 
344 See James Griffin, 'Some Problems of Fairness, ' Ethics 96 (1985): 100-118. 
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QALYs but rather that they are merely aimed at assessing the total or the aggregate of 
good to be produced by different policies, in rather the same way as utilitarian 
calculations do. We might therefore believe the QALY approach to be intuitively 
unjust because its guiding principle that we should distribute in such a way that will 
generate most QALYs conflicts with the principle of need. I have argued throughout 
the thesis that there are certain synchronic needs that each person has, and which have 
equal urgency irrespective of the age of that person. However, the QALY approach 
attaches as much value to the QALYs generated by treating those in a state of lesser 
need as it does to those generated by treating those in a state of greater need. But, as 
Lockwood notes, even if a healthcare economist could show that facelifts generated 
more QALYs than kidney dialysis it may be that justice should prevent the shift of 
resources from one to the other. 345 
Another way in which the QALY might be seen to violate justice is that it does not 
give credit to those individuals who have been responsible. By themselves QALYs do 
not differentiate between those who have brought about their need by their own 
actions, perhaps through pursuing an unhealthy lifestyle, and those who have looked 
after themselves. Thus, as far as the QALY method is concerned the responsible old 
might find themselves being passed over in favour of the irresponsible young in just 
the same way as with the FIA. 
Therefore, to conclude this section, the QALY method, as with the FIA and CLV, is 
not intrinsically ageist because it does not necessarily involve negative cultural 
judgements about the old. Unlike the FIA, QALYs are not inherently ageist because 
3" Lockwood, 'Quality of Life and Resource Allocation., 
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they do not necessarily discriminate against the old, though, like the CLV, they will 
often nonetheless tend to do so in a way that may be wrong for extrinsic reasons: 
either because they reinforce moral bias or because the social and economic 
consequences for older people are morally wrong. Like the FIA, the QALY method is 
unconcerned with the principle of personal responsibility, while that principle is 
integral to the CLV. Finally, the QALY is different from both the CLV and the FIA 
because it is not concerned with equalising shares of some good (either life, resources 
or welfare) between persons, rather it is the good itself (quality life years) that is the 
focus of the concept. 
5.4 Synchronic alternatives to the CLV: the SSV and CSV 
As we have noted in the previous chapter, there are different possible views about 
synchronic patterns of distributions which have been developed by Dennis Mckerlie 
and Larry Temkin. 346 These are important because if they are at all plausible then we 
are able to challenge any exclusive concern for the CLV (perhaps on the basis that it 
neglects synchronic needs), and we will also be able to deny that the justification of 
egalitarian ageism is not contentious. To this end Mckerlie suggests that distributive 
equality should not be conceived simply as a relation that exists between the complete 
lives of different people, but may alternatively exist between either the corresponding 
segments, or between the simultaneous segments of different people's lives. Thus, we 
can distinguish at least three possible views about where the relation of equality 
... See Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time, ' Ethics 99 (1989): 475-49 1; Mckerlie, 'Equality Between 
Age-Groups, ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 275-295; Larry Temkin, inequality (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), chapter 8. 
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should lie: the CLV, the simultaneous segments view (SSV), and, thirdly, the 
corresponding segments view (CSV). Note that for the purposes of simplicity the 
examples used in this section will refer only to strict equality rather than 
prioritarianism. The prioritarian principle will be the focus of attention in the 
following section where I examine Mckerlie's more complex recent analysis on the 
subject of synchronic distribution. 
An integral part of the CLV is a belief that the way that people's lives have fared in 
the past is important, and it assumes that one period of faring badly can be 
compensated at a later temporal segment with another period of faring well. For this 
reason Mckerlie refers to any theory that adopts the CLV as taking places 
egalitarianism. It assumes that there is nothing wrong with taking turns to experience 
misfortune provided that everyone has equal amounts of good fortune over their 
complete lives. 
In contrast to the CLV, both the SSV and the CSV do not view the way people have 
fared in the past as important. The CSV merely requires that everyone's childhood, 
youth, middle-age and old age correspond and are roughly equal. That would still 
mean that inequality could legitimately exist between the young and old, though, just 
as it may for the CLV. The CSV, like the CLV, also implicitly accepts that taking 
turns to experience plenty and destitution is not wrong. The SSV, however, denies this 
assumption. The SSV requires that all inequality should cease between everyone 
living through different time segments of their lives at the same time. This means that 
those that are now in their youth should have shares of benefits equal to those who are 
now old or middle aged. it might be said that this latter view is the most authentically 
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egalitarian because it aims purely at equality and does not justify inequality between 
time segments as the other two views do. In support of the synchronic view, and in 
opposition to 'taking turns egalitarianism', Temkin asks; 'if an egalitarian system is 
truly objectionable, shouldn't an egalitarian clearly and unequivocally oppose and 
seek to dismantle it, rather than favour its perpetuation with different ViCtims? 9347 
Each of these views make different claims about the justice or injustice of egalitarian 
ageism, and the tables below can be used to illustrate this. We should imagine that A 
and B are either two separate individuals or age groups, and that the numbers indicate 
different levels of benefits at different temporal periods. In Case I, A and B live 
through four temporal periods of equal length, but B is significantly worse off than A 
over her complete life. In Case II, both A and B have equal amounts of benefits over 
their complete lives, but they take turns in being wealthy and poor. In Case III the two 
groups or individuals are of different birth cohorts, B not being born until the third 
temporal segment of A, but both live equally long lives and both enjoy equal benefits 
over the course of their complete lives. Case IV is similar to Case III except that 
where A and B are both alive their shares of benefits are equal. 
TI T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
Case IA8 8 8 8 
B2 2 2 2 
Case 11 8 
B2288-- 
347 Temkin, Inequality, p240. 
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Case III A2288 
B228 
Case IV A8822 
B22 
The CLV finds nothing bad about Cases II, III and IV because both A and B end up 
with the same benefits over their complete lives. The CLV finds Case I morally 
wrong, though, because B ends up with significantly less than A over her complete 
life. The CSV can only find Case III acceptable, and it views Cases I, II, and IV as 
being as bad as each other because in all three cases the corresponding segmental 
inequality is the same. The SSV agrees with the CSV that both Cases I and Il are 
equally bad but for a very different reason. In both I and II each of the simultaneous 
segments of A and B are equally unequal. However, while CSV favours Case III, SSV 
would claim that the inequality existing between A and B in the years that their lives 
overlap is also morally bad. The SSV could only find Case IV acceptable, and on first 
glance this may seem the most plausible from a common sense view. 
However, the fact that SSV is exclusively concerned with synchronic equality means 
there is a reason for thinking that this view is also implausible. If we imagine two 
ftirther cases, Case V in which although both A and B fare quite well over the course 
of their entire lives, there nevertheless exists some inequality between them and A is 
always slightly better off. In Case VI both A and B have equal shares of benefits at 
each stage of their lives, but neither are as well off as their counterparts in Case V. 
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TI T2 T3 T4 
Case VA 15 15 15 15 
B 10 10 10 10 
Case VI A 8 8 8 8 
B 8 8 8 8 
The implausible implication of a concern for strict synchronic equality is that the SSV 
would always favour Case VI to Case V, and indeed, would favour a move from Case 
V to Case VI if it were possible. But the same is also true for the strict egalitarian 
CLV inasmuch as it gives exclusive concern for diachronic equality, because the 
share of complete life benefits of A in Case V far exceeds that of B, and the view 
would therefore deem it unjust. The example is thus as much a criticism of the 
plausibility of strict diachronic equality as it is strict synchronic equality. 348 
Nevertheless, one important implication which Temkin highlights with regard to the 
practical significance of these different views is that while the SSV would always 
advocate transfers from one age group to another if any inequality existed between 
them at any particular temporal moment, the CSV and the CLV would not. The fact 
that these latter views accept the idea of taking turns means that they would not think 
it necessary to make such transfers even if, for example, today's old were 
significantly worse off than today's young. If the old have fared well in the past then 
there is nothing necessarily wrong with their being destitute in their old age. In fact, 
343 Note that this implication only challenges the plausibility of the CLV of strict equality and does not 
affect the CLV of priority. 
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those views may actually require the destitute elderly to transfer some of their few 
remaining resources to the younger age group if we could calculate that over a 
complete life they otherwise would have been better off than the young. So both 
views would countenance significant inequality between young and old, and so justify 
egalitarian ageism. 349 
The main purpose of this section has been to show that the CLV sometimes has 
implications that are not morally intuitive, that the CLV is not the only possible view 
of distributive equality, and that there are altemative views which would seem more 
plausible in some circumstances. For that reason it is not obvious that we should 
always give the CLV exclusive concern. However, for any of these alternative views 
to have any plausibility most people would argue that we need to move from strict 
egalitarianism to a less demanding priority view. 
5.5 The synchronic priority view (SPV) 
Let us return, therefore, to the distinction that Parfit made between priority and 
equality, outlined in section 4.2 (iii), and the three possible answers to the question of 
to whom we should give priority: 
those who are worse off in their lives as a whole, 
(2) those who are worse off at a time, 
349 Mckerlie rejects the CSV because he thinks his examples show that we are primarily troubled by 
inequalities between synchronic segments. Norman Daniels, however, disagrees and, assuming that 
there is equality over complete lives Daniels is troubled less by inequality between corresponding 
segments than by SSV. The reason for this is that inequalities in salaries and prestige seem less wrong 
when attached to stages of a career that each person goes through, because these inequalities provide 
incentives for productivity. 
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(3) those who have needs that are morally more urgent. 350 
To recapitulate, Parfit notes that there is often a divergence between (1) and (2), but a 
convergence between (2) and (3). Thus, someone who is now among the worst off 
may have been quite well off in the past, but if a person's needs are morally more 
urgent then she is likely to be someone who is worse off at a time than others in 
society. Parfit chooses to 'ignore' this problem, but he notes that other prioritarians 
have tended to conflate the distinction between (1) and (3). Thomas Nagel, for 
example, seems initially to favour the idea that urgency of needs takes priority over 
complete lives, but he then conflates the distinction by claiming that 'Priority is given 
to individuals who, taking their lives as a whole, have more urgent needs'. 351 Such 
conflation, however, is a mistake. If complete lives are the relevant unit of egalitarian 
concern then the divergence between the worse off over a complete life and those 
whose needs are morally more urgent at a temporal moment are increased. Again, 
imagine two persons A and B living through four temporal periods, and for the 
moment let us put the independent moral principle of personal responsibility for one's 
predicament to one side. 
TI T2 T3 T4 
Case VII A 
B5555 
If we were concerned to promote priority at a time, i. e. to take a synchronic priority 
view, we would give assistance to A at T3 and T4, even though over a complete life 
... Derek Parfit, 'Equality or Priority? ', delivered as the Lindley Lecture at the University of Kansas, 
21 November 199 1, reproduced in Clayton & Andrews (eds. ) The Ideal OfEquality, pp8l-125. 
351 Ibid, P121 
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she will do better than B, and even though she has been significantly better off than B 
in the previous two temporal periods. We might take this further and suggest that if 
we are referring to different though overlapping generations, it might be thought 
morally right to assist the members of an older generation that has been better off 
during their youth than the current young are today. Such a view would thus conflict 
with the views of those who advocate 'generational equity'. Nevertheless, if we 
imagine the digit 2 in the example below to signify significant destitution, then it is 
not absurd to argue that at T3 society should recognise that A has a stronger claim to 
assistance than B, despite the fact that B will be worse off over a complete life than A. 
Case VIII TI T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
A8822 
B--6633 
Tbus, in the context of this thesis, an older person's needs may be currently more 
urgent than a younger person's, even though over a complete life the older person has 
been much better off than the younger person has a hope of being. 352 If we give 
priority to the more urgent needs at a time we would help the older person in this 
example, if we give priority to the fair shares of benefits over complete lives we 
would give priority to the younger person. We can define the former of these views as 
the synchronic priority view (SPV), and the latter the diachronic priority view (DPV). 
In his most recent article Mckerlie defends an SPV that would sometimes outweigh 
352 For the purposes of this argument I am discounting the practical difficulties of ever ascertaining the 
exact quality and quantity of benefits the younger person will know that she has a chance of receiving. 
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diachronic Priority. 353 Mckerlie argues that if we accept that there are distinctive 
principles ofjustice between age groups, principles that are distinctive from principles 
ofjustice solely concerned with complete lives, then the former are best understood as 
priority for the temporally worst off in society. 
However, the SPV faces the same problems as the strictly egalitarian SSV: it does not 
give any importance to how well off people have been in the past. For example, 
imagine the two people in Case IX, A who has been well off throughout his life until 
old age when he falls to a level of near destitution, and B who has been worse off than 
A throughout his life but in old age is marginally better off than A. 
TI T2 T3 T4 
Case IX A9 
B6666 
At T4 the SPV would give priority to A, which may not seem fair to B who has been 
significantly worse off diachronically. But Mckerlie does not suggest that we should 
abandon concern for diachronic distributions altogether. Rather, what Mckerlie is 
saying is that if we apply the priority principle to both complete lives and to temporal 
periods of people's lives we might sometimes think that the special value of helping 
someone who is badly off now is more important than the special value of helping the 
person with the worst complete life. Thus, SPV is not the only consideration that 
353 Dennis Mckerlie, 'Justice Between the Young and the Old, 'PhilosophyandAblicAffairs 30 
(2002): 152-177. 
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matters for the distribution between young and old, and it will not always be the 
strongest. 
To adopt the SPV exclusively would not be a plausible approach for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, it would imply that there was something objectionable about the idea 
of 'taking turns'. And, as Geoffrey Cupit has pointed out, most people who think that 
age discrimination is unjust do so without holding that 'taking turns' is by its nature 
UnjUSt. 354 Secondly, an exclusive concern for synchronic distribution would not 
recognise the importance of the independent moral principle of personal 
responsibility. As I noted in chapter 4, the main reason thinkers like Dworkin are 
committed to the CLV is because it ensures that people must be responsible with the 
fair share of benefits they receive, and this is thought to justify the luck egalitarian 
claim that individuals should shoulder the cost of their free choices (or option luck). If 
society ensured that people always had sufficient benefits within each temporal period 
then people would not need to be responsible for their choices. They could squander 
their equal share of initial resources within each temporal period with impunity, and 
this would have detrimental effects for wider issues such as a society's productivity. 
We could thus formulate a dilemma for society with regard to the issues of the CLV, 
egalitarian ageism, and personal responsibility. Either we accept the CLV which 
condones ageist policies, or else we could challenge the CLV in which case we risk 
violating the principle of personal responsibility. What we need is a medium between 
diachronic and synchronic distributive principles. 
354 GeoffreY CuPit, justice, Age, and Veneration, ' Ethics 108 (1998): 702-7 18, p707. 
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5.6 The hybrid model of distributive justice 
Mckerlie therefore favours what we might call a hybrid notion of the unit of 
egalitarian concern that seeks to balance synchronic needs with diachronic; fairness. 
He outlines his view thus: 
One possibility is that we care about equality [or priority] between complete lives, but 
we also accept some principle that gives weight to inequalities between parts of lives. 
Faced with a choice about whether to compensate for past inequality, we would have 
to balance the gain in equality between complete lives against the loss in terms of 
equality between parts of lives. In some examples we might think that one 
consideration was stronger, in different examples the other consideration. 355 
A distribution should not be confined to the CLV because many egalitarians would 
find synchronic inequality morally wrong in some circumstances when the 
fundamental needs of persons are ignored. Nevertheless, we should not rule out 
considerations of the fairness of complete life distributions both because people have 
diachronic interests and because we must give expression to the moral principles of 
the 'separateness of persons', and of individual responsibility. 
However, the hybrid model has obvious flaws. Firstly, although the hybrid model of 
strict egalitarianism would be fairly easy to construct it would be morally implausible 
because it would require that people enjoyed equality both over their complete lives 
as well as at synchronic periods. The ideal distribution would therefore look like Case 
X, and not only would it be subject to the levelling down objection, but it would also 
leave little room for personal responsibility. 
355 Mckerlie, 'Equality and Time', p484. 
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Case X TI T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 
A8888 
B--8888 
I The hybrid model of prioritarianism, on the other hand, would incorporate a concern 
for both synchronic and diachronic distributions and would compensate individuals on 
the basis of the urgency at each point. However, prioritarianism measures the 
goodness of well-being independently of any particular distributions of people's well- 
being. Therefore, a hybrid prioritarian principle is complicated by the fact that there 
are three types of measure to be calculated: firstly, the measure of well-being at a 
period; secondly, the measure of complete lifetime well-being; and thirdly, a measure 
that balances the two. The problem is that if there is no prior distributive principle to 
determine the third measure, then the balance between synchronic and diachronic 
priority will be a matter of mere intuition. Therefore, in complicated situations such as 
Case XI below, it may be difficult to decide upon which of two people we should 
assist, and while some people would give assistance to A over B on the grounds that 
her synchronic position was morally more urgent, others would give assistance to B. 
on the grounds that she would otherwise have a significantly less complete life share. 
TI T2 T3 T4 
Case XI A9 9 8 3 
B6 6 6 6 
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5.7 Synchronic distribution and (dis)continuous personal identity 
Despite the intuitive and practical difficulties that the purely synchronic and hybrid 
models of distribution face, one further criticism that we can refute is that they rely 
upon a metaphysical theory of discontinuous personal identity. Being concerned with 
the temporal well-being of persons does not imply that we accept that people have 
different identities at different stages of their lives. This is despite the fact that the 
idea of a discontinuous personal identity has been used as a defence against ageisn-L 
Derek Parfit has provided the classic contemporary account of a discontinuous 
personal identity, which he supports with descriptions of experiments involving brain 
bisection. 356 Briefly, Parfit argues that we only think that rationality implies that we 
should give equal concern to each temporal period of our lives (described as the 
Requirement of Equal Concern) because we uncritically assume what he calls the 
Non-Reductionist view. That is we accept the metaphysical idea of the Cartesian ego 
which involves the existence of a mental substance that makes an individual the same 
person over time. This means that we assume that 'personal identity over time does 
not just consist in physical and/or psychological continuity but a 'finiher fact". 357 
Parfit's own view is that of the Reductionist. That is, every person's existence 
consists only of a brain and body, and that continued physical existence and 
psychological connectedness are the only features that constitute a person's identity. 
The logic of his view is that, because psychological connectedness and continuity can 
356 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pt 3. See also Thomas Nagel, 'Brain Bisection and the Unity of 
Consciousness, ' in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 147-164. 
357 parfjý Reasons and Persons, p2 10. 
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vary greatly in degree, it is quite plausible to suggest that in an important way we are 
not the same person at one temporal point as we were at an earlier temporal point. If 
we accept this view about our personal identity, then it would not be irrational for us 
to accept what he calls the Extreme view, that we have no more reason to care about 
the later stages of ourselves as we do to care about the lives of other people. And that 
means we can quite rationally 'discount', or care less about, the well-being of a future 
Self 358 
If our older selves are no more connected to us than other people it would 
significantly undermine the idea that good and bad periods of life can be compensated 
for over a complete life, and we would therefore have to reject the CLV. If so, then 
we would have to consider the claims of different people of different ages at any 
synchronic moment to be no different from the justice between separate persons over 
their complete lives. This Reductionist view about personal identity might therefore 
be used as a defence of anti-ageism rather than ageism, and something like this 
defence has been used by Age Concern itself One reason that Age Concern gives for 
rejecting the idea that an individual's lifestyle choices should affect her moral claims 
and entitlements in later life is that, 
[M]any of us, as we age, find it difficult to identify with the thoughts we had and the 
actions we performed when young. In other words, in some important sense we are no 
longer the 'same people' in old age that we were at the time we engaged in so-called 
imprudent behaviours. 359 
358 The discount rate is based upon the level of psychological connectedness that exists between the 
earlier and later selves. 
359 Age Concern England. The Millenium Papers: Values andAttitudes in anAgeing Society (Age 
Concern England, 1999), p27. 
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If individuals are no longer the same people as they age then we have every reason to 
treat elders no differently from younger people. It provides a reason to ensure older 
people have as much in the way of society's benefits as anyone else irrespective of the 
size of their previous claims on society, and this would make an exclusive concern for 
the synchronic principle of distribution the most plausible. 360 
Thus, if the reductionist view were linked to a synchronic distributive view of equality 
or priority, then it would challenge the justification of egalitarian ageisnL 
Nevertheless, it might at the same time do nothing to discourage cultural ageism. it 
might be suggested that a discontinuous identity is precisely what the culturally 
oppressive model of ageism posits and might therefore be used as a justification of 
ageism. Cultural ageism justifies treating people differently because they are seen to 
be intrinsically inferior to younger people in the same way that racists perceive 
members of different ethnic groups and as many sexists view women. As we saw in 
chapter 3, Iris Young argues that older bodiqs are objectified as different, ugly and 
loathsome because they are associated with decline and decay, and Julia Kristeva's 
conception of abjection claims younger people develop 'border anxiety' about their 
own identities which cause them to act discriminatively against what they perceive as 
a threat. The old are seen as a threat because their objectified bodies represent the 
decay that all of us will one day become. Philosophical ideas about discontinuous 
identity and cultural ageism both propose that older selves are not the same as the 
younger selves they once were, and this posits a 'them' and 'us' relationship between 
the two. Thus, the argument that Age Concern puts forward to challenge egalitarian 
360 However, the view is of course subject to practical difficulties such as determining exactly when a 
person had indeed become a different person, and on a societal scale this problem might be 
insurmountable. 
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ageism might inadvertently reinforce ageist stereotypes about the old being somehow 
different. 
The effects of this might be illustrated by the work of Richard Posner who has 
explicitly embraced the idea of a discontinuous personal identity in order to explain 
the behaviour of the elderly. 361 Posner claims that we can think of the life of any one 
person as a series of 'multiple selves' time-sharing the same body, and he justifies this 
claim by identifying the cognitive shift between what he calls the 'fluid' intelligence 
of the young to the 'crystallised' intelligence of the old. The fluidity of the young 
represents the imagination they bring to problem solving and their hope and optimism 
about what might be achieved, while the crystallised intelligence of the old represents 
the reliance on experience-based skills and knowledge that become increasingly 
redundant. Because of this Posner suggests that 'the costs of learning new things are 
lower to young than old people". 362 Indeed, if such is the case then employers would 
be justified in discriminating against older candidates for jobs that required the 
development of new skills. 
However, unlike Parfit, Posner has no theory of the kinds of connectedness that Might 
underlie claims about identity. Moreover, as Daniels argues, Posner in fact merely 
'reinforces ageist stereotypes' by connecting stereotypical views about the old and 
young with this supposed shift in cognitive style. 363 Because the old have a 
crystallised intelligence, it seems, they also have the psychological traits of 
" Richard Posner, Ageing and OldAge, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 
" lbid, p70. 
363 Norman Daniels, 'Does Economics Provide a Unified Account of Ageing Behaviour and Ageing 
PolicyT Ethics 108 (1998): 569-585. 
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'loquacity' and 'penny-pinching', and Posner links it to a number of common 
stereotypes about the old being 'sure about nothing', 'cynical', 'small-minded', 
Spessimistic', 'cowardly', and concerned only with 'keeping alive'. 364 None of this 
supports the anti-ageist position. Nevertheless, despite this debate over the 
implications of a discontinuous personal identity there are good reasons for either 
rejecting it or ignoring it in matters of social justice. 
Firstly, the Reductionist view is simply deeply implausible. As Christine Korsgaard 
points out, there are practical reasons for regarding ourselves as the same rational 
person existing over time, and that the conception of a person as a unified agent is not 
365 therefore based upon a metaphysical assumption, but practical reason. If we think 
of what is important in life we find that it involves relationships with others, interests, 
ambitions and life-plans, all of which exist and develop over time. And in order for us 
to take part in these activities we are logically required to think of ourselves as a 
unitary agent, which means that '[w]hen the person is viewed as an agent, no clear 
366 
content can be given to the idea of a merely present self. That is not to say, 
however, that we do not take ourselves to have synchronic interests, because the 
existence of synchronic interests does not challenge either a continuous personal 
identity or the idea that at any moment our agency involves long-term goals as well. 
Moreover, as Geoffrey Cupit points out, '[mlost people who think age discrimination 
114 Posncr,, 4geing and Old-49e, pp 102-108. 
365 Christine Nt Korsgasard, 'Personal Identity and the Unit of Agency. A Kantian Response to parfjý, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 101-132. 
3"" lbid, p 114. 
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unjust do so, I suggest, without entertaining any doubts about the identity of people 
over time'. 367 
A second reason to reject Reductionism, at least as far as social justice is concerned, 
is that a political or moral theory is conceptually independent of the metaphysical 
theory of personal identity. According to Rawls, moral theory 'is the study of how the 
basic notions of right, the good, and moral worth may be arranged to form different 
moral structures'. Its project is 'to identify the chief similarities and differences 
between these structures and to characterize the way in which they are related to our 
moral sensibilities and natural attitudes, and to determine the conditions they must 
satisfy if they are to play their expected role in human life. '368 As Rawls explains, 
though, this moral project is logically separate from metaphysical questions. 
The study of substantive moral conceptions and their relation to our moral sensibility 
has its own distinctive problems and subject matter that requires to be investigated for 
its own sake. At the same time, answers to such questions as the analysis of moral 
concepts, the existence of objective moral truth, and the nature of persons and 
personal identity, depend upon an [moral] understanding of these structures. Thus the 
problems of moral philosophy that tie in with the theory of meaning and 
epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, must call upon moral 
theory. 369 
Therefore, whether or not the Reductionist view is correct is irrelevant from the 
perspective of moral theory unless there is a ffirther moral theory that shows that this 
view about personal identity is morally relevant. 
370 Rawls recognises that I[o]ur 
conceptions of the good can and often do change over time, usually slowly but 
367 Geoffrey Cupit, 'Justice, Age, and Veneration, ' p705. 
369 p 
, awls, 'The 
Independence of Moral Theory, ' (1975) in Collected Papers, p286. 
369 Ibid, p287. 
370 such an argument may be possible if the moral notion of well-being we adopt is the experienced 
psychological state of welfiLre. However, I largely dismissed the welfare metric in section 4.4. 
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sometimes rather suddenly', and that '[w]hen these changes are sudden, we are likely 
to say that we are no longer the same person', yet such a conversion implies no 
clmge in our public or legal identity. 371 
5.8 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined a number of varying units of egalitarian concern and found 
that by themselves they all have implausible implications, both from strict egalitarian 
and prioritarian perspectives. We have said that individuals have irreducible 
synchronic and diachronic interests and that there is no principle to determine that one 
is more fundamental than the other. From a distributive egalitarian perspective, 
therefore, we are faced with a dilemma: should we fulfil the diachronic interests and 
allow ageist policies, or should we promote synchronic interests and sacrifice a degree 
of concern for personal responsibility? While the CLV, the FIA and the QALY will 
each justify ageist public policies, the synchronic alternatives do not sufficiently 
respect the principle that each of us should take personal responsibility for our lives. 
The most intuitively compelling view of egalitarian distribution, therefore, is a hybrid 
model, which, rather than giving exclusive concern to either diachronic or synchronic 
interests, recognises the importance of both. The problem for this hybrid view of 
distribution, however, is that it is difficult to formulate and operationalise as a 
workable principle of economic justice. 
371 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p22. Note that Rawls uses a political conception of the person rather 
than a moral conception- 
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However, if we accept the proposition in chapter 4 that social equality is morally prior 
to distributive equality, then by establishing a distributive system that encourages and 
maintains that social equality we fulfil what justice requires. But we do not need to 
ensure diachronic distributional equality in order for there to be social equality. What 
is needed for social equality is a distributive system that protects the synchronic 
interests that persons have in enjoying a minimally decent existence, but which at the 
same time respects the principle that individuals are personally responsible for the 
success of their own lives. In chapter 71 argue, in line with Elizabeth Anderson's 
account of DE, that both of these goals might be achieved by using a version of the 
capabilities metric. Before examining this distributive system, however, we should 
further critique the CLV in the next chapter by developing the concept of the 
prudential analogy (PA). The PA, which is a logical extension of the CLV, involves 
an analogy of how one rational individual would intra-pcrsonally distribute their finite 
complete life share of benefits and then recreates it on a societal scale. In this way 
individual prudence is thought to guide principles of social justice. Nevertheless, 
while the CLV examined in this chapter merely condones ageism as an unfortunate 
consequence of pursuing diachronic equality, the PA will actually prescribe it. 
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Chapter Six: Egalitarian ageism and the prudential analogy 
My argument in this chapter will be that a prudential analogy is a logical adjunct to 
the premise of the CLV, and that while the latter only justifies ageist policies, the two 
principles combined will actually prescribe them. The chapter examines two versions 
of the prudential analogy, used by Ronald Dworkin and Norman Daniels respectively, 
in order to illustrate their discriminatory implications. 
6.1 The prudential analogy as an adjunct to the CLV 
The CLV deals with the share of publicly provided benefits to which people are 
entitled over the course of their entire lives. These benefits are limited because we 
exist within conditions of relative scarcity, and publicly provided benefits must 
consequently be rationed between citizens in a way that is fair. The fact that they are 
limited means that we must find a way of distributing those finite shares of benefits 
over the different stages of a person's life in such a way that will ensure he or she will 
enjoy as good a life as possible. This, then, is the purpose of the prudential analogy 
(PA), and it is a logical adjunct to the CLV. 372 
The PA involves a fundamental shift in perspective, and rather than viewing the 
problem of intergenerational justice as one between competing groups of young and 
old, it views each age group as representing a different stage in one life. A PA is an 
analogy between; on the one hand, how one rational individual would invest her equal 
diachronic share of benefits in such a way as to insure herself against disease, 
372 The PA would of course be irrelevant in conditions of abundance rather than scarcity because there 
would then be no finite share to distribute intra-personally. 
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accidents, or poverty in old age, and, on the other hand, how society should provide 
the means to meet these needs to all citizens. To ensure the analogy is fair the 
prudential agents would be in possession of the general facts of her society's level of 
wealth, cost of living, the average life expectancy, and the relevant facts of tendency 
to disease and accidents. The PA is thus an ideal thought experiment, and the 
insurance the rational agent would choose to pay, and the benefits she would accrue, 
could then be replicated on a societal scale in the form of tax and welfare benefits. 
The PA is based on two premises. Firstly, there is an understanding that justice is 
concerned only with the complete lives of separate persons, and this means that a 
distribution across the temporal parts of different lives is only objectionable if it 
produces an unfair distribution in terms of complete lives. Secondly, the issue of 
fairness between age groups can be reduced to a question of prudential thinking about 
complete lives. That is to say if we understand social justice as the 'fair' distribution 
of benefits between separate lives then we can think ofjustice between age groups as 
the 'fair' distribution of those equal benefits over the course of those separate lives. 
These two premises suggest that there is no real conflict between the claims of the 
young and old and that prudential thinking will find a solution that benefits everyone, 
or, as Daniels claims, 'prudence guides justice'. 373 
The combination of the CLV and PA addresses one of the criticisms of the FIA 
outlined in the last chapter. The FIA claims that once people have had a 'good 
innings' of life that they should be discriminated against within health care in favour 
3" Norman Daniels, Justice andJustification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 281. 
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of younger people who have not yet had their fair innings. The criticism of that ageist 
justification is that the old will have paid more in national insurance contributions 
over their longer lives, and so have contributed more to the welfare system than the 
young, that consequently they deserve to be treated before the young. The FIA is 
unconcerned with previous contributions and so cannot address the criticism. 
However, unlike the FIA, a combination of the CLV and a PA do not focus 
exclusively on chronological age but are rather directly concerned with how people 
have or would have contributed to a welfare system in the past. This method would 
determine how those individuals would have invested their income in a way that 
would take into consideration what people should be entitled to in old age. That 
means, if a welfare system discriminated against the old and either restricted their 
access to certain medical treatments, or only provided them with an inadequate 
pension, then that would be because rational individuals would have chosen those 
policies from within an ideal decision process. 
One final issue for this section is the effect the adoption of a PA would have on the 
influence of the independent moral principle that individuals should be personally 
responsible for the success of their lives. As we have seen, personal responsibility is 
an integral part of the reason that many thinkers adopt the CLV. Nevertheless, 
implementing the PA in practice has the effect of diminishing the influence of this 
principle. The reason for this is that by replicating the analogy on a societal scale 
means providing welfare benefits to those individuals who would not have been 
sufficiently rational to invest any of their diachronic share of benefits as contributions 
to that system Thus, because the PA must work on an averaging principle, both the 
rational and the irrational would be insured to the same degree in the real world. This 
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is not to say, however, that certain ways of encouraging responsibility could not also 
be introduced, i. e. by imposing penalties on smokers for the costs they create for 
health care. 
The rest of the chapter examines the different prudential analogies within the work of 
Daniels and Dworkin. It is widely accepted that the work of Daniels has set the 
agenda for political philosophy as far as the problem of intergenerational justice is 
concerned, just as the work of John Rawls has set the agenda for the broader concept 
of social justice. Indeed, as Clark Wolf has noted, 'whether one agrees with Daniels 
or not, his work is the place to start. 374 Nevertheless, before examining Daniels' 
conception of the prudential analogy I wish first to look at Dworkin's theory, both 
because it is the more flawed, and because to correct that flaw Dworkin would be 
unable to move to Daniels' conception without conflicting with his wider theory of 
justice. 
6.2 Ronald Dworkin and a 'just' diachronic distribution of healthcare 
Dworkin's conception of social justice has already been outlined in chapter 4, and in 
this section we examine the practical implementation of his hypothetical insurance 
model for the issue ofjustice in the distribution of healthcare. 
375 Dworkin seeks a just 
distribution of society's goods to the temporal stages of individual lives, and his 
theory explicitly insists that prudence and prudent saving are the key to social justice. 
After equalising resources prudent agents are asked whether they would buy in to an 
374CIark Wolt 'Healthcare Access, population ageing, and intergenerational justice, ' in A. Harry 
Lesser (ed. ), 4geing, 4 utononv and Resources (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p215. 
375 Dworkin, 'Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, ' in McGill LawJourna138 (1993): 883-899. 
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insurance plan that would guarantee certain medical treatments and diagnostic 
procedures but would deny others. Dworkin tries to determine what we would 
rationally spend on healthcare in competition with the other goods we may wish to 
purchase, assuming that each person's purchasing power is equal and finite. The idea 
that shares should be equal and finite means we can measure the cost of any 
preference we have for one good in terms of the absence of another good of similar 
value. If individuals would purchase certain healthcare goods (i. e. emergency medical 
treatment) and not others (i. e. life-extending treatment when very old or senile), then 
society should emulate those hypothetical decisions in order to provide a just 
distribution of healthcare resources. Thus, the central idea of Dworkin's PA is that we 
should aim in practice to make collective, social decisions about the quantity and 
distribution of healthcare so as to match, as closely as possible, the decisions that 
people in the community would make for themselves in what he calls 'the appropriate 
circumstances'. 376 
The first condition of these appropriate circumstances is, as already outlined above, 
that the economic system of society should provide a 'fair equality' in the distribution 
of resources, and only by doing this can we treat all citizens with equal concern and 
respect. The second of the appropriate conditions involves individuals having full 
awareness of the value, cost and side effects of all medical procedures, and the third 
condition is a type of Rawlsian veil of ignorance hiding individuals from knowledge 
of their own probability of contracting any disease or becoming victim to any kind of 
accident or violent incident. If we could keep as close to these conditions as is 
practically possible, then the decisions that people in the community would have 
376 Dworkin, 'Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, ' p888. 
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made for themselves are the ones that the state should emulate on a societal basis. 
This then is the application of the insurance analogy to the -problem of justice of 
healthcare distribution. Note, however, that what Dworkin deems to be just are the 
decisions that people would make for themselves 'if they were looking from youth 
do" the course of their lives and trying to decide what risks were worth running in 
return for not running other kinds of risk. 9377 This phrase 'looking from youth down 
the course of their lives' leaves Dworkin's use of prudence open to the criticism that it 
is ageist. This is because it is based upon the choices that a young person would make, 
whilst aware of her current age and goals, and the result of that choice will 
consequently be biased in favour of the young and against the old . 
378 We Might argue 
that this represents a 'tyranny of youth', because the decisions that the younger person 
makes will limit the opportunities of the same person when they become older. 
What, then, does Dworkin believe would be the result of this insurance analogy? He 
believes that almost no-one would purchase insurance that would provide life-saving 
treatment once they had fallen into a permanent vegetative state (PVS), and no-one 
would purchase insurance for expensive medical treatment after they had entered the 
later stages of Alzheimer's disease. Most contentious of all, though, few would insure 
for the provision of 'heroic medical intervention' that would keep them alive four or 
five more months or 'technology whose main results benefit people in relatively old 
aget. 379 The reason that people would not so invest is that they could better spend 
377 Ibid (Italics added). 
3"' on this point see Richard Posner, Ageing and OldAge, pp266-7; Tyler Cowan, 'Comment on 
Daniels and Mckerlie, ' in Lee M. Cohen (ed. ) Justice Across Generations (Public Policy Institute of 
the AARP, 1993): 227-35. 
379 Dworkin, 'Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, ' p890. 
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those premiums on training, experience, culture or investment. Although Dworkin 
acknowledges that many people want to remain alive as long as possible, provided 
they remain. conscious, alert and relatively pain free, he nevertheless makes the 
following claim: 
My point is rather that they would not want those additional months at the cost of the 
sacrifices in their earlier, vigorous life that would be necessary if they had to make 
that choice. They would think the money better spent, earlier, on job-training or 
education or investment or on something else that would benefit their lives as a whole 
380 more than just taking on a few months of very limited life at the end. 
What this represents, in addition to a tyranny of the youth, is a conflict between the 
synchronic and diachronic interests of a person. The synchronic interests of the older 
person is to live a few more months, or undergo certain beneficial treatments, while 
the diachronic interests of the person is perhaps that the resources be diverted from 
financing these later benefits and use them to provide benefits for the younger self If 
we followed Dworkin's reasoning it would mean harming the synchronic interests of 
our own later selves by allowing the synchronic interests of younger selves, or what 
we at any time perceive as our diachronic interests, to dictate the distribution of a 
finite share of resources over a complete life. But one might object that there is surely 
more to what justice requires than the way that prudent people in their youth would 
determine to allocate a finite set of resources 'down the course of their lives'. Is it 
plausible to imagine a doctor at a patient's bedside giving the following homily: 
I'm sorry Mrs Smith, but I'm afraid we are going to deny you the medical treatment 
that would give you five more months of life. The reason we deny you this is because, 
although you think you want those months now, if you were a rational 20 year old 
deciding how to spend your finite share of goods down the course of your life, you 
would elect to spend the money that would have paid for this treatment on a youthful 
culture trip to Italy instead. 
390 Ibid, p891 (italics added). 
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We might ask whether there are ways of amending Dworkin's scheme to avoid the 
'tyranny of youth' criticism. While there is not room here to examine this question in 
depth it would seem that the best way to avoid the tyranny of youth is by adopting a 
more extensive veil of ignorance in the way that we will see Daniels does. However, 
as we shall also see in the next section, such a veil of ignorance does not make the 
prudential analogy immune to criticism. Moreover, it is arguable that a broader veil 
would not be compatible with Dworkin's wider theory as briefly outlined above. 
Dworkin's theory differs from that of Rawls precisely because Dworkin wants to 
make individuals aware of their conceptions of the good, and in that way make them 
responsible for the costs they involve so they do not impose those costs on others. 381 
This awareness would obviously negate the possibility of being neutral in the 
distribution of the benefits over one's life. 
6.3 Nonnan Daniels and the PLA 
Like Dworkin, Norman Daniels does not think that justice between the young and old 
is simply a matter of justice between different age cohorts, but thinks that each age 
group represents a stage of our lives. He argues that the interpersonal problem of 
distribution between different people of different ages is morally equivalent to the 
intrapersonal problem of distribution between the different temporal stages of a single 
life, and it is this claim that leads him to the prudential lifespan account (PLA). 
Daniels is explicit that his theory is to be seen as an independent principle of justice 
and as an adjunct to Rawls' theory ofjustice. He also believes that the PLA rests upon 
fairly a non-contentious claim: that there is an important difference between 
391 Dworkin, 'Justice in the Distribution of Health Care, ' p372. 
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distributive problems that cross the boundaries between persons on the one hand, and 
problems that involve allocations of goods between the different stages of a single life 
on the other. As such, Daniels makes the underlying assumption that the issue of 
distributive justice between the complete lives of separate persons is to be determined 
before the question of justice between age groups is addressed, and the former 
therefore has lexical priority. Daniels argues that by constructing a 'frame' to isolate 
the age-group problem from interpersonal transfers of goods, the theory is able to 
emphasise the importance of persons as separate entities. This assumption also 
represents the necessary acceptance of the CLV. 
(i) The CLV and the PLA 
Having framed the theory of justice between age groups the PLA adopts a partial 
Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance', which prevents the prudential agents from having 
knowledge of their social and economic status, their current age, conceptions of the 
good, and the expected length of their lives. It is from behind this veil that prudential 
agents determine the fair distribution of their diachronic shares over the course of 
their complete lives, though this 'partial' veil is more extensive than the one adopted 
by DworkiM382 However, as with Rawls' 'justice as fairness, there are some facts 
which the prudent deliberators are aware of in order that they may determine a just 
distribution. That is to say, they are aware of facts about general life expectancy in 
their society, important facts about the disease/age profile, and facts about patterns of 
392 one of Dworkin's criticisms of John Rawls' theory is that his veil of ignorance omits too much 
information regarding the individual's conception of the good, with the consequence that the theory 
cannot ensure that individuals take full responsibility for the costs that ensue from their chosen life- 
plans. 
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economic growth, and knowledge of people's usual needs for resources at different 
ages. 
383 
Before discussing the principle of age group justice that these prudential deliberators 
will agree upon it is necessary to outline two further assumptions that condition the 
circumstances in which prudential deliberators decide, i. e. the standard theory of a 
maximising rationality; and the Requirement of Equal Concern. The first of these, the 
assumption of a maximising rationality, is based upon the central claim of the 
classical or standard theory of individual rationality. Derek Parfit describes this as the 
Self-Interest Theory, the central claim of which is: 
(S 1) For each person, there is one supremely rational ultimate aim: that his life go, for 
hiM as well as possible. 
384 
This central claim involves ftirther claims, the most significant for our purposes 
being; 
(S4) What it would be rational for anyone to do is what will bring him the greatest 
ft. 385 expected bene I 
""Daniels, Am I My Parent's Keeper?: An Essay on Justice Between the Young and Old (New York: 
oxford University Press, 1988), p75. 
394 Derek Parfit, Reasons andPersons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p4. 
385 lbid, p8. 
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Together these two principles are what we can refer to as our maximising rationality, 
and, as Daniels notes, within the PLA, S4 will be aggregated over a complete iife. 386 
That is to say the prudent deliberators behind Daniels' version of the veil of ignorance 
will choose the intrapersoml distribution that promises to maximise the greatest 
expected diachronic benefit. This is important because the policies that will bring 
greatest diachronic benefit may well be those that also create significant negative 
benefit at certain synchronic temporal periods, and this implication will be of 
relevance when we examine the various criticisms of the PLA below. 
The second assumption that conditions the decision procedure is what Parfit has 
referred to as the Requirement of Equal Concern; that a rational person should be 
equally concerned about all the parts of his or her own future. 387 This might also be 
called the age-neutrality principle because it assumes an attitude of moral neutrality 
towards the intrinsic worth of the different ages of a life. Such an impartial concern 
would mean that 'a smaller present good is not to be preferred to a greater future 
good'. 388 We must therefore assume that prudent deliberators are concerned about 
their well-being over their complete lives, and are not more concerned with the 
success of one part of it than the others. Given these assumptions, Daniels argues, 
resources should then be distributed between people of different ages in the way that 
prudential agents would divide them over the corresponding temporal stages of a 
single life. Like Dworkin, Daniels believes that once the above conditions have been 
secured regarding the decision procedure, then '[w]hatever is prudent from this 
386 Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p285. 
397 parfjtý Reasons andPersons, p313. 
3911 Henry Sidgewick, Methods ofEthics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 198 1), p3 8 1. 
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perspective constitutes what is jUSt,. 389 A synchronic question of justice between age 
groups at any temporal moment has therefore been reduced to a diachronic question 
of budgeting between the various temporal stages of one life. 
The veil of ignorance that Daniels adopts differs from that of Dworkin in that it 
prevents the prudential deliberators from knowing their own conceptions of the good. 
This 'means they must not allow their deliberations to be biased in favour of what 
seems prudent merely from the perspective of the plan of life they have at a particular 
point in their life, say early adulthood. 090 The reason for this is that Daniels 
recognises that 'we revise plans of life, often in fundamental ways, as we age9 '391 and 
if an informational. constraint were not imposed upon prudential agents then there 
would be a danger that resources may be wasted on youthful projects leaving little for 
people in old age. 392 The fact that the informational constraint is imposed means that 
the PLA is not subject to the same criticism of the 'tyranny of youth' that can be 
levelled at Dworkin. 
The PLA is a general principle that provides us with a way of thinking about the 
distribution of goods other than healthcare, such as income support. Indeed, the 
prescription of the PLA for income distribution and health care are different. While 
income distribution would be 'roughly equal', the distribution of health care resources 
389 Daniels, Am My Parent's Keeper? p92 
'90 lbid, p75. 
391 lbid, p 120. 
392 Clark Wolf questions the necessity for the imposition of the informational constraint on prudential 
deliberators. If they are rational and respect the Requirement of Equal Concern why would people 
favour their present projects whatever age they were? See Clark Wolf, 'Healthcare access, population 
ageing, and intergenerational justice, ' p2OO. 
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would involve some inequality of provision and would justify some degree of age- 
based rationing. Daniels believes that medical and healthcare resources would be 
distributed to protect the 'age relative normal opportunity range' at every temporal 
stage of life, arguing that a central unifying function of healthcare is to maintain and 
restore functioning that is typical or normal for our species. Healthcare derives its 
moral importance from the fact that normal functioning has a central effect on the 
opportunities open to an individual, and by relieving illness and disease society may 
help guarantee individuals a fair chance to enjoy the normal opportunity range for 
their society. 
The normal opportunity range for a given society is the array of life plans that 
reasonable persons within it are likely to construct for themselves. An individual's 
fair share of that range is the array of life plans he or she may reasonably choose 
given his or her talents and skills. Disease and disability shrinks that share from what 
is fair while healthcare protects it. This, Daniels suggests, means that we should use 
the impairment of the normal opportunity range as a fairly crude measure of the 
relative moral importance of healthcare needs. Because we have obligations to ensure 
people have a fair equality of opportunity, it means we also have social obligations to 
provide health care services that protect and restore normal functioning. Daniels 
argues that this range naturally contracts as we age with impairments to normal 
functioning and that, therefore, a 'prudently designed healthcare system will be 
responsive to facts about the types and frequencies of diseases and disabilities that 
393 
emerge at different points in the lifespaW. 
393 Norman Daniels, Am I My Parent's Keeper? p77. It should be noted that the opportunity based 
theory that Daniels espouses cannot explain why long-term care should be provided in cases where 
disability is so severe that services do nothing to compensate for losses of normal functioning. These 
would be cases such as advanced Alzheimer's disease. For a critique of this problem see David 
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Daniels also argues that from behind the partial veil 'prudential deliberators would 
prefer a distributive scheme that improves their chances of reaching a normal lifespan 
(normal life expectancy) to one that gives them a reduced chance of reaching a normal 
lifespan but a greater chance of reaching an extended lifespan once normal life 
expectancy has been reached'. 394 Thus, a policy of age based rationing would operate 
in circumstances in which scarce or expensive life-extending treatment could only be 
provided to those who have already reached a 'normal' life expectancy if by doing so 
we would need to restrict such treatment to the young. Nevertheless, while certain 
life-extending treatments would be restricted to the elderly, personal care and social 
support services are just as valuable for restoring normal functioning to older persons 
and would therefore be supplied to that age group. Thus, because Daniels believes 
that the lives of citizens as a whole will be better if we rationed resources by age, so, 
the equal rights to healthcare that individuals held over a complete life would 
nevertheless yield unequal entitlements at different points in their liveS. 395 
What the PLA says about the intra-personal distribution of income is quite different, 
and it will be the prescriptions the PLA has for this rather than for healthcare that I 
will concentrate on in the rest of this section. The PLA would dictate that the prudent 
course of action would allocate resources in such a way that income would remain 
E)eGrazia, 'Grounding a Right to Health Care in Self-Esteem and Self-Respect,, Public, 4ffairs 
Quarterly 5 (1991): 301-318. 
394 Daniels, 'A lifetime approach to healthcare, ' inAgeing and Ethics (Toronto: Humana Press, 199 1), 
p239. 
395 Daniels, Am I My Parent's Keeper? p8 1. 
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4roughly equal' over a lifetime in accordance with what Daniels calls the income 
preservation principle (Ipp). 396 Daniels argues that rational deliberations, 
do not know the details of their plan of life and must instead reason about their well- 
being by reference to a Rawlsian index of primary social goods. The argument for this 
constraint, however, is not Rawlsian; rather, it is justified by an appeal to the classical 
theory of rational prudence. To demonstrate an equal concern for all parts of their 
lives, the prudent deliberators should not base their choices on the details of the plan 
of life they happen to hold at the time of choice. 397 
The choice of the IPP would thus be motivated by the integration of three principles: 
firstly, that we have no intrinsic preference for one part of our lives over the others; 
secondly, that individuals would reason so as to maximise aggregate expected benefit 
(in line with the standard theory of rational prudence); and thirdly, that such 
individuals would be behind a partial veil of ignorance. The first two principles are 
those of rationality, the third is adopted to ensure that the conditions of the decision 
procedure are fair. 
The Rawlsian difference principle permits inequalities between the separate lives of 
individuals provided that such inequality benefits the least advantaged. Thus, if we 
were to adopt the maximin reasoning for intrapersonal justice then rather than 
ensuring 'rough equality' it would allow income inequalities between the different 
stages of people's lives. Those inequalities would be permitted provided they made 
the complete lives of individuals maximally well-off (measured in primary social 
goods), and provided that they also benefited the stages of life in which people are 
likely to be worst off as a result of that inequality. By allowing such inequalities 
between persons society could provide incentives to the more talented to be 
lbid, p 12 1. 
lbid, p 120. 
258 
productive and thus raise the social product as a whole, benefiting all citizens. 
However, such building of the social product is not an obvious goal as far as 
intrapersonal justice is concerned, and this reasoning is therefore blocked by the 
assumption that lifetime shares of income have already been framed as fair shares. 
Individuals cannot therefore expand their lifetime income share by allocating it in 
certain ways, because such investment strategies are already accommodated within 
the notion of a lifetime share. Similarly, they cannot argue in favour of allowing 
inequalities in income levels between stages of their lives provided such inequalities 
in income levels work to make them maximally well-off (as measured by income) 
during the stages of their lives in which they are worse off 
Therefore, because the problem has been framed it means that '[i]nequalities in 
income levels between the stages of life work only as a zero-sum game, making one 
, 398 period of life better off at the expense of another period or stage of life. T'hus, as a 
consequence, Daniels believes that 'the prudent course of action would be to allocate 
resources in such a way that income (standing proxy for the complete index of 
primary goods) would remain roughly equal over the lifespan'. 399 If an individual 
could know that his plan of life contained preferences which at all stages of life would 
make an unequal distribution preferable (perhaps because it would increase lifetime 
satisfaction), then an unequal intrapersonal distribution would be a better one for that 
individual. But we cannot know that plans will cohere in this way, and we often 
fundamentally change our life plan as we age. It is this fact of uncertainty that leads 
"" lbid, p 12 1. 
"" Ibid. 
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Daniels to believe the IPP would be chosen: a principle that ensured people sufficient 
resources at each stage of their lives to pursue whatever plan of life they may have at 
each particular stage. 
This then is how Daniels explains his conclusions. However, there are several 
criticisms that may challenge both the conclusions that he draws when deliberating on 
the assumption of the soundness of the CLV and the prudent analogy, but that also 
challenge the plausibility of the CLV itself 
(ii) Would Prudential deliberators reject the IPP? 
The first set of criticisms that may successfully challenge Daniel's theory is to show 
that even if we accept his precondition of the CLV, and the standard assumption of a 
maximising rationality of self-interest, that rational deliberators behind the veil of 
ignorance would nevertheless not come to the conclusion of the (IPP). That is they 
would not distribute the finite life time share of resources 'roughly equally' across a 
life. In fact, it is at least arguable that in order to maximise expected benefit, or 
diachronic well-being, over our complete life it may be necessary to allocate 
disproportionate shares between younger and older selves, and it is consequently quite 
possible that, as Mckerlie claims, prudence 'would treat the very old harshly'. 400 
The claim would be that, given the goal of maximising diachronic well-being, there is 
reason to think that many people might rationally use the classical theory of practical 
40" Dennis Mckerlie, 'Equality Between Age-Groups, ' Philosophy and Public, 4ffairs 21 (1992): 275- 
295, p287. 
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reasoning to favour a life that did in fact involve synchronic inequalities, even if by 
doing so they did not increase the total complete life benefits they could enjoy. The 
reason might be that in order to maximise diachronic well-being such benefits require 
unequal consumption throughout a life. Daniels does in fact point to this possibility 
himself He claims some 'qualifications' are necessary to the IPP and that income 
distribution must be adjusted if it is to count as a measure of well-being at different 
points in the lifespan, because what we are really interested in is a person's standard 
of living'. But equal income levels at different stages of life may not represent equal 
standards of living. The example he uses is that if income spent on raising children, 
including advancing their educational opportunities, is at least part inelastic and 
represents a 'durable good' that produces benefits to parents over their complete 
lifespan, then we should readjust the post-retirement income levels of the parents by 
subtracting some portion of income to be spent on their children . 
401 If we violate the 
Ipp in the way Daniels suggests then this may not be enough to create or justify age 
discriminatory policies, but if we combine it with other likely reasons for detracting 
from the IPP then the aggregated consequences may result in a significant restriction 
of benefits from the old. 
What then are these other possible reasons that prudential deliberators would fail to 
preserve sufficient resources for their old age as the IPp suggests they would. Firstly, 
individuals behind the veil of ignorance do not know how long they personally will 
live, although they do know the average life expectancy one can expect to enjoy 
within their society. If that average is something like 75, then they know that although 
they can expect to reach that age they are far less likely to reach 85, and quite unlikely 
"" Norman Daniels, Justice andJustification, p 162. 
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to make 95. It must seem at least plausible then that rational deliberators about their 
own lives would not save very much for the slim possibility that they might live that 
long. While it might be prudent to save some resources for great age it certainly does 
not seem imprudent to decide not to save the same 'roughly equal' share of income at 
that life stage as every other. To do so would be to risk wasting a significant share of 
one9s complete life resources. 
This consideration does not violate the age-neutrality principle because it is not 
necessary to assume that the older life segments are of less intrinsic value than any 
other segment of one's life. An age-neutrality principle does not therefore prevent age 
discrimination. For the very old to be neglected it is only necessary to acknowledge 
that the prudential deliberators, behind a veil of ignorance, would know that they are 
very unlikely to live long enough to enjoy any benefits set aside for the very old age 
group- 
A second reason that the PLA may not necessarily lead to the IPP is that people will 
often find it to be prudent to consume a greater share of their finite resources while 
young. As we have seen, Daniels stipulates that the budget to be distributed intra- 
personally has already been framed by interpersonal justice, and that therefore 
prudential deliberators could not seek to expand their lifetime share by allocating it in 
certain ways, perhaps by investing in their human capital while young. Daniels 
believes that because such a disproportionate youthful allocation would not increase 
one's complete life share of resources that consequently people would not distribute it 
in that way. However, it does not seem necessarily irrational to consume more of 
one's resources while young, either in education or developing oneself in other ways, 
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even if it does not increase one's complete life earning power. For example, 
education, cultural experience and travel may increase one's diachronic well-being for 
psychological rather than merely materialistic reasons, and we might invest in them 
even if by doing so we reduced our lifetime shares. As we saw in the last section 
Dworkin is quite explicit that such considerations would justify restricting resources 
from the very old. It was a criticism that this would lead to ageist social policies. 
Daniels, on the other hand, seems to deny that such justifications would be 
considered. 
A third criticism outlined by Mckerlie is a consequence of the calculations that would 
be inherent to a maximising rationality, which would mean that 'prudence will only 
save for old age if the sacrifice that such saving requires early in life is less than the 
eventual gain when the resources are used during old age. 402 It is an unfortunate fact 
that with the onset of old age one's physical and mental powers usually begin to 
I decline and this makes 
it more difficult to use one's resources to improve one's life. it 
is also increasingly unlikely that we would expect to want to 'radically revise' our 
conceptions of the good as we grow older, and while one reason might be that we 
would simply lack the energy and motivation, another reason is anticipated by Daniels 
himself in a footnote. Rationally prudent individuals may well discount their later 
years from the consideration of the fecundity of the benefits they can expect from 
them. Thus, Daniels acknowledges that, 
if this is so, then, other things being equal, a later year is worth less than an earlier 
one because whatever opportunities for generating fiirther benefits from activities 
pursued in a later year are less than those generated at an earlier year. 403 
402 McKerlie, justice Between the Young and the Old, ' Philosophy and PublicAffairs 30 (2002): 152. 
177, p 160. 
403 Daniels, Justice andJustification, p282, fn 1. 
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Again, however, it is not necessary that by favouring earlier years in this way we 
would violate the age-neutrality principle. It would simply not be a prudential 
calculation to invest as much in to the later temporal periods of our lives as the 
income preservation principle would suggest, given the overall goal of maximising 
the greatest diachronic; benefit over a complete life. 
These considerations suggest that it is quite plausible that given the conditions of 
Daniel's veil of ignorance, combined with his commitment to the CLV and the 
maximising rationality, that prudential deliberators would not choose his IPP. Indeed, 
rather than saving a roughly equal share of income for each stage of life it is quite 
plausible that the later stages will be neglected to some extent. Moreover, while each 
of these considerations might lead to only a small deviation from the IPP, taken 
together they may well collectively lead to justify a certain amount of age 
discrimination. One of Daniels' fundamental assumptions is that prudence should 
dictate justice, but if it is not imprudent to leave little for one's own very old age it 
does not necessarily follow that justice does not require society to provide a sufficient 
income for people who live to the age of 95 and beyond. This consideration points to 
the strong possibility that justice can not be simply reduced to the prudent decisions 
that individuals would make about their own lives. It might be thought plausible to 
suggest that social justice must take consideration of the fundamental interests of 
persons who are actually at that stage of their lives, irrespective of whether they 
would, in a hypothetical situation involving an informational constraint, have made 
provision themselves. 
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Therefore, as with Dworkin's theory, Daniels' use of prudence may justify egalitarian 
ageism Nevertheless, there are other possible reasons for thinking that the PLA is 
significantly flawed. 
(iii) Would Prudential deliberators reject the CLV? 
So far, on the face of it, these criticisms do not refute the CLV, they merely dispute 
the conclusions that Daniels arrives at with reference to income distribution given his 
assumption of the CLV, a maximising rationality and a prudential analogy. However, 
the object of this thesis is not just to show the unfortunate ageist consequences of an 
adherence to these principles; it is also to refute the idea that the CLV is necessary or 
even plausible. It is quite possible that prudential deliberators behind a similar veil of 
ignorance to that which Daniels adopts would choose alternatives to the PLA that 
were not committed to the CLV. Indeed, people are not necessarily committed to the 
CLV, nor is it obvious that justice requires a commitment to it. 
This section examines Daniels' methodological assumption of the CLV as a 
precondition of the PLA and outlines two important objections raised by Clark 
Wolf 404 M Wolf notes, 'Daniels' methodology implies a presumption that what a 
general theory of justice entitles people to as individuals is a finite budget of health 
care resources and primary goods', 
405 and that at first glance it might seem that this 
assumption is supported by the reflection that the total health care budget is finite. 
"' Clark Wol& 'Healthcare access, population ageing, and intergenerational justice., 
405Wol& p225. 
265 
However, the fact that the total social health care and primary social goods are fmite 
is an entirely different and separate issue from the assumption that each individual is 
entitled only to an equal share of both. The conventional view, which both Daniels 
and Dworkin reject, accepts that social goods and distributive goods are finite, but 
argues that the overall budget should be used in a way that will minimize each 
person's expectation of suffering due to illness or disability by distributing these 
goods on the basis of need. If different people have different needs it is not obvious 
why it should not be appropriate to distribute goods unequally, and why to do so 
would involve an objectionable violation of the separateness of persons as Daniel 
supposes. Wolf argues that there is a plausible negative utilitarian alternative to the 
PLA, which is entirely consistent with Daniel's decision procedure, and that it would 
be seriously considered by rational deliberators. This alternative would be a form of 
contractualism, because it could be agreed upon along contractualist lines, and it 
would dictate that social institutions should be arranged and social resources should 
be used in such a way that for each individuaL his or her expectation of suffering due 
to ill health or deprivation is minimized. 406 
This contractual negative utilitarianism (CNU) would not be vulnerable to the same 
objections that are levelled against simple utilitarianism or QALYs because it does 
not interfere with the principle of the 'separateness of persons': it does not aim at 
maximising aggregate or total utility. Rather, CNU aims to minimise each person's 
expectation for disadvantage, irrespective of their complete life share of goods, and it 
therefore implicitly rejects the CLV. The CNU would take 'need' as the only relevant 
criterion for health care distribution in the same way that the conventional view does. 
"" lbid, p226. 
266 
And as has been noted, it is this conventional view that Daniels and Dworkin reject. 
Unlike the CLV, therefore, the CNU would not sanction transfers from those already 
badly off to those quite well off, irrespective of how much a person had already 
enjoyed in their complete life, and it would not therefore justify egalitarian ageism. 
Therefore, '[t]o the extent that Daniels' scheme is different from the CNU, its 
implementation would involve an increase, for each person, in the expectation that she 
will suffer from ill-health and deprivation', 407 and it must seem plausible that the 
CNU would at least be considered by rational deliberators. One might complain that 
this CNU is not fair because it does not give everyone an equal share of lifetime 
goods, but as Wolf argues, it is fair insofar as it might plausibly be chosen from 
behind the veil of ignorance, and it is procedurally fair in that it provides each person 
with an equally low expectation of suffering from disease or deprivation over their 
complete liveS. 408 The fact that it would not be absurd for rational deliberators to 
choose the CNU over the PLA seems to show that the methodological assumption that 
is central to the PLA, regarding the framing of age group justice within a general 
theory of social justice, is open to question. 409 
"I Wolý 'Healthcare access, population ageing, and intergenerational justice,, p23 0 
408 There are other criticisms of CNU that advocates of the position like Wolf would need to address. 
Firstly, one standard criticism is that CNU would seem to argue for the painless killing of those who 
would otherwise suffer. Secondly, it would arguably give an implausible account of the trade off 
between different kinds of healthcare. For example, we want to treat the loss of hearing for individuals 
even though this would take resources away from other healthcare activities which deal with greater 
suffering2 but CNU would seem to have a difficulty with this. 
401 Another alternative to the principle of the PLA that Wolf believes might conceivably be chosen by 
prudential deliberators from behind a veil of ignorance is that of the sufficiency minimum (SM). His 
arguments for this are similar to those presented by Harry Frankfint outlined in chapter 4, who believed 
that the SM would be chosen over Rawls' difference principle. 
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It seems clear, therefore, that not only would rational deliberators not necessarily 
choose Daniels' PLA even given the assumption of the CLV, but that the CLV itself 
would not necessarily be chosen given the nature of Daniels' veil of ignorance. 
(iv) Is the PLA impractical? 
Another criticism of the PLA is not that it would justify ageism, but that its 
commitment to the CLV makes it less practical in light of current demographic trends. 
As Paul Johnson argues, 'the PLA can only provide a guide to the distribution of 
resources between age groups if the treatment by age is consistent for successive birth 
cohorts'. 410 However, the benefit ratios (the ratio of benefits to contributions that 
individuals enjoy) have been falling for successive cohorts in recent decades due to a 
fall in the support ratio of employees to retirees. Indeed, this is one of the principal 
sources of intergenerational conflict, and it may be that because the size of successive 
generations varies in the real world, the PLA consequently fails. It is the very fact that 
rapid ageing has arguably undermined generational equity that motivates defences of 
egalitarian ageism, but it is also this very condition that potentially undermines the 
plausibility of the PLA. 
Daniels argues that the PLA can solve the question of justice between different age 
cohorts by solving the problem ofjustice between age groups first, and that the latter 
will provide us with guidance as to how to solve the former. He believes that because 
each cohort will age through a society's institutions that they therefore each have an 
410 Paul Johnson, 'Population ageing, social security, and the distribution of economic resources, ' in A. 
Harry Lesser (ed. ), Ageing, Autonomy andResources (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), p 155. 
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interest in establishing institutions that solve the age group problem. However, he 
recognises that such institutions must remain stable over time in order to function, 
while in practice they necessarily operate under conditions of uncertainty with 
demographic changes, varying economic growth rates, and technological changes 
affecting productivity. Each of these problems affects the level of resources that can 
be contributed to the income support system by each cohort and these will tend to 
challenge the fairness of the benefit ratioS. 411 
There are essentially two practical methods of providing income support for the old. 
The pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system of state pensions is synchronic in the sense that 
each year's contributions from workers are used as that year's pensions to the retired. 
This synchronic system necessarily involves risk-sharing between age cohorts and an 
acceptance of some degree of variation in the benefit ratios that individuals enjoy. 
However, if we maintain a synchronic PAYG system in the current situation of a 
rising ratio of pensioners to workers, the cohort problem is that while the level of 
contributions will have to remain roughly the same the level of benefits to each 
individual will continue to fall. Rather than 'approximate equality', this will 
necessarily lead to an unequal ratio of benefits to contributions for all future 
participa s. 
412 
41 1 Daniels is using pay-as-you-go (PAYG) scheme which involves transfers between age cohorts 
rather than a Idiachronic' scheme that relies directly on vested savings by each cohort exclusively for 
its own use. 
412 The basic arithmetic of the PAYG system is that with an increase in the number of pensioners, and a 
decline in the number of workers supporting them, the workers would need to continue to contribute at 
the same relative tax rate (taxation to earnings) while the current net transfer of that income will be 
distributed amongst a larger number of recipients, thus providing a reduced level of benefits to each 
individual. 
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The alternative is a diachronic system and involves either separate individuals, or 
each cohort as a whole contributing towards their own separate stock of assets that 
accumulate through their working lives and are then drawn upon and run down in old 
age. Many in the intergenerational equity debate have argued that such a system 
should be adopted as a way of solving the perceived problem that exists today 
whereby the current old age group are drawing upon a larger share of benefits, 
financed by current workers, than will be available for the next cohort when it reaches 
old age. 
Daniels is committed to a PAYG system, and he believes that the practical strategy 
for ensuring each cohort has a stake in such a scheme, and so is committed to 
supporting the relevant institutions that enforce it, is to ensure they enjoy 
dapproximate equality' in benefit ratioS. 413 However, the upper and lower limits of 
approximate equality remain very much a potential source of conflict, and there is no 
overriding principle to determine how much deviation from equality is equitable. One 
might also question why distributive equity between birth cohorts should necessarily 
be defined in terms of equality of benefit ratios. Of course such a definition of equity 
is consistent with Daniels' wider assumption of the CLV which is not violated if each 
person contributes and receives roughly the same in benefits and contributions over 
his complete life. Nevertheless, inter-cohort equity might be defined instead as; 
equality of inputs (each cohort paying the same Proportionate tax rate); equality of 
outputs (each cohort receiving the same Proportionate pension); or equality of welfare 
results (each cohort of retirees having the same standard of living relative to 
413 Some compromises with this principle of approximate equality of benefit ratios will be inevitable in 
order to establish an institution that has the support of all cohorts, but there will be a bias in favour of 
early entrants who will enjoy higher benefits to contributions. 
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workers). 414 It is not obvious that defining inter-cohort equity as equality of benefit 
ratios, (and so justifying the CLV), is more fundamentally fair, or more likely to 
ensure that people are committed to the scheme. 
Daniels suggests two possible strategies to refine benefit ratios to ensure a rough 
equality despite the challenges of demographic shifts. The first is to build a cushion of 
saved benefits while the ratio of workers to retirees is still relatively high, but this 
6solution' is problematic because it is the very fact that the ratio is no longer high 
which is generating claims of unfairness in benefit ratios and fuelling the 
intergenerational equity debate. Daniels' second, and it would seem, principal 
suggested strategy is to alter the current employment and benefit policies that have 
until recently provided incentives for older workers to withdraw from the workforce 
while they are still physically and mentally robust. He argues that: 
pushing older workers out of the work force in periods of unemployment, when there 
are large numbers of young workers seeking employment opportunities, may have 
seemed an acceptable way to ration jobs by age, or it may have seemed an appropriate 
way to make room for better-educated and potentially more productive workers in 
technologically advancing economies. .... These underlying considerations should be 415 
reassessed. 
Daniels' support for abolishing mandatory retirement ages therefore follows the 
contingent argument from efficiency as examined in chapter one of this thesis, and it 
is not therefore a point of principle for him that older workers should not be 
discriminated against. Daniels' suggestion of this strategy also supports Feldman's 
414 johnSon, 'Population ageing, social security, and the distribution of economic resources, ' p158. 
415 Daniels, Justice andJustification, p280. Note, therefore that Daniel's support for abolishing 
mandatory retirement ages follows the contingent argument from efficiency as examined in chapter one 
of this thesis. It is not a point of principle for him that older workers should not be discriminated 
against. 
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argument (also in chapter one) that all spheres of potential age discrimination are in 
fact related. 
However, regardless of whether these practical strategies are sufficient to maintain the 
synchronic method of income provision, there is a further criticism that can be raised 
against Daniel's claim that ratio benefits must remain 'approximately equal'. As we 
have seen, the conditions that Daniels believes are necessary for successive birth 
cohorts and age groups to be adequately committed to an income transfer scheme are; 
a rough equality of benefit ratios; for those ratios to be constant over time; and for that 
scheme to be governed by the IPP. However, benefit ratios may be roughly equal over 
a compete life and yet favour the young. That is to say that over a complete life a 
person might enjoy a rough equality between the benefits he has received to the 
contributions he has made, and yet may nevertheless receive more of those benefits 
during his youth and relatively few in old age. 
(v) Is the PLA incompatible with Rawls' theory of justice? 
it might be argued that Daniels cannot frame the problem of age group justice by 
Rawls' difference principle, because while the frame theory explicitly embraces the 
CLV, Rawls's theory can be understood as having a strong element of synchronic 
concern and therefore does not embrace the CLV. As free and equal citizens Rawls 
believes we each have two moral powers; the capacity for a sense of justice; and a 
capacity for a conception of the good. Citizens are defmed as equal insofar as they are 
all regarded as having the essential minimum degree of the moral powers necessary to 
engage in social cooperation and to take part in society as equal citizens. Rawls is 
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generally considered to be a prioritarian rather than a strict egalitarian and, as we have 
seen, his difference principle permits some inequalities provided they act as incentives 
for the talented and that they be arranged so as to be of greatest benefit to the least 
advantaged. 416 These inequalities are measured by the differences in citizens' 
lif 
. 
417 (reasonable) expectations of primary goods over a complete e The primary social 
goods are the various social conditions and all-purpose means that any rational person 
would want whatever their conception of the good might be, and those who have least 
access are defined as the 'least advantaged group'. 
The index of primary social goods is drawn up by asking what things, are required by 
citizens to maintain their status as free and equal and to be normal, fully cooperating 
members of society. Since the prudential deliberators know that an index of primary 
social goods is part of a theory of justice they will not accept principles unless that 
index secures what they think is required to protect their essential interests. What will 
be required, therefore, is a minimum standard of essential benefits (primary goods or 
resources) necessary for individuals to continue to be fully cooperating members of 
society over their complete lives, and this arguably must include each consecutive 
synchronic moment. 
The fundamental question for this section is whether these primarY social goods are to 
be distributed according to the CLV, in which case the distributive shares would be 
416 Rawls, A Theory ofJustice Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971,1999), p266. 
of course the second principle of Rawlsian justice includes the requirement that social and economic 
inequalities should be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity, and this is of significance to the question of ageist employment practices. 
417 john Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restateinent (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
200 1), p57. (Italics added). 
273 
allocated diachronically, or should they rather be allocated synchronically? We have 
already seen in chapter 5 that Rawls is generally assumed to distribute primary social 
goods diachronically though we also said that a synchronic distribution was quite 
plausible. Nevertheless, the way in which these goods are to be distributed within a 
Rawlsian society would in turn depend upon the way we define the membership of the 
'least advantaged' group in society, i. e. should the individuals who incorporate this 
group be defined as such diachronically or synchronically. Would we define a person 
as being in that group as a measure of their complete life, or could someone be a 
member of that group at one point in their lives and not be a member at some other 
point. The question is important in that if we are to apply priority to the worst off 
diachronically then we would need to allocate benefits to those who, over a complete 
life, are worse off than others. If we take the synchronic view then we need to allocate 
benefits to those who are worse off than others at a temporal moment, regardless of 
how well off they have been in the past or are likely to be in the future. There is no 
reason to assume, as we have seen Derek Parfit does, that 'there is no difference 
between those who would be worse off at a time, and those who would be worse off 
in their lives as a whole. -4 18 There seems nothing absurd about the possibility of 
someone being a member of the synchronically worst off group but not a member of 
the diachronically worst off group. 
if we look at the example below, we can imagine two very old men (members of what 
is often called the 'old old' group) who are now in their last stage of life at T5. Person 
A has been quite well off for most of his life, but towards the end his savings have run 
"'Derek Parfit, 'Equality or Priority'?, ' in Matthew Clayton& Andrew Williams ( . 
), I, a of 
Equality (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002): 81-125, p103. 
eds; 7he de I 
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very low and he becomes very poor. He is now a member of the synchronically worst 
off group. Person B, on the other hand, has been one of the worst off for all his life, 
but he is now slightly better off than he has ever been in the past and not as badly off 
as Person A. Thus, although person B is a member of the diachronically worst off he 
is not a member of the synchronically worst off. Ajqd for person A the position is 
reversed. 
TI T2 T3 T4 T5 
Person A 30 30 30 25 5 
Person B 10 10 10 10 15 
If we think that membership of the 'least advantaged' group is diachronic in nature 
then we would give the not so badly off person B priority over person A, while if we 
think of it as synchronic we would give priority to person A over person B. From a 
diachronic perspective we could imagine that the worst off group comprises those 
persons who on average have an income of 10 or below, or from a synchronic 
perspective to include those who have an income of 10 or below within any particular 
temporal period. This is obviously an important question for distributive justice 
generally, and for the question of egalitarian ageism I have outlined in this thesis. 
To determine who comprises the 'least advantaged' we can examine Rawls, 
understanding of how the index of primary social goods (PSGs) applies to persons. it 
would seem from some readings of 'justice as fairness, that the allocation of primary 
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goods should be in terms of equal amounts over a complete life. However, there are 
several reasons why the index should also have a concern for synchronic allocation. In 
effect Rawls assumes that there should be a social minimum of the PSGs sufficient to 
maintain and exercise our two capacities below which people should not be allowed 
to fall, and he is not concerned, or believes it is not possible, to take account of the 
distribution of the primary goods above that minimum (accept that further increases in 
inequality will not be permitted unless they are to the benefit of the least advantaged). 
To illustrate this we can use Rawls' own discussion about the distribution of health 
and medical care, which itself constitutes a primary social good .4 
19 These are cases 
which are characterised as ones 'in which citizens fall temporarily - for a period of 
time - below the minimum essential capacities for being normal and fully cooperating 
members of society'. 420 
Now Rawls starts out by saying that 'the index of primary goods is an index of 
421 
expectations of these goods over the course of a complete life' , and that these 
expectations are viewed as attached to the relevant social positions within the basic 
structure of society. But this enables the two principles to allow for the differences in 
need arising from illnesses and accident over the normal course of a complete life. 
Therefore; 
Individuals' expectations of primary goods (their index) can be the same ex ante, 
while the goods they actually receive are different ex post, depending on the various 
contingencies - in this case, on the illnesses and accidents that befall then, 422 
411 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatenwnt, pp 171-5. 
420 lbid, pp 171-2. 
421 lbid, p 172. 
422 lbid, p 173. 
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Thus, we see how the medical and health needs of citizens should be allocated to them 
on the basis that they are normal cooperating members of society 'whose capacities 
for a time fall below the minimum'. 423 'There is an imPortant claim I want to make 
about this. The ex ante distribution would in principle follow the CLV, and so would 
distribute goods (based upon the principle of priority) across a life. But, because 
Rawls' theory takes urgency of one's claims as morally important, the ex post 
distribution would be based upon a synchronic concern for the temporal needs of 
persons. Social justice would thus recognise urgency as pertaining to those needs 
whose satisfaction should be given synchronic priority. What this also means is that 
the membership of the least advantaged group would be constituted by those who are 
worse off at a time rather than those who, on balance, would be worse off over a 
complete life. The difference principle covers those needs of persons up to the point at 
which further provision would lower the expectation of the least advantaged, and in 
this way we can fix the level of the social miniMUM. 
424 Once again the same 
(diachronic) expectations ex ante are comparable with widely divergent benefits 
received depending upon differences in need ex post. 
We see the importance of using a political conception of the citizen as having a public 
identity over a complete life as fully cooperating members of society, because the 
representatives behind the veil of ignorance must view the various claims, 
including those we make in all phases of life from childhood to old age - from the 
point of view of one person who is to live through all phases of life. The idea is that 
the claims of those in each phase derive from how we would reasonably balance those 
claims once we viewed ourselves as living through all phases of life. 
425 
423 Ibid. 
424 See J. Rawls, .4 Theory ofJustice, section 44. 
421 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p 174. 
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This may sound like Daniels, and indeed, Rawls refers to Daniels in a footnote, but 
what Rawls' examination of people's various claims is certainly not committed to is 
the CLV. It does not use a 'frame theory' of the set share of 'fair' diachronic benefits 
and then view justice only as a matter of how prudence would distribute those 
resources within a complete life. Rawls talks about 'a balance' of claims, and that 
suggests that older persons will have legitimate claims for resources which compete 
with claims for the same goods by younger persons. Thus, the question of justice 
between the young and old remains an inter-personal rather than a purely intra- 
personal one. Rawls argues that the strengths of claims to medical care should be 
regarded 'as tied to maintaining our capacity to be a normal member of society and 
restoring that capacity once it falls below the minimum required 9.426 
We might also note that if the theory of moral psychology outlined in chapter 2 
(section 2) is sound then it too has important implications for the Rawlsian form of 
contractual justice. If prudent agents deliberated upon the just principles of justice 
from behind a veil of ignorance, while they were at the same time aware of the 
divided nature of their self-interest, then it is not absurd to suggest that they would 
choose principles that ensured a level of synchronic well-being suff-icient for 
individuals to maintain their capacity to be normal members of society. This 
possibility seems to be strengthened when one remembers Rawls, own strains of 
commitment requirement that stipulates that the principles Of justice on which 
individuals agree within the original position must be ones they can remain committed 
to once they are put into effect. And it would seem 
difficult for many older people to 
426 Ibid. 
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remain committed to distributive principles that left them destitute during the 
synchronic period of their old age. 
Thus, someone may have required benefits all his life to be maintained at the 
minimum required, and yet he would still have a legitimate claim to assistance when 
very old in order that his fundamental capacities and highest order goals in life be 
protected. That is to say those capacities to exercise a conception of the good life and 
to have a sense of justice. So if we were to ask whether the ex ante diachronic 
consideration would constrain the ex post synchronic consideration, a condition 
necessary for the CLV generally and for both Dworkin's and Daniels' theories, the 
answer from Rawls would be no. My claim therefore is that while Daniels and 
Dworkin apply prudence to the internal allocation of a fair share of diachronic 
resources in one life, Rawls' maximin egalitarianism is concerned with the 
relationships that exist between lives on a synchronic basis. The diachronic ex ante 
distribution would merely be a guideline, but it could not constrain the synchronic ex 
post distribution, or else this would conflict with the understanding of who constitute 
the membership of the least advantaged group. 
What, if anything Rawls would have to say about egalitarian ageism is not strictly 
relevant to this chapter. What is important is whether Daniels can frame his theory of 
justice between age groups with Rawls' difference principle. For him to be able to do 
this, Rawls' difference principle would have to operate diachronically, and only then 
could Daniels embrace the CLV on which the PLA is premised. However, if the 
membership of the 'worst off group' can plausibly be synchronic, then the difference 
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principle cannot operate in a purely diachronic way, and Daniels' version of the PA is 
flawed as a result. 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
The PA is a logical adjunct to the CLV and has been adopted by two of the most 
prominent contemporary political philosophers. I have argued that both versions of 
the PA have ageist implications, but while those implications might be fairly explicit 
in Dworkin's version, they would be unintended within that which Daniels espouses. I 
have also argued that prudential deliberators, from behind a veil of ignorance, would 
not necessarily accept the CLV, and that Rawls' theory of justice in fact has a 
significant element of synchronic concern for the needs of citizens. Arguably, 
therefore, the difference principle is not committed to the CLV. If this claim is sound, 
then it provides another reason for thinking Daniels' PLA is flawed. 
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Chapter 7: Towards a non-ageist social equality 
The purpose of this final chapter is to examine the non-ageist and anti-ageist 
implications of the theory of democratic egalitarianism (DE) outlined in chapter 4, 
and of its principle that we should equalise social relations (ESR). Not only would DE 
not permit the egalitarian ageism we have shown to be a consequence of distributive 
luck egalitarianisn4 but it would also actively challenge either form of ageism 
wherever it existed. It is therefore my argument in this chapter that anti-ageists should 
at the same time be advocates of this form of social equality. The sections within this 
chapter argue that the values that are thought to underline the CLV can either be 
effectively challenged or else incorporated within DE. It is important to note here, 
though, that DE remains only a sketch of a theory, and that further refinement will be 
necessary. 
7.1 DE, 'fairness', and the anti-ageist ethic 
Chapter 4 outlined the major questions to which distributive egalitarians typically 
attempt to fmd answers, and the way a particular theory addresses these questions 
determines whether or not it will condone ageist social policies. The fundamental 
question is the unit for which a theory has egalitarian concern, and in this regard LE 
embraces the CLV- It does so for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, diachronic 
equality is perceived to be the fairest distribution because it provides equal 
opportunity for everyone to make of their lives what they wish. Secondly, the CLV 
protects the principle of personal responsibility and ensures that individuals are held 
fully accountable for their choices. The responsible are prevented from having to 
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carry the costs of other people's idleness and foolish choices, and this provides strong 
incentives for individuals to be economically prudent and productive. A combination 
of 'fair' diachronic equality and personal responsibility is mutually supportive 
because the former is maintained by requiring people to carry the costs of their own 
choices. Any theory that challenges the CLV must respond to these two justifications, 
and in this section I start by challenging the idea that we should adopt the view on the 
grounds that it is fair. I then argue in the following sections that we do not need to be 
committed to the CLV in order to protect the principle of personal responsibility. 
The commitment to the CLV justifies ageist policies against the old, but it does not 
actually require them, and I have outlined these implications in section 4.5.427 
Nevertheless, once an egalitarian theory is committed to the CLV it would be a 
logical step for it to adopt a prudential analogy (PA) as an adjunct to this, and in 
chapter 6 we saw how a combination of the CLV and the PA plays an integral part 
within the theories of Dworkin and Damiels. A PA seeks to illustrate how a rational 
individual with an equal complete life share of benefits would distribute that share 
intra-personally across his or her life, and to determine how rational individuals 
would insure themselves against poverty or ill health and how much they would save 
for old age. The PA is built upon the premise that fairness and justice should be 
guided by prudence, but it nevertheless leads to ageist social policies. 
I have argued that what is needed to challenge ageism is a principled position that 
both defends anti-ageist policies on non-contingent moral and Political grounds, and 
which is consistent with egalitarian political theory. The anti-ageist ethic that I have 
427 1 have also pointed out that the CLV mightjustify discrimination against theyoung as much as it 
does against the old. 
282 
defended begins with an account of the divided nature of a person's self-interest in the 
sense that each individual has both synchronic and diachronic interests. This 
distinction between the different interests of persons is not normally made. Rather, 
people's interests are often assumed to be only diachronic in nature, and this 
assumption helps support the CLV. Nevertheless, it has been my claim that each 
person has particular fundamental synchronic interests that are not reducible to the 
diachronic, and that political morality ought to satisfy these irrespective of a person's 
past well-being or their chronological age. Policies that do not respect the 
fundamental synchronic interests of the old are ageist and wrongful. This then 
constitutes the anti-ageist ethical position. A further claim might be that policies 
which neglect or violate those synchronic interests during any part of a person's life 
would thereby deny their personhood at that time, and it is this latter notion that 
philosophers like Oliver Leaman are appealing to when they claim that ageism is (no 
less vicious a form of discrimination than sexism and racism. 9428 
The response of the anti-ageist to the fairness justification of the CLV, therefore, is to 
point out that a distribution that is understood only in diachronic terms will cater only 
for diachronic interests, and this will override and ignore the synchronic interests of 
persons. However, the problem for anti-ageists is that because diachronic and 
synchronic interests are irreducible there is no way to determine which should take 
priority in any particular situation. It is the synchronic interests of the old that anti- 
ageists wish to protect, but by itself this free-standing ethical principle that synchronic 
interests have moral weight may not be sufficient to successfully overrule all 
egalitarian justifications of ageism. And it is for this reason that part of my aim in this 
4211 Oliver Leaman, 'Justifying Ageism, ' in A. Harry Lesser (ed. ), Agejng,, 4tdonoM andResources 
(Aldershot: Shgate, 1999), p 187. 
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thesis is too locate that ethic within a broader political egalitarian theory, that of DE, 
because it is only in that way that we can consistently pursue non-ageist public 
policies. 
The core value of DE is a normative view concerning the nature of the social relations 
that exist between citizens at any moment rather than any particular distribution of 
benefits, and the relevant questions for the advocates of this position are to ask what 
social, political and economic arrangements are compatible with that conception. 
429 
Advocates of social equality have argued that it is more fundamental than distributive 
equality, and that the latter should be constrained by the former. Thus, distributive 
inequality is only significant for DE to the extent that it creates an inequality of 
power. 430 
However, while distributive equality would seem easy to measure, equalising social 
relations seems a far more complex proposition. Nevertheless, as noted in chapter 4, 
one way in which we can make sense of the principle would be through the 
application of an interpersonal test similar to G. A. Cohen's concept of comprehensive 
jU tif C ti n. 43 SIa01 That concept requires that in order for a policy argument to be 
comprehensively justified it pass a test that 'asks whether the argument could serve as 
a justification of a mooted policy when uttered by any member of society to any other 
429 Samuel Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism?, PhdosphyandPublic Affairs 31 (2003): 5-39, p27. 
430 See, for example, Richard Arneson, 'Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, ' Ethics 110(2000): 
339-349, p340. 
43 1 G. A. Cohen, 'Incentives, Inequality, and Community, ' in Stephen Darwal I (ed. ) Equal Freedom: 
Selected Tanner Lectures on Human Values (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995): 
331-398. Anderson adopts the concept of comprehensive justification to only apply to the economy, 
but the way Cohen presents it suggests it would be relevant to any social context. 
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member. 9,432 Any justification of age discrimination would only be justified if it 
passed this interpersonal test. Discrimination based upon cultural ageism would 
obviously not be justified, but the importance of certain fundamental synchronic 
interests would also mean that age discrimination based on arguments for diachronic 
equality might also be unjustified in this comprehensive way. A mooted policy that 
had the effect of harming the synchronic interests of older persons would not receive 
their support when it was proposed to them, and it would not therefore be 
comprehensively justified. The CLV and its justification of ageism would not 
therefore be compatible with the political and social ideal of DE. 
But that the test of comprehensive justification would not be passed in this instance 
serves to underline the fact that if an ageist policy were implemented it would 
manifest itself by creating conditions of social inequality between citizens. It is these 
conditions of social inequality that the test exists to prevent. However, the only form 
of discriminatory policies that are likely to be permitted by DE and its interpersonal 
test are those that benefit the synchronic interests of all contemporaneous citizens. 
One example of this kind of discrimination noted above is that of the flu vaccinations 
that are offered only to the old. 
I have argued that the CLV has been justified on the grounds that it is fair, and I have 
presented the responses to this claim from the anti-ageist ethical position as well as 
the democratic egalitarian interpersonal test. However, even if we accepted that the 
CLV was underpinned by the value of fairness there is another argument that may still 
weaken the plausibility of the CLV. Jonathan Wolff argues that fairness is not the 
432 Jbid, p348. 
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only important egalitarian value, but rather that it is only one part of a social 
egalitarian ethoS. 433 Wolff outlines a social ethos that incorporates the dual values of 
respect and fairness which he believes best captures the essence of egalitarianism, and 
he acknowledges that the two values may sometimes conflict. He claims further that 
other egalitarian values like respect and self-respect would be compromised by the 
adoption of what he calls a monist or lexical priority theory that views fairness as 
either the only or the priority value. And he characterises the LE version of 
distributive egalitarianism as just such a monist theory. However, if fairness is not the 
only value that an egalitarian theory ought to protect then there is reason for certain 
forms of distributive unfairness to be tolerated to the extent that they help to preserve 
a society of respect for all. 434 To guide policy by this ethos would again seem to 
require some intuitive balancing because there is no overriding principle to determine 
which value has priority. But to insist on 'fairness' alone would, on Wolfs view at 
least, not be an adequately egalitarian approach. Therefore, the requirement that we 
ensure the social bases of self-respect for individuals, and the requirement that 
people's fundamental basic needs should never be neglected, both mean that a certain 
amount of inequality of complete life benefits ought to be tolerated. The CLV would 
be violated by both requirements. 
Thus, there are three arguments against the fairness justification of the CLV: the anti- 
ageist ethic that emphasises fundamental synchronic interests; the normative principle 
that social relations should be equal (expressed through a test of universal 
justification); and the claim that fairness is not the only fundamental value of the 
433 jonathan Wolff , 'Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos,, Ph osop d Pubic ff 27 (1998): 98-122. . 
11 hY an 1A airs 
434 lbid4 p 119. 
286 
egalitarian ethos. However, we now need to examine DE in more depth to see how it 
recognises the importance of individual responsibility, and how it does so without 
embracing the CLV. And for this we must first look at the form of economic 
distribution that DE would defend. 
7.2 DE and cconomic distribution 
In chapter 5 we found that within distributive egalitarianism there are two alternatives 
to the diachronic CLV: the synchronic: view; and the hybrid view. The synchronic 
view is morally problematic because if it we compensate inequality at each temporal 
moment then we weaken the requirement that individuals be personally responsible 
for the success of their lives. The hybrid view (combining both synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions), which I have argued is the most morally plausible view, is 
nevertheless problematic in a practical sense because there is no overriding principle 
to determine whether the diachronic or synchronic distribution should take 
precedence. Again we seem to be faced with the need for an intuitive balancing that is 
always messy. The hybrid distributive view parallels the divided nature of a person's 
self-interest in which the synchronic and diachronic are irreducible to one another, as 
well as Wolff s claim that egalitarianism requires the two potentially conflicting 
values of fairness and respect. 
However, it is also the hybrid model of distribution that I believe is closest to the 
aspirations of DE. DE, as a form of social rather than purely distributive equality, 
requires the social relations between persons to be equal at each temporal moment as 
well as between their complete lives. The issue is to find a coherent distributive 
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system that reflects such social equality. We might first look at the distributive 
implications suggested by the irreducibly dual nature of our self-interest, and of the 
anti-ageist ethic. The anti-ageist ethic involves acknowledging the moral force of each 
person's fundamental synchronic interests, and so requires at least the basic needs of 
the old to be provided by society regardless of each person's complete life share. At 
the same time the anti-ageist ethic would not condone an exclusively synchronic 
distribution because the diachronic interests of a person must also be protected and 
should not to be overruled by her synchronic interests. As we noted in chapter 2, 
many of our diachronic interests rely for their fulfilment on the precondition that we 
can plan the development of those interests over time. The very fact of having 
diachronic interests, therefore, presupposes a capacity for personal responsibility. And 
an exclusive concern for synchronic distributions would undermine the ability of 
citizens to plan and develop their diachronic goals. 
It is my claim that Anderson's account of DE provides the social conditions necessary 
to meet the distributive implications of both dimensions of our self-interest. The 
moral force of the synchronic interests of persons are represented by Anderson's first 
desiderata for egalitarian principles which is to identify certain goods to which all 
citizens must have effective access over the course of their whole 
liveS. 435 On the 
other hand, in recognition of the importance of personal responsibility Anderson 
makes it another specffic desideraturn for any adequate theory of egalitarian justice 
that its principles 'should uphold the responsibility of individuals for their own 
435 Elizabeth S. Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337, p314. 
Anderson actually lists five desiderata for egalitarian theories, of which the two discussed here are the 
first and fourth respectively. However, as Anderson's other three desiderata are not directly relevant to 
this discussion I will refer to the two I discuss as the first and second. 
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lives'. 436 This latter desideraturn would also in part acknowledge the importance of 
incentives for people to work and thereby provide the tax revenue to fund the 
synchronic benefits necessary to ensure that each citizen remains above a sufficiency 
minimum. DE would not allow exclusively synchronic distributions to take 
precedence over diachronic for the reason that such a policy could not be 
comprehensively justified. If a policy was proposed that would repeatedly compensate 
the irresponsible for the losses they incurred for bad option luck at each temporal 
moment, then those citizens that took responsibility for their lives would not readily 
endorse it. Such a policy would reward the lazy and culpably irresponsible, and would 
not be compatible with incentives for people to be productive. 
However, in order to fulfil the two desiderata to which she is conunitted, and which 
represent both the synchronic and diachronic interests of persons, Anderson believes 
that democratic egalitarians should adopt a version of the capabilities metric. 437 In the 
following two sections I examine first how the capabilities metric fulfils the 
desiderata that citizens should have synchronic access to certain goods throughout 
their lives, and secondly, how that metric also fulfils the diachronic concern that 
people have responsibility for the success of their lives. 
7.3 DE, capabilities and synchronic well-being 
In line with her first desideratum, Anderson argues that certain functionings are of 
special egalitarian concern because they constitute the necessary social conditions of 
436 Ibid. 
437 lbid, p316. 
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freedom for individuals. And so the private and public goods necessary to facilitate 
those functionings should be provided to individuals as a matter ofiustice. Moreover, 
because Anderson believes that the victims of bad option luck should continue to have 
access to these goods despite their earlier poor or unlucky decisions, equal access to 
these particular goods should be guaranteed over the complete lives of citizens. I have 
argued above that the capabilities metric is synchronic in its application because the 
functionings it guarantees have a synchronic dimension. 
But what particular functioning sets would a non-ageist DE guarantee access to? As 
we noted earlier, one problem of the capabilities metric is how we determine those 
functionings that justice requires society to supply. However, we have recognised the 
importance of the fundamental synchronic interests each person has to having their 
basic needs met, to autonomy, and to the social bases of self-respect. It would seem, 
therefore, that any plausible account of equality within the space of capabilities 
should include at least these three. Moreover, the 'social conditions of freedom' that 
Anderson outlines involve two conditions; those conditions that are necessary to 
enable individuals to avoid oppressive social relationships, and those necessary for 
them to function as equals in a democratic state. 438 If it makes sense that we might be 
oppressed at one point in our lives and not at another then it also makes sense to think 
of these social conditions of freedom as having a synchronic dimension. Because 
Anderson is seeking to defend those who have suffered bad option luck it is precisely 
because the capability metric does have a synchronic dimension that she adopts it for 
DE. 
411 lbid, p313. 
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Anderson believes that for the social conditions of freedom to be met there must be a 
guaranteed access for individuals to capabilities both within the public sphere such as 
political rights but also within such institutions of civil society as hospitals and public 
and private 'enterprises engaged in production'. This involves a right of citizens not 
only to participate in the political sense but also within the economy, and to not be 
discriminated against within healthcare or the workplace. As these social conditions 
are guaranteed over the complete life such rights do not diminish as citizens age. 
Anderson maintains that any individuals that are excluded from these institutions of 
civil society or segregated within them, or who are sub ect to discrimination on the 
basis of an ascribed social identity by such institutions, have been effectively 
relegated to a second-class citizenshi P. 439 This discrimination would be incompatible 
with DE, or the ideal of social equality that it gives expression to, and these 
requirements would then place constraints on the type of distributive system that 
would be permissible. 
Anderson distinguishes three aspects of individual functioning: functioning as a 
human being, which involves having one's basic biological needs fulfilled; 
fiinctioning as a participant in a system of cooperative production, which provides a 
qualified right to worthwhile employment; and functioning as a citizen of a 
democratic state, which guarantees one's political rights and liberties. To function as a 
human being involves those basic needs that sustain biological existence and include 
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and access to what Anderson calls the basic 
conditions of autonomy (i. e. knowledge of one's circumstances and options, the 
ability to deliberate, and the self-confidence to think and judge for oneself). Such a 
439 lbid, p316. 
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requirement would protect the basic needs of older citizens against the justification of 
certain ageist policies. To function as a citizen not only includes political rights but 
also the ability to appear in public without shame and not being ascribed outcast 
status. Part of the necessary preconditions for such functioning would be the 
challenging of negative cultural stereotypes and would give justification to the 
advocacy strategy outlined in chapter 3. To participate within a system of cooperative 
production involves having access to meaningful employment, and to the training and 
education necessary to develop one's talents, whatever one's age. 440 
7.4 DE, anti-ageism, and personal responsibility 
How then does DE fulfil a concern for synchronic well-being and at the same time 
ensure personal responsibility? As we have seen, DE guarantees what amounts to a 
sufficiency minimum (SM) involving effective access to the social conditions of 
freedom to all citizens over their entire liveS. 44 1 Thus, while LE only insures citizens 
against certain kinds of loss (i. e. disadvantages that are the result of brute bad luck), 
DE only insures citizens against the loss of certain kinds of goods (those necessary to 
maintain equal social relations, or the social conditions of freedom). As far as the state 
is concerned, the two alternative policies of LE and DE may turn out to cost 
" Anderson believes that citizens should regard every product of the economy as jointly produced by 
everyone working together. This involves recognising that those that occupy more productive roles in 
the economy owe that productivity partly to the fact that they have been freed by others from the need 
to spend their time in low skilled tasks. Such reflections undermine the notion that workers at the top 
make more of a contribution to the economy, and so deserve a far greater share of the product, and this 
sets limits to the levels of tolerable inequality. 
'"I We have previously noted in chapter 5 that many people might criticise the SM by asking why 
inequalities beyond a threshold are not deemed to be morally undesirable per se. The response of DE is 
twofold. Firstly, economic equality has been an objective of very few egalitarian social movements 
from the suffragettes to those promoting the rights of the disabled. Secondly, economic inequality is 
only important to the extent that it can be translated into inequality of power, and the one does not 
presuppose the other. 
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approximately the same, but critics will argue that maintaining the SM is too costly 
for those who have been prudent. This is because the prudent must part with some of 
their income in order to contribute to the safety net for the culpably irresponsible. 442 
The SM might thus be said to be too expensive because it does not sufficiently 
encourage personal responsibility, and there are two reasons why an adequate political 
and moral theory should encourage that moral virtue; firstly, responsibility has 
intrinsic value in itself (i. e. it is good if people show responsibility for their lives); and 
secondly, personal responsibility is thought to be necessary from a practical 
perspective in order to prevent the indigent from bankrupting the state. 
In response to this criticism, advocates of DE would argue that personal responsibility 
for the success of one's life is in fact respected within Anderson's account of DE. It 
does so because DE does not indemnify individuals against all losses that result from 
imprudent behaviour; it only guarantees an agreed set of capabilities that are 
necessary for a person to function as a free and equal citizen, and to avoid social and 
cultural oppression. If, as a consequence of their free choices, individuals lose their 
access to capabilities over and above the basic guarantees then they carry the costs 
themselves. 
Another strategy that DE adopts for promoting the responsibility of individuals is that 
it only guarantees access to the SM, individuals still have to exercise responsible 
agency in order to achieve most of these functionings. This means that people 
442 This point is made by Richard L Arneson, 'Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, ' Elhics I 10 
(2000): 339-349, p347. Arneson defends what he calls Responsibility-Catering Prioritarianism (RCP) 
which he believes is immune to the criticisms that Anderson levels at LE, but is morally more 
compelling than her account of DE. However, his elaboration of RCP is too brief to make a fair 
comparison with the DE defence of anti-ageism outlined in this thesis. 
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continue to have an incentive to act prudently, to work and invest wisely, if they wish 
to have more comfortable lives. And most people will. Moreover, while each able- 
bodied adult would have a guaranteed access to a decent income, there may 
nevertheless be conditions within the community necessary for her to fulfil in order to 
access that income, and these obligations would be such things as functioning either 
within the private sphere of the family (i. e. bringing up children) or the public sphere 
of the workplace. Thus, DE guarantees not actual levels of functioning but effective 
access to those levels, and individuals can choose to function at a higher level if they 
wish by working harder for more income. 443 DE is therefore consistent with 
constructing the incentive structure required to support a modem economy, which, in 
turn, is needed in order to promote the production and growth necessary to provide 
egalitarian guarantees in the first place. Furthermore, the DE guarantees are not 
necessarily effective access to equal levels of functioning, rather they are merely 
levels sufficient to stand as an equal in society. In some areas of functioning 
distributive equality is required '[flor example, each citizen is entitled to the same 
number of votes in an election as everyone else'. 
444 On the other hand, equal 
diachronic shares of impersonal resources are not necessary. 
Nevertheless, critics might still argue that these conditions are insufficient to ensure 
an adequate level of personal responsibility. The reason that Anderson's theory 
guarantees access to a set of capabilities is to ensure that those who make foolish 
choices in their lives do not pay a price disproportionately heavy and end up destitute. 
She does not believe many people would find this just. However, the question arises 
443 lbid, p318. 
"" Ibid. 
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as to what society should do about those who are incorrigibly irresponsible. David 
Sobel notes that DE guarantees 'effective access to the social conditions of freedom to 
all citizens regardless of how imprudently they conduct their lives', 445 and that this 
means that those societal guarantees must be forever owed to whoever lacks such 
capacities at any time and for whatever reason. 446 Sobel imagines the example of 
someone who has lost her legs through some 'crazy risk' and who now repeatedly 
sells the wheelchair provided by the state on the black market, and then presumably 
squanders the money. However, each time she sells the means to her mobility she 
again lacks that capability, and this, Sobel complains, means that society is repeatedly 
obliged to replace that wheelChair. 447 
One way that DE might avoid this implausible obligation would be to extend the use 
of the principle of universal justification, beyond the context of the economy to which 
Anderson restricts it, to include all contexts of social relations as I suggested above. It 
might be possible for those who have suffered bad option luck to formulate a 
plausible argument in favour of a policy that ensured their basic synchronic needs 
continue to be met, but it is less likely that the culpably irresponsible wheelchair user 
could plausibly construct an argument in defence of a policy that ensured that she 
have a replacement wheelchair each time she sold the last one. Ultimately, therefore, 
"' Anderson, P326. 
446 David Sobel, Comment on Anderson, 
44' What Sobcl may have overlooked, at least as far as his example is concerned, is that under DE, 
citizens refrain from making intrusive moralisingjudgemcnts about how others ought to have used 
their capabilities (and the means to enjoy them that arc provided by the community), but that '[tjhe sole 
exception to this principle concerns criminal conduct' (Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? 
p327). The repeated selling of a community provided wheelchair on the black-market would not only 
be culpably iffesponsible, it might also be plausibly deemed criminal. One might suggest that in this 
example, and many others we could think of, DE would not be obligated to replace the squandered 
itcm. 
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this extended use of the principle of universal justification would involve the making 
of moralising judgments. But these moral judgements would not be those made by 
government officials on the basis that a disadvantage is the result of either option or 
brute luck, rather they would be made on the basis that few of one's fellow citizens 
would think such a policy is justified. There comes a point at which citizens could no 
longer justify a policy allowing the culpably iffesponsible to squander the 
community's resources. We might say that beyond that point would be to tolerate 
abusive social relations, or social relations in which some citizens took a disrespectful 
advantage of others. Where this point actually falls in any particular case might be a 
matter of contention, but although this implication is perhaps vague and unsatisfactory 
it may be the subject of further research. 
Another strategy that DE theory may follow in regard to ensuring people take 
responsibility for, and carry the costs of, their choices while at the same time 
guaranteeing the SM of capabilities, is to require that people internalise those costs 
wherever possible. Thus, for example, while society's obligations 'to provide 
healthcare is unconditional and cannot be rescinded' ; 448 it would nevertheless seem 
wrong to make prudent non-smokers pay more for universal health insurance because 
so many fools smoke. DE would therefore require individuals to internalise the costs 
of irresponsible behaviour ex ante, and yet guarantee medical care as and when it is 
needed. As Anderson notes; 
If the costs of some particularly dangerous activity are high, and if the activity is not 
performed in one's capacity as a participant in the productive system, then justice 
permits a tax on that activity to cover the extra costs of medical care for those injured 
by engaging in it. A tax on each pack of cigarettes, adjusted to cover the medical costs 
448 Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality? ' p329. 
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of treating smokers, would force smokers to absorb the extra costs of their 
behavioUr. 449 
One ftirther criticism of the SM is that irrespective of the level of responsibility shown 
by individuals, there will always come a point at which guaranteeing a sufficiency 
level of functioning to each member of society will become too expensive. Richard 
Arneson, for example, argues that when misfortune strikes it is simply an unfortunate 
fact that some people either cannot be sustained at the threshold level no matter what 
resources are invested, or else only at exorbitant expense to the commUnity. 
450 one 
such example here is that when individuals get increasingly old and infirm it will no 
longer be possible to guarantee certain freedoms. Arneson believes that it is 
inescapable in such situations to do otherwise than make morally sensitive cost - 
benefit analysis in order to determine whether maintaining an individual at the 
guaranteed level (or some specified distance from it) is morally worthwhile. The 
problem for Anderson's account of DE is that it rejects the use of moralising 
judgements, and for that reason it is inhospitable to such analysis. Nevertheless, the 
problem may be addressed to some extent by the extension of the principle of 
universal justification, and the application of that test within particular social contexts. 
I will examine this further in a section below that discusses healthcare. 
"9 lbid, p328. 'Mis strategy, and the SM of capabilities it supports, is of course subject to the criticism 
that it is perfectionist about the possible conceptions of the good. Why should smokers not enjoy cheap 
cigarettes and have less medical care? However, as Anderson argues, this objection fiLils to appreciate 
the distinction between what people want and what other people are obligated to give them. The basic 
duty of citizens acting through the state is not to provide them with what makes them happy but to 
secure for them the conditions of freedom, and these are facilitated by a set of neutral goods or 
capabilities that citizens need in order to function as equals over the course of their entire lives. 
"" Richard I Arneson, 'Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism,, Elhics 110 (2000): 339-349. 
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7.5 DE, capabilities and cultural ageism 
In chapter 31 examined the concept of culture which I characterised as a socially 
constructed lens through which we perceive ourselves and others. Many of the beliefs 
and values that we hold are drawn unreflectively from prevailing social norms, and if 
those norms contain prejudice we may not be readily conscious of that fact. Cultural 
oppression involves the cultural formation of negative judgements and attitudes about 
the moral and social worth of others or oneself Ilese negative attitudes or 
stereotypes are social constructs that both identify and defme the moral and social 
worth of older persons, which are then internalised by both those that oppress as well 
as the victims themselves. Such negative cultural stereotypes may be used as reasons 
to restrict access to healthcare or income distribution to the old and even strip them of 
their right to vote. Moreover, they may even be assumed to militate against the 
seriousness of more directly harmful and oppressive forms of discrimination. While 
racism and sexism involve negative cultural attitudes that oppress individuals over the 
course of their complete lives, and so violate the diachronic interests of blacks and 
women, cultural ageism involves negative attitudes towards the old and act against the 
synchronic interests of older persons. In this respect at least cultural ageism is 
intrinsically wrong in the same way as either racism or sexism. 
A purely distributive theory of equality would not necessarily challenge negative 
cultural stereotypes, and as Kymlicka points out, it is the mistake of many liberals to 
believe that cultural oppression could not survive under conditions of economic 
equality. Indeed, Scheffler has argued that Dworkin's ideal of equality, as it is applied 
to questions of distribution, is not itself a model of social and political equality and is 
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in fact compatible with social hierarchy. 451 Moreover, G. A. Cohen notes that if the 
Dworkinian state failed to treat its citizens with equal respect and concern 'then no 
analogous duty falls on individuals. It is not the individual's duty to treat everyone 
(relatives, friends, and strangers alike) with equal respect and concern. A52 Thus, even 
if economic justice prevailed there is no obvious reason that negative cultural 
stereotypes should not do so as well. 
In order for society to create a culturally just environment these negative moral 
judgements and stereotypes should be challenged, and as I argued in chapter 3, this 
can best be achieved by pursuing an 'advocacy strategy'. Unne the neutral state 
laissez faire strategy the advocacy strategy can challenge inegalitarian cultural 
practices and beliefs publicly and actively and engage in cultural reform, while at the 
same time not interfering with personal expression in the way the censorship strategy 
would. The advocacy strategy seeks to persuade rather than coerce individuals, and 
does so through economic, educational and ideological activities and would provide 
active financial support for associations and groups striving to combat inegalitarian 
cultural prejudices like ageism. Groups such as Age Concern. 
As DE seeks to equalise social relations between citizens it would certainly challenge 
the cultural prejudices and stereotypes that constitute cultural ageisnL Anderson 
points out that one advantage of using Sen's capabilities metric is that it allows us to 
" Scheffler, 'What is Egalitarianism? ' p34. Note that Scheffler is careful to point out that Dworkin 
stands out amongst luck egalitarians in the sense that he does in fact attempt to situate his distributive 
theory within a broader social and political ideal. See Samuel Scheffler, 'Equality as the Virtue of 
Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin, ' Philosophy and PublicAffairs 31(2003): 199-206, p204. 
452 G. A. Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), pI 64. Cohen describes Dworkin's conception of equality as 'statocentric'. 
Scheffler describes it as an 'administrative conception' for the same reasons. 
299 
analyse injustices in regard to matters other than simply that of the distribution of 
resources and other divisible goods. 453 For example, Anderson notes that, 
Feminists work to overcome the internal obstacles of choice - of self-abnegation, lack 
of confidence and low self-esteem that women often face from internalising norms of 
femininity. At the same time gays and lesbians seek the ability to publicly reveal their 
identities without shame or fear which requires significant changes in social relations 
of contempt and hostility, and the disabled aim to reconfigure public spaces to make 
them accessible. No mere redistribution of divisible resources can secure the freedom 
these groups seek. 454 
Very often what is needed to create social equality is the challenging of the social 
norms that convey the negative cultural judgements that support these forms of 
oppression, and for this reason DE would embrace the advocacy strategy. 
7.6 DE and positive discrimination 
One way in which negative social norms and cultural stereotypes can be challenged is 
by positively discriminating in favour of those people who are normally discriminated 
against, and positive discrimination in favour of blacks and women is normally 
justified in this way. Such positive discrimination would be justified by DE as a way 
of improving the social relations between citizens in'the long term just as it would 
also be justified as a way of countering negative ageist cultural stereotypes, 
particularly in the field of employment. However, the efficacy of positive 
discrimination within the other social contexts addressed by this thesis, of healthcare, 
income support, and voting rights, is less obvious. 
453 Anderson, p320. 
454 Ibid. 
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This is not to say that all age discrimination in those other contexts is wrong. But any 
discrimination, positive or otherwise, would be wrong to the extent that it violated or 
neglected the fundamental interests of individuals to have their basic needs met and to 
have access to the social bases of self-respect. These are interests that positive 
discrimination is motivated to protect and develop in the long term, while cultural 
ageism, like sexism and racism, undermines these interests. 
7.7 Anti-ageist DE in context 
Thus far this chapter has argued that DE and the principle that we should equalise 
social relations provides us with a philosophical position from which both cultural and 
egalitarian ageism can be challenged. I now return briefly to each of the four social 
contexts outlined in chapter I to examine how DE would defend an anti-ageist 
position in a practical way. 
(i) Healthcare 
As noted above, culturally oppressive stereotypes do influence the thinking of those 
who are involved with decision-making within the allocation of health care. However, 
the FIA, the QALY, and the CLV each justify the restriction of such resources to the 
old, which means we can never be certain of the degree to which the discrimination in 
any situation is motivated by cultural ageism or egalitarian considerations. However, 
if an advocacy strategy were initiated that debunked negative cultural stereotypes 
about the moral and social worth of older patients, then it might become easier to 
determine the influence of the purely egalitarian arguments for ageism. 
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The principle that we should equalise social relations, and that we should respect the 
synchronic interests of all persons, whatever their age, would, I suggest, mean DE 
would support what Dan Brock called the 'conventional view' of healthcare; that 
access to various treatments should be based upon medical need alone and free at the 
point of use . 
455 Age, therefore, would not be permitted to influence rationing 
decisions because everyone has the same fundamental synchronic interests that 
demand equal protection. Following the concept of comprehensive justification, 
imagine the CLV, FIA or QALY policy arguments having to phrase the argument for 
an ageist health policy that denied treatment to an older person in need of it. Such an 
ageist argument might appeal to the older person using the FIA thus; 
You have been lucky enough to have lived a fair innings of life. You ought to now 
deny yourself further treatment and allow a younger person to receive that treatment 
so that they too might reach a fair lifespan. 
Alternatively, the argument might use the CLV and PA and instead claim; 
As an old man you have now used up your complete life share of benefits (as it would 
have been distributed under ideal conditions by an optimally rational individual 
behind a partial veil of ignorance), and you therefore have no moral claim to any 
further healthcare. 
If it is true that the 'rest of one's life' is as precious to each person irrespective of their 
age, as Harris suggests, the ageist policy argument would not be endorsed by all or 
even most older citizens. Moreover, the ones that did endorse the view may in fact do 
so as a consequence of their having internalised negative cultural judgements 
regarding their own moral and social worth. 
455 Dan Brock, 'Justice, healthcare, and the elderly, ' Philosophy andPublic, 4ffairs 18 (1989): 297-312, 
p299. 
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The drawback that this commitment to the conventional view presents, however, is 
that we continue to be faced with a problem of how we are to go about rationing 
limited resources among unlimited demands, apart from the internalising policies 
noted above that require people to carry the costs of irresponsible behaviour ex ante. 
The DE and the anti-ageist ethic are unhelpful if we imagine that a choice must be 
made between two people as to which receives a heart and lung transplant that only 
one can have. We can imagine two persons, person A who is a healthy 75 year old 
that has always taken care with his health but who is unlucky enough to have a 
congenital heart weakness, and person B who is a 55 year old heavy smoker. The FIA 
would choose person B simply because he is the younger, but as we have seen, one of 
the criticisms levelled at this view is that it takes no account of the level of 
responsibility a person has shown for his health. The CLV and PA combined would 
also choose person B if it would seem likely, as Dworkin and Daniels claim, that few 
people would save money for organ transplants in their old age. 
However, DE would not be able to decide between them. The first desideraturn. for 
egalitarian principles that Anderson outlines requires that certain goods, among them 
medical care, must be guaranteed to citizens over the course of their entire lives. This 
means that we could not discriminate against the older patient in this context and that 
it would be wrong to simply choose not to give the transplant to person A. However, 
this does not mean we could choose person B either. The reason for that is that 
although the second desideratum. requires upholding the responsibility of individuals 
for their own lives, it also requires that this be done without passing demeaning and 
intrusive judgements on the level of responsibility they have displayed. This seems to 
rule out the possibility of refusing to treat the smoker on the grounds that he is 
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responsible for his own ill-health. Indeed, we have already seen that the costs of 
irresponsible behaviour like smoking are to be borne ex ante by those who engage in 
it, and that 'the obligation to provide healthcare is unconditional and cannot be 
rescinded. ' 
Thus, quite apart from the force of the anti-ageist ethic, DE itself would not be able to 
decide upon which person to treat. Nevertheless, the problem of how we are to ration 
a good is separate from the argument presented within this thesis, which is that 
distribution should not be rationed simply on the basis of age and that this ethical 
principle would be defended as part of DE. And in this much my argument would 
seem to be vindicated by the discussion above. However, rationing need not take a 
person's age into consideration, and one alternative way this might be achieved is 
through the use of a lottery. 
(ii) Income support 
The CLV is an essential feature of any egalitarian theory of diachronic distribution, 
and it has been my claim in this thesis that it would permit significant restrictions of 
benefits to the old in order to ensure lifetime equality between persons. It has been the 
concern of groups like Americans for Generational Equity (AGE) that the current old 
age group are not just enjoying greater benefits than all the previous old cohorts, or 
simply that they are benefiting at the expense of the current young and middle-aged, 
but that they are enjoying greater benefits at the expense of the next generation of the 
old who will be worse off. From the perspective of the CLV some restrictions on 
these benefits is morally required. In chapter 6 (section 3. iv) we noted that the PAYG 
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synchronic system of income support in old age has been blamed for this perceived 
intergenerational injustice. For those concerned with diachronic; equality the answer 
may lie in either one of two possible diachronic support systems, one that might be 
established on an age cohort basis, and another on an individual basis. 
However, the principle that we should equalise social relations is more likely to 
support the PAYG system rather than either diachronic system because the latter 
would justify agcist social policies. For example, if we take the diachronic cohort 
system we can imagine two age cohorts, one 20 years older than the other, and each 
accumulating separate stocks of assets in preparation for old age, and imagine further 
that cohort A has been unlucky enough to have lived through very low levels of 
economic growth which are then reversed as A reaches retirement. The members of 
that cohort may suffer destitution as a result of bad luck, but as far as the diachronic 
cohort system was concerned, even though the younger age group B might now be 
quite well off it would have no obligation to provide support to the older age group. 
The position at T4, however, would represent grossly unequal social relations 
between contemporaneous citizens, a situation that DE could not countenance. 
TI T2 T3 T4 
Age group A 10 10 10 5 
Age group B 10 10 so 
For social relations to be equal would require different age groups to share the 
benefits and burdens that result from either advantageous or disadvantageous 
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economic conditions within the lives of contemporaneous citizens. Rather than the 
Gapproximate equality' of benefit ratios that Daniels defends, DE would understand 
equity between age groups as a rough equality of welfare benefits, in the sense that 
they would be relative to the current income of workers. 456 Such an understanding 
would violate the CLV because the contributions and benefits that each individual 
enjoyed might differ widely, and this could be construed by distributive egalitarians 
as unfair. Nevertheless, in line with the argument proposed by Wolff, such unfairness 
would be justified within a broad egalitarian ethos in the pursuit of the social 
conditions that respect all citizens, and in which the social bases of self-respect are 
guaranteed. 
In addition to this anti-ageist proposition, however, DE also provides us with a way of 
challenging the current old age group if it is indeed true that its members are receiving 
too much as a consequence of their political power. Rather than claiming such a 
situation as wrong on the grounds that each person is not getting her fair and equal 
share of diachronic benefits, DE would view the situation as unjust on the purely 
synchronic grounds that relations between citizens were unequal. On these synchronic 
grounds age discrimination against the young would be as extrinsically morally wrong 
as any discrimination against the old. Thus, we can acknowledge the problem and 
rephrase it in a way that gives us a reason to seek to correct the imbalance without the 
need to appeal to the CLV or the FIA. 
"" This would of course mean higher contributions would be required from workers during periods 
when the retiree-worker ratio was unfavourable. 
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(iii) Voting rights 
This is obviously a problem closely linked to the intergenerational equity debate is the 
fact that the median age of the electorate is increasing in all industrialised societies, 
and because older voters tend to be more active there is a fear expressed by some that 
members of that age group may use their increasing electoral strength to further their 
own short-term self-interest at the expense of the young. As we have seen the 
proposed solutions to this perceived problem include disenfranchising the elderly. 
This, of course, would not be countenanced by the principle of ESR. DE is democratic 
not just in the sense that it requires people to have equal voting rights, it also requires 
people to be equal in a social sense that each person accepts the obligation to justify 
their actions in terms that are acceptable to others. This, in essence, is Cohen's 
principle of comprehensive justification outlined above. It would be difficult to phrase 
a proposition to older people that they should be deprived of the vote on the grounds 
that they are likely to misuse it. Such a proposition would effectively strip the elderly 
of citizenship (in a similar way as criminals), and consequently is unlikely to be 
endorsed. Moreover, the disenfranchisement of members of one age group would 
mean that a synchronic inequality of social relations existed between the young and 
old. The young would have a vote while the old would not and that would be a serious 
imbalance of power. 
However, if a demographic trend did increase the power of the old over the young in 
the way that has been suggested, then certain arrangements may be necessary to 
correct this. A reduction of the voting age to 16 or 14, and proxy votes for parents of 
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younger children would be compatible with DE because, if anything, they make the 
social relations between young and old more equal. 
(iv) Employment 
We noted in chapter one that, although ageism within the workplace is currently 
widespread, the government has recently made what has been called 'the business 
case for age diversity'; that ageism is bad for business. With the recent demographic 
trends that are bringing about a high ratio of retirees to workers there are good 
financial reasons for the government to be concerned that people stay in work until 
much later in their lives than past cohorts. Moreover, the same demographic trends 
mean there are now fewer younger workers available in the labour market to fill ever 
increasing vacancies, and this means that firms themselves have an incentive to hire 
and retain older workers even if that means retraining them when they are already in 
their fifties. This is of course a contingent argument against ageism in the workplace, 
and as I noted in chapter 1, utilitarian reasons of contingency and efficiency can argue 
either for or against ageism. 457 
However, DE seeks to provide an ethical reason for challenging ageism in the 
workplace, which it does by requiring social relations to be equal. It may be the case 
that cultural ageism is more prominent within employment than egalitarian 
arguments, and an advocacy strategy may be effective in challenging some of the 
negative cultural stereotypes that depict older workers as slower to learn, less flexible, 
and out of date. 
457 We found in chapter 5 that Daniels, a liberal egalitarian, also provides just such a contingency 
argument for older workers to remain in employment. 
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7.8 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion to this chapter I would argue that the DE principle that social relations 
between citizens should be as far as possible equal means that it is an inherently non- 
ageist egalitarian theory that would at the same time actively challenge cultural 
ageism. DE is non-ageist in the sense that it is a socially egalitarian theory that 
incorporates an inherent synchronic concern for the well-being of individuals. It can 
therefore incorporate the anti-ageist principle that the fundamental synchronic 
interests of older persons have a moral weight that is equal to that of younger persons. 
Nevertheless, DE is also committed to the diachronic value of personal responsibility 
that ensures the moral plausibility of many contemporary distributive egalitarian 
theories. DE therefore requires citizens to be personally responsible for the success of 
their own lives, and leaves room for the incentives necessary to encourage 
productivity but, unlike LE, it does not countenance the destitution of any of its 
citizens at any time in their lives. DE therefore gives expression to the two irreducible 
sets of interests that people have. 
Because DE seeks to actively challenge the cultural oppression that creates unequal 
social relations it would be entirely compatible with an advocacy strategy against 
negative cultural stereotypes. Moreover, just as Rawls argues that within his theory 
'the principles of justice are prior to considerations of efficiency', 458 so for DE the 
principle of ESR would constrain the degree to which considerations of efficiency 
might justify age discrimination. If democratic egalitarians require society to ensure 
that the social relations between citizens are equal then any demands for a more 
459 John Rawls, A Theory ofJusfice, Revised Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971,1999), 
p6O. 
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efficient use of public goods, such as healthcare, would be constrained by that 
principle. 
In line with this thinking we can say that DE would not condone any form of age 
discrimination that was either motivated by negative judgements concerning the moral 
or social worth of older people, or which permitted older individuals to fall into a 
situation in which either their relations with others involved subordination, or in 
which their fundamental synchronic interests were not respected. That is to say, 
circumstances in which their basic needs were not met, where they were constrained 
from acting and thinking autonomously, or where they could not be expected to enjoy 
adequate self-respect. The only situation in which discrimination against any age 
group would be condoned on these terms would be a situation in which that 
discrimination benefited the synchronic interests of all citizens, and this has been 
shown to result from the provision of flu vaccines to older people. For these reasons 
those who advocate non-ageist policies should be democratic egalitarians. 
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Conclusion to thesis. 
The aim of this thesis has been twofold. Firstly, the thesis has overcome the 
vagueness of the concept of 'ageism' that gives rise to the diametrically opposed 
views concerning whether or not it is just, and it has done this by examining exactly 
what this concept involves. The thesis has discussed two very different forms of 
ageism or wrongful age-discrimination: cultural ageism and egalitarian ageism. The 
former is intrinsically wrong because it is motivated by negative judgements 
concerning the moral and social worth of older people. The latter, on the other hand, 
does not involve moral bias, and so it is intrinsically benign, but is nevertheless 
extrinsically wrong to the extent that its consequences harm the synchronic interests 
of older individuals. 
The second aim of the thesis has been to develop an anti-ageist ethical principle 
capable of comprehensively challenging both forms of ageism and which is at the 
same time consistent with liberal egalitarian political theory. The thesis has integrated 
the anti-ageist principle, that the synchronic interests of all persons including the old 
are of equal moral value, with a democratic social egalitarianism that seeks to equalise 
the social relations between citizens. The thesis has then contrasted this social 
equality with mainstream egalitarian theories that are concerned primarily with 
economic distribution. In this way the thesis has connected the debate about the 
morality or otherwise of age discrimination with an ongoing debate within 
contemporary liberal philosophy. The discussion of these two forms of egalitarianism 
has shown that DE is inherently non-ageist, from which we can conclude that anti- 
ageists should at the same time be democratic egalitarians. 
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